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~BSTRACT 
[he thesis is concerned with the concept of mental effort and sustained perceptual-motor performance. 
t is proposed that mental effort represents a finite resource which is capable of modulating those 
:ognitive operations underlying perceptual-motor performance. In addition, it is hypothesised that 
nental effort investment is associated with a number of energetical costs. This finite quality of effort is 
lsed to justifY a self-regulatory mechanism designed to ensure that effort is deployed in a rational 
fashion. 
A model of mental effort regulation is proposed based on a process of self-appraisal. This process is 
informed via feedback from external sources (concerned with performance effectiveness) and internal 
symptoms (concerned with energetical state and personal discomfort). Both sources offeedback are 
amalgamated into a cognitive-energetic appraisal, which represents the basis for the formulation of 
effort policy, i.e. whether to increase, decrease or sustain current level of mental effort. 
This model is explored via four experimental studies of sustained perceptual-motor performance. An 
initial laboratory study investigates the influence of individual differences and sleep deprivation on 
effort regulation. This study revealed that low performance capacity is associated with an increase of 
mental effort investment. The fol1owing two studies are concerned with driving behaviour. An 
experiment contrasting the influence of sleep deprivation and alcohol on driving performance illustrates 
the influence of external and internal feedback on effort regulation. The fol1owing experiment 
investigates this issue in detail by exposing drivers to objective performance feedback during a 
sustained ~ourney'. A final laboratory study provides evidence that mental effort is a finite commodity 
and il1ustrates a number of alternative effort policies in action. 
These findings and their implications for the model of mental effort regulation are discussed. 
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L INTRODUCTION 
'.1 Definitions and hypotheses 
[his thesis is based on two related propositions: (a) that mental effort exerts an influence on 
)erformance quality and energetical state, and (b) the regulation of mental effort is determined via a 
iual assessment of external feedback (related to overt performance quality) and internal feedback 
:related to energetical state). The purpose of the thesis is to investigate the conceptual utility and 
~mpirical validity of both propositions within a model of mental effort regulation. 
fhis model is proposed and investigated within the context of sustained perceptual-motor performance. 
fhis task scenario has been selected to focus the scope of the current document onto those sustained 
activities in the laboratory and in the field which permit a degree of self-regulation. 
fhe concept of mental effort has growing significance for work psychology and ergonomics. In the 
course of the current century, from the industrial revolution onwards, Western working life has been 
characterised by a shift of emphasis from manual to mental activities. This trend is maintained and 
accelerated by contemporary developments in information technology. For instance, a pan-European 
survey reported by Paoli (1997) conducted from 1995 to 1997 indicated that "time pressure" in the 
workplace had increased from 35 to 42%. However, an upper limit on the efficiency and safety (and 
therefore, the benefits) of current and future technological systems is determined by the inherent 
limitations of the human information processing system. 
It is proposed that mental effort may exert a crucial influence on human performance capability, both in 
the sense of task demands and maximum working duration, i.e. how much information is too much 
information? How long can individuals sustain performance on a given task? In this respect, mental 
effort has a pivotal role if good human factors (with respect to both technology and working practices) 
is defined by a reciprocal process of performance optimisation between human and machine. 
It may be argued that mental effort is a pertinent and significant construct for the study of human 
performance. However the concept of mental effort does not enjoy a high profile in either ergonomics 
research or the annals of psychological literature. There are several possible reasons for this relative 
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neglect. In the first instance, the concept of effort has traditionally been associated with physical 
actiVIty. This confusion stems from early fatigue research where physical effort was defined in 
concrete terms using measures of muscular metabolism (Ryan, 1953). As we shall see, the 
quantification of mental effort is not so straightforward. The current thesis is not concerned with 
physical effort or physical work activity. Therefore, future usage of both terms "effort" and "mental 
effort" are intended to be synonymous. 
A second encumbrance originates from particular problems of definition associated with effort. The 
absence of consistent definition has rendered effort little more than a conceptual dumping ground for a 
variety of vague, motivational variables over the years. It is argued that such difficulties owe much to a 
problem of semantic transition, when words are extrapolated from colloquial usage into the realm of 
theory. Specifically, the word 'effort' has semantic ties to a number of everyday verbs, e.g. to 
scrutinise, to focus, to concentrate - each of which contribute to a colloquial definition. This 
observation is not intended as criticism in itself - linkage between a scientific term and a colloquial 
term does not imply that the former is necessarily flawed by association with the latter. However, there 
is a requirement to make a clear distinction between scientific and colloquial definitions of the term. A 
number of "common-sense" assumptions are inherent in colloquial usage, rooted in shared 
understanding, which should not infiltrate scientific definition in the absence of an explicit theoretical 
or empirical justification. 
This impact of colloquial "noise" in scientific writing may impede the development of shared definition 
and understanding within the research community. A more insidious influence concerns the generation 
of post-hoc hypotheses based on colloquial assumptions. It is argued that effort is particularly 
vulnerable in this respect. If we feel that we understand what it means experientially to "concentrate" 
or "intensify effort" - this may inhibit the development of scientific explanations to describe the same 
phenomenon. Alternatively, a researcher finding a significant and unanticipated improvement of 
performance may cite "increased effort" as a post-hoc explanation without the requirement for further 
explanation. All of which conspire to discourage detailed explanation and investigation. 
A third inhibitory factor concerns the location of mental effort within psychological traditions and sub-
disciplines. Hockey, Coles, & Gaillard (1986) illustrated that effort had an equidistant relationship 
with both "wet" biological and "dry" cognitive or computation traditions in psychology. In other 
words, mental effort is presumed to modulate attentional processing within the cognitive system. 
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However, the manifestation of mental effort was frequently registered as psychophysiological activity 
in the central nervous system, an area allied to biological tradition in psychology (Mulder & Van Der 
Meulen, 1973). The analysis produced by Hockey, Coles, & Gaillard (1986) stipulated the existence of 
a schism between both traditions and formulated the concept of "energetics" to bridge the gap. 
Therefore, the concept of mental effort may have been developed inconsistently due to the biological 
and computational bias of individual researchers. It is only recently that a unified, cognitive-
energetical view of mental effort has been proposed (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997). 
Despite these obstacles, mental effort has endured as a psychological concept. It has been proposed 
that the existence of an effort concept is based upon three central hypotheses (pashler, 1998): 
• The investment of mental effort will generally result in an improvement of task performance. 
• The investment of mental effort is associated with certain psychological "costs." 
• The regulation of mental effort is under volitional control. 
Therefore, mental effort does not exist as a unitary construct, but rather as a connected group of related 
hypotheses that are rarely investigated simultaneously. The following paragraphs wiJI expand and 
analyse each hypothesis in detail. 
The first hypothesis states that mental effort will improve the Quality of performance. There are several 
aspects to this assertion. In the first instance, it is assumed that an investment of mental effort is 
associated with an intensification of psychological activity, which brings about an increase of 
performance quality. In other words, the cognitive system may work at a higher rate or to a higher 
level of precision when mental effort is increased. Wickens (1986b) proposed a gain function in order 
, 
to describe this intensification of cognitive activity. Within his analysis, a vector equation was used to 
describe a performance output (X) resulting from a series of information processing operations (A, 8, 
C): 
x = lA, B, C], 
In Wickens' analysis, each of the three information processing operations (A, 8, C) were associated 
with a gain function. Therefore, the vector equation was altered as follows: 
x = IGa, Gb, Ge] * lA, B, C] 
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Wickens (1986b) proposed that gain could exert an influence on information processing in two ways. 
In the first instance, a cognitive process was modulated with respect to the signal-to-noise ratio. This 
type of modulation may influence the sensitivity and hence the evaluative quality of a given cognitive 
component, e.g. to isolate a target from noise during visual search. Secondly, gain could affect those 
qualitative aspects of information processing such as an alteration in terms of response bias, e.g. to 
recognise red shapes rather than blue shapes in a visual array. Both forms of modulation represent 
possible mechanisms by which mental effort could influence the quality of performance. 
Regardless of the specific mechanism mediating effort and performance, an individual will always 
invest mental effort with the express purpose of performance improvement or protection. This 
distinction was characterised by Mulder (1986) as effort investment in the service of task demands (i.e. 
task effort) versus effort investment to buttress performance in the presence of physical and 
environmental stressors such as drugs, sleep deprivation, noise, high temperature etc. In the case of the 
former, mental effort is invested as a response to a perceived increase of task demand, e.g. complexity, 
pacing etc. The investment of state effort is primarily concerned with performance reinforcement 
under conditions of duress. Mulder (1986) suggested that both exist as distinct modes of mental effort 
investment. The current thesis argues that task- and state-related effort represent different instances of 
the same underlying mechanism (this statement will be expanded at a later point). 
One problem associated with the first hypothesis is an obvious disregard for the possibility that 
increased mental effort may not always achieve a desired improvement of performance. This scenario 
will certainly arise if an individual has insufficient expertise or inadequate sensory capabilities. In 
addition, the investment of mental effort may not improve performance of elementary task activities. 
For example, consider how the investment of mental effort may affect the performance of a simple 
mathematical task, e.g. 2 + 2. In certain instances, the quality of performance may be insensitive to 
varying levels of mental effort investment. This possibility was articulated by Norman & Bobrow 
(1975) as data-limited performance. 
Eysenck (1982) and Schonpflug (1985) postulated a complimentary argument - that the quality of 
performance could be expressed in terms of efficiency. This conceptualisation represented a ratio 
relationship between cognitive intensity or effort and overt performance. Within this framework 
(extended in Eysenck & Calvo (1992)), performance matrices are characterised as overt manifestations 
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)f internal cognitive operations. If a high standard of performance is possible with minimum effort 
nvestment, this represents the highest level of efficiency. In other cases, performance effectiveness 
nay only be achieved "at cost," i.e. via a corresponding investment of mental effort. A matrix 
·epresenting the relationship between mental effort and performance effectiveness is shown below in 
Figure 1. The descending arrow from left to right is used to represent declining efficiency as high 
performance is attained at higher levels of "cost" in terms of mental effort. The arrow descending from 
right to left illustrates how effectiveness may only be achieved with a corresponding investment of 
mental effort. 
HIGH 
w 
\,) 
Z 
~ 
~ 
a. MED 0 
IL 
a. 
W 
D.. 
LOW 
LOW MED 
MENTAL EFFORT 
HIGH 
Figure 1. The relationship between performance effectiveness and mental effort based on the 
analysis of Eysenck & Calvo (1992). 
The relationship shown in Figure 1 exemplifies the second hypothesis concerning the costs associated 
with mental effort investment. These economical metaphors of "costs" and "expenditure" represent a 
legacy from the model of mental effort described by Kahneman (1973) and other resource theorists 
(Navon & Gopher, 1979). For Kahneman and others, mental effort was assumed to exist as a finite 
commodity, present in "reserve" and capable of being in "debt" if overextended (similar to the oxygen 
debt that characterises muscular exertion). 
The costs associated with mental effort are due to the finite nature of effort reserves and may manifest 
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themselves in a number of ways. This topic has been addressed in a series of papers by Hockey 
(Hockey, 1986b; Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997). His argument is that mental effort regulation is highly 
sensitive to a number of latent decrements, such as selective task failure, increased sympathetic 
nervous system activity and fatigue after-effects. These latent decrements represent various costs 
associated with mental effort investment, which may be apparent before any degradation of task 
performance. It should be noted that costs might express themselves via an impact on overt 
behaviour/strategy or in terms of psychophysiological changes. In addition, rising intensity/frequency 
oflatent decrement may function on the basis of a positive feedback loop, i.e. actively degrading the 
quality of performance, demanding further effort investment and subsequently acerbating the frequency 
and magnitude of future latent decrements. 
Schonpflug (1 986a) characterised the relationship between mental effort and performance quality in 
terms of "Behaviour Economics." Within his framework, the costs of exertion due to mental effort 
investment included: (a) reduced physical and mental health, (b) exhaustion ofintemal biological 
energy, and (c) exhaustion of external resources such as social assistance and technical aids. 
According to his view, mental effort must be regulated in accordance with three broad strategies: (1) to 
save effort whenever possible, (2) to calculate the utility of effort deployment (in terms of expected 
outcomes and consequences), and (3) to rationalise the distribution of mental effort over time-on-task. 
The issue of utility is key to an understanding of "Behaviour Economics" and the analysis of effort 
shown in Figure 1. 
A connection between mental effort and voluntary control (i.e. the third hypothesis) was described by 
Binswanger (1991). According to his Objectivist perspective, the purpose of mental effort was to fuel a 
"conceptual faculty" thus enabling "mental focus." The development of "focus" implied: logical 
introspection, the identification of vagueness, a counteraction of emotional bias (an awareness of 
thinking rather than feeling), a distinction between rationality and rationalisation, and a consideration 
of a wide range of evidence (i.e. "a mind in full focus places no consideration above the truth" 
(Binswanger, 1991), p. 164). In a manner similar to those economic notions in the previous paragraph, 
this perspective places great emphasis on rationality. For instance, if an individual desires a particular 
outcome or goal, he or she employs the conceptual faculty in order to formulate a plan that is both 
effective and efficient. 
The underlying notion of this hypothesis is the volitional regulation of mental effort. In other words, 
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an individual may decide whether to invest effort into a task. This subject of volition was heavily 
mooted by late 19th century psychologists and has been prominent by its absence from contemporary 
research (Baars, 1993; Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970). Despite this low profile, Baars (1992) proposed 
that the ideomotor theory of voluntary control devised by James (1890) represented a strong foundation 
for contemporary research. In his original work, James (1890) emphasised the formulation of 
psychological goals to enable voluntary control. For instance, James (1890) employed the example of 
man awakening in the morning and attempting to leave a warm bed in a cold room. The process of 
voluntarily leaving the bed was achieved by overwhelming one "image" or goal (the anticipated cold 
and discomfort of getting out of bed) with another goal (the obligation to get up and engage in 
purposive activity). It is presumed that effort investment plays a role in the resolution of antagonistic 
goals. 
These three hypotheses have developed in relative isolation from one another with different emphases 
on behaviour. The devolution of effort hypotheses may be blamed on the absence of a coherent and 
enduring theoretical framework. The current document is concerned with mental effort regulation and 
sustained performance. An attempt to unite aH three hypotheses within a single framework of sustained 
task performance is presented in the foHowing section. 
1.2 Cost and the effort economy 
The effort economy is a phrase to describe the expenditure of mental effort across time-on-task. This 
analogy is based on an economic system of supply and demand (Kahneman, 1973; Navon & Gopher, 
1979; Schonpflug, 1986a). This conceptualisation rests on an assumption that mental effort exists as a 
finite commodity that may be present in "reserve." A refreshed individual begins a task with a full 
"tank of fuel" or reserve, which is expended at a given rate over the task period. A difficult, 
demanding task will necessitate a higher rate of effort expenditure to guarantee adequate performance 
relative to an easier task. Therefore, effort expenditure occupies a two-dimensional space between the 
requisite level necessary to achieve adequate performance and the maximum duration of task activity. 
When the finite reserve of effort is exhausted, adequate performance is no longer possible. Therefore, 
the rate of effort expenditure and the level of effort reserves before task activity will determine the 
maximum duration of adequate performance. The relationship between demands (requisite expenditure 
per unit time) and supply (level of reserves minus cumulative expenditure) provides a simplistic basis 
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for the effort economy. A similar argument has been forwarded by Davies & Parasuraman (1982) to 
explain the performance decrement characteristic of vigilance activities (i.e. a sustained, perceptual 
vigil). 
The level of task demand determines the level of expenditure necessary to sustain adequate 
performance, however, it is not the only factor capable of influencing requisite expenditure. If the 
individual must perform in the presence of internal stressors (e.g. sleeplessness, drugs) or external 
stressors (e.g. noise, extreme heat), these energetical factors will inflate task demands and the requisite 
level of effort expenditure. This is an important point as certain energetical factors such as 
sleeplessness and fatigue may depress the level of effort reserves available to an individual prior to task 
activity. Therefore, energetical stressors may be capable of influencing both expenditure and level of 
reserves available for task performance. 
The simplest version of the effort economy is analogous to a fuel-tank metaphor and is illustrated in 
Figure 2. In both examples, effort investment is determined by three variables: (a) the amount of effort 
held in reserve, (b) the level of effort expenditure necessary for adequate task performance, and (c) the 
cumulative decline of effort reserves across time-on-task. In Figure 2a, the requisite level of effort 
expenditure is modest relative to available reserves. This individual begins the task with 100 effort 
units in reserve and has only expended half of those reserves at tl0. 
When task demand is increased as shown in Figure 2b, a different pattern is apparent. This individual 
must expend effort at 11 units per period and may only sustain a requisite level of effort investment 
until t8. After this point, the individual is unable to expend sufficient effort to guarantee adequate 
performance and effort reserves are exhausted by the end of the task. 
The scenario illustrated in Figure 2b raises the question - what happens to the performance of those 
individuals who have exhausted their available effort reserves? Several options are possible. The 
individual may choose to withdraw from task activity or reach a point of complete physical exhaustion 
(Hancock & Warm, 1989). Alternatively, an individual may continue to perform at a lower level of 
effort expenditure or even in the absence of effort expenditure (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997). In this 
case, two possibilities may emerge: (a) the individual maintains performance albeit at much reduced 
level or (b) performance collapses to a catastrophic degree. 
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Figure 2. A hypothetical effort economy for sustained investment during (a) a low effort task and 
(b) a bigher effort task. 
Given a Hobson's choice of physical collapse, task withdrawal or significantly reduced performance, a 
state of negative equity within the effort economy is something to be avoided by the human operator. 
This argument reinforces the desirability of a sensitive and rational mechanism for mental effort 
regulation, in order to avoid this scenario. 
A more 'intelligent' version of the effort economy would permit a proactive type of regulation, wherein 
effort may be withheld as well as invested in order to avoid a complete exhaustion of reserves. There 
are two important innovations at the basis of a more advanced model of the effort economy. The first 
concerns the role of energetical costs associated with continued task performance and effort 
investment It has been hypothesised that sustained effort investment is associated with costs such as 
task stress and fatigue (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997). On this basis, it is postulated that stress, fatigue 
and related energetical costs may manifest themselves when remaining effort reserves are low. These 
costs may function as an early-warning signal of impending exhaustion. In addition as stated earlier, 
energetical costs may render the task more demanding and raise the requisite level of effort 
expenditure. This mixture of increased discomfort and accelerated costs represents a form of 
psychological inertia with respect to continued task performance. Furthermore, this inertia may be 
boosted if the magnitude of costs increase in line with impending exhaustion. If this were the case, the 
net result of energetical costs would be to produce a rising disinclination to continue task activity 
(Bartley & Chute, 1947). 
The presence of costs may create a chain reaction within the effort economy to reduce the level of 
expenditure. First, the individual makes a voluntary choice to settle for a lower quality of task 
performance. This tactic may involve tolerating a higher number of errors or working at a slower 
pace. The aim of this strategy is to reduce the level of effort expenditure as a means of postponing the 
exhaustion of remaining effort reserves and ameliorating any discomfort introduced by energetical 
costs, i.e. effort conservation (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997). 
A hypothetical example of this mechanism is presented in Figure 3. This model plots the falling level 
of effort reserves by requisite and actual levels of effort expenditure, i.e. requisite for acceptable level 
of performance. The influence of energetical costs on effort expenditure is apparent between time-
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of errors from the primary task may represent the gap (if any) between requisite and actual levels of 
effort expenditure. These indirect expressions of the effort economy must be monitored and evaluated 
by a regulatory mechanism. 
1.3 The Regulation o/Mental Effort 
The effort economy is fundamental to the proposed link between volition and cost underlying the 
regulation of mental effort. This dynamic between the need to performance and the desire to rest rests 
on the finite characteristic of mental effort, which may not be invested indefinitely with respect to time-
on-task. This framework is intended to unite elements of James' ideomotor model (i.e. goal conflict) 
and those economic models of human information processing (Kahneman, 1973; Navon & Gopher, 
1979). 
The finite nature of mental effort may be translated into a requirement for a psychological form of 
'book-keeping,' wherein investments are registered and evaluated, and debt must be avoided. When an 
individual faces a potential source of mental effort input, a decision must be made (consciously or 
otherwise) to invest or to conserve mental effort (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997). Given that effort was 
assumed to be finite, it is important that this decision is made on a rational basis, taking account of the 
desires and the capability of the individual. This decision is termed the formulation of effort policy. 
The formulation of effort policy is based on feedback with respect to both the quality of ongoing 
performance and energetical costs. This formulation is determined by external feedback from task 
performance, i.e. how well am I performing? Similarly, energetical costs may express themselves via 
internal feedback concerning wellbeing and personal discomfort, i.e. how am I feeling? 
It is hypothesised that both performance and discomfort feedback are associated with standards based 
on past experience. When individuals formulate an effort policy, they have certain expectations 
concerning the level of performance quality and magnitude of energetical costs associated with a given 
level of performance. Ifthese expectations are fulfilled, then performance is achieved "at cost." If 
performance is achieved at a lower psychological cost than expected, this may be termed efficient 
performance (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Schonpflug, 1985). On the other hand, if performance evoked a 
higher level of psychological cost than expected, the individual may perceive performance to be 
inefficient. 
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The concept of behavioural efficiency is crucial to the type of 'book-keeping' that underlies mental 
effort regulation. Efficiency represents a unification of external and internal sources of feedback into a 
cognitive-energetical assessment. The assessment of efficiency is the basis of the effort policy. We 
may choose to invest or to conserve effort in response to inefficiency. It is hypothesised that these 
effort strategies may be enforced to different quantitative degrees, e.g. high investment, low investment 
etc. 
The three hypotheses of mental effort may be amalgamated into a model of effort regulation, it is 
assumed: (a) that mental effort influences the quality of performance, and (b) this capacity for 
modulation is finite and effort is not available in an infinite quantity. In addition, sustained investment 
of mental effort may be associated with a number of "costs" which may impact on performance quality 
and energetical status. Therefore, (c) a model of effort regulation is proposed wherein the influence of 
effort deployment on both performance quality and energetical status is monitored and assessed. This 
process of monitoring and regulation drives the formulation of effort policy (i.e. a decision whether or 
not to invest mental effort), which in turn, underlies the volitional nature of effort investment. 
The regulation of mental effort is assumed to be a fluid and highly adaptive process. Successful 
regulation is based on inconstant directives, some of which may even be mutually exclusive, i.e. goal 
(a) to sustain performance and goal (b) to minimise symptoms of task stress. In addition, as effort is 
finite in nature, the range of effort strategies available to the individual may be limited in scope on 
certain occasions. 
The model of mental effort regulation adopted by the thesis is simplistic. Feedback is received from 
dual sources of external and internal feedback. External feedback is concerned with overt performance 
and the perception of performance efficacy. Internal feedback is perceived along a energetical 
dimension, concerning the appraisal of Central Nervous System (CNS) functioning and physiological 
symptoms combined with the self-assessment of affective changes such as mood. The feedback from 
cognitive task performance and energetical state are combined to produce a cognitive-energetical 
assessment of behavioural efficiency. This assessment is the basis for the formulation of effort policy. 
A schematic representation of this model is shown below in Figure 4. This model will be extended and 
described in greater detail via a literature review in Chapter 2 
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Figure 4. Schematic representation of the mental effort regulation model. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This document constitutes a systematic extrapolation of the model of mental effort regulation described 
in the previous section. The purpose of the main literature review in Chapter 2 is twofold: (a) to 
describe theoretical perspectives on mental effort, and (b) to elaborate the model of mental effort 
regulation. With respect to the latter, those sources of external and internal feedback are described with 
reference to the literature. In addition, the assessment of cognitive-energetical efficiency and its 
influence on effort policy (i.e. the decision whether or not to invest mental effort) is also described in 
detail. 
A number of empirical hypotheses concerning the model of effort regulation are stated in Chapter 3 
which represents an introduction to the empirical work contained in the four following chapters. In 
addition, Chapter 3 is concerned with a brief review of methodological issues such as quantification of 
mental effort and testing environment. 
Each empirical chapter describes an experiment to study different facets of the proposed model of 
effort regulation. The initial study (Chapter 4) represents an investigation into individual differences 
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with respect to performance capability, a biological stressor (sleep deprivation) and mental effort 
regulation. The aim of this laboratory experiment is to study the hypotheses that: (a) good 
performance under strenuous conditions is the product of increased effort investment and (b) good 
performers are characterised by increased levels of effort investment and an awareness of external 
feedback. 
The following studies represent applied research into the area of driving performance and driver 
impairment. An important area for the second study in Chapter 4 was the differential level of feedback 
awareness, which may exist between individuals. This theme is pursued in the fourth study (Chapter 5) 
where subjects are exposed to a range of biological stressors (e.g. fulVpartial sleep deprivation, 
alcoholic intoxication) in combination with sustained task activity. This study will address how 
different categories of stressors exert an influence on effort regulation and the appraisal of 
internal/external feedback. 
It is assumed that effort may be poorly regulated due to the erroneous appraisal of externaVinternal 
feedback. This hypothesis represents the focus of the final study (Chapter 6) where subjects are 
provided with objective performance feedback during a simulated driving task. It is anticipated that the 
presence of objective feedback may directly influence effort regulation by highlighting external cues. 
The final study (Chapter 7) will how effort policy and effort regulation is shaped by the joint influence 
of task demand and time-on-task. It is assumed that increased task demand will emphasise external 
factors and promote effort investment. On the other hand, increasing time-on-task will accelerate the 
rise of energetical costs and lead to effort reduction or conservation. 
The results of all empirical data and their implications for the model of mental effort regulation are 
described in Chapter 8. A description of future research and the limitations of the thesis research are 
also included in this final chapter. 
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2 MENTAL EFFORT, PERCEPTUAL-MOTOR PERFORMANCE AND 
EFFORT REGULATION 
2.1 Concepts of mental effort 
The investment of effort represents a direct interface between energetical modification and ongoing 
cognition activity. This connection may be described in terms of a gain function (Wickens, I 986b ) 
(Section 1.1). This modulatory link between mental effort and cognition is entirely descriptive, based 
on a simplistic metaphor where the rate or quality of cognitive activity is controlled by the level of 
effort investment, in the same way as the rate of cooking is controlled by the temperature of the oven. 
This metaphor may be highly intuitive but it is an inadequate heuristic to drive detailed analysis. 
Mental effort is a difficult concept to define because it occupies a unique niche between biological and 
computational traditions in psychology. Effort is biological in the sense that it is influenced by 
energetical variables such as sleeplessness, drugs and stressors. On the other hand, if effort is capable 
of influencing cognitive activity, it must also be amenable to a computational conceptualisation. This 
gap was one of the subjects discussed in a paper by Hockey, Coles, & Gaillard (1986) written to 
highlight the discontinuity between 'wet' biological and 'dry' computational traditions in psychology 
and to unite both approaches within the hybrid discipline of energetics. These authors produced a wet-
dry continuum of energetical constructs to illustrate a transition from the biological tradition to 
contemporary models of cognition. The original analysis of candidate mechanisms produced by 
Hockey, Coles, & Gaillard (1986) has been slightly adapted and appended in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1. Energetical concepts and their major influences in psychological theory. eNS = central 
nervous system, IPS = information processing system. Adapted from Hockey, Coles, & Gaillard, 
(1986). 
Mechanism Theorists Principle Locus of Action 
fuel Thomdike eNS 
arousal Malmo, Duffy eNS 
resources Kahneman, Navon & eNS, lPS 
Gopher, Wickens 
Automatic/controlled Shiffrin & Schneider lPS 
processmg 
The following sections will describe each of the candidate mechanisms shown in Table 1 in more 
detail. In addition, each is considered as a candidate mechanism to represent the cognitive-energetical 
interface between performance and effort. 
The first mechanism is described in terms of a fuel metaphor, where the brain functions as the engine 
for cognitive activity and mental effort is the fuel necessary for cognition. This is a simplistic analogy, 
which originated from early work on mental fatigue (Thomdike, 1900), but the metaphor is not without 
a certain logic. For example, it is known that the brain consumes 15% of cardiac output and accounts 
for between 20 and 30% of resting metabolic rate (Anderson, 1981). Despite these ample demands and 
in contrast to other organs, the brain has no local storage form for nutrients. Glucose cannot be stored 
to initiate energy release and therefore approximately 60% of body glucose from the liver goes directly 
to the brain (Van Toiler, 1983). Therefore, the brain is totally dependent on a continuous supply of 
oxygen and glucose from the blood. This dependency is underlined by the fact that coma ensues if the 
brain is deprived of blood for as little as 10 seconds (Anderson, 1981). 
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At the cerebral site, it is estimated that 60"10 of energy is dedicated to synaptic activity (Madsen, 1993). 
A primary source of energy expenditure is the active pumping of ions in and out of the axon against the 
electrochemical gradient, following the transmission of an action potential (i.e. a nerve impulse). This 
process is necessary to re-establish the membrane potential and to optimise synaptic conditions for 
future transmission of action potentials (Madsen, 1993). 
In basic terms, it is logical to assume the brain acts as both the engine and the site of action for 
cognitive activity. A fuel mechanism implies that increased procedural effort may be manifested as 
accelerated cerebral metabolism, increasing synaptic efficiency and thereby increasing the rate or 
quality of cognitive operations. In fact, several theorists have postulated that the influence of fatigue 
on performance may be interpreted in terms of cerebral metabolism, i.e. the energy is not available to 
completely pump ions from the synapses, therefore sub-optimal signal-to-noise ratios are produced at 
the synaptic gap (Crawford, 1961; Tsaneva & Markov, 1971). There is some empirical evidence to 
support this hypothesis (Mayleben, et al., 1998). However, the assumptions that: (a) all cognitive 
activity has a physiological analogue in the brain, and (b) the intensity of cognitive activity has a linear 
relationship with the processes of cerebral metabolism, represent a considerable conceptual leap 
beyond these fundamental connections (Beatty, 1986). 
The concept of arousal has been used to describe a continuum of central nervous system (CNS) 
activity, ranging from deep sleep to high excitement (DuffY, 1962; Malmo, 1959). It has been 
proposed that both high and low extremes of arousal have a detrimental influence on human 
performance and this relationship is encapsulated in the Yerkes-Dodson Law (Yerkes & Dodson, 
1908). The relationship between arousal and mental effort is ambiguous. It has been assumed that the 
arousal and effort overlap in terms of their influence on performance. Therefore, either an increase of 
effort or arousal may be sufficient to increase the intensity of behaviour (Kahneman, 1973). On the 
other hand, Sanders (1983) proposed that effort functioned as a modulator of arousal. In a recent paper, 
Hockey (1997) hypothesised that increased sympathetic nervous activity (i. e. increased arousal) may be 
a side effect associated with mental effort investment. 
An arousal mechanism is based on the notion that mental effort influences performance by galvanising 
sympathetic nervous activity. This position is logical and is connected with the fuel mechanism 
described earlier. For example, increased sympathetic activity includes the release of catecholamines 
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(in the form of adrenaline and noradrenaline) from the adrenal cortex and the adrenal medulla 
respectively. Adrenaline has the net effect of mobilising glucose as an energy source and increasing 
sympathetic nervous activity (Cox, Cox, & Thirlaway, 1983; Wesnes & Warbuton, 1983) and 
therefore, influencing the efficacy of cerebral metabolism. 
Despite this logic, the arousal mechanism is beset with various problems concerning theoretical 
development, operationalisation and interpretation. The analyses of (Mulder (1986) and Hockey 
(1997) both contain an explicit distinction between effort and arousal. For example, if we are 
extremely tired, effort may be invested to compensate for detrimental influence of sleepiness on 
performance. Ifwe are highly stressed, effort may be invested to aid concentration and to overcome 
anxiety. Both constructs have a negative correlation at extremes of arousal and a positive relationship 
within the medium range. On this basis, arousal is rejected as a potential mechanism for mental effort. 
The topic of arousal and its relationship to mental effort is too complex to warrant a full treatment in 
the current thesis. The interested reader is directed to the following literature for in-depth treatment of 
arousal theory (Hamilton, Hockey, & Rejman, 1975; Hancock, 1988; Kahneman, 1973; Teigen, 1994; 
Venables, 1984), measurement issues concerning the arousal concept (Broadbent, 1971; Hockey & 
Hamilton, 1983; Lacey, 1967; Thayer, 1989) and the relationship of arousal to mental effort and related 
psychological concepts (Davies, 1983; Kjellberg, 1977b; Parasuraman, 1983). 
The resource metaphor has been developed over twenty years to explore fundamental aspects of 
selective and sustained attention. Resource theory is based on a principle of scarcity, i.e. that our 
capabilities to perceive, analyse and respond are finite, both with respect to instantaneous task demands 
and sustained demands over time. If instantaneous or sustained demands exceed available resources, 
performance will decline as a direct result. The resource metaphor originated from concrete analogies 
to describe attentionallirnitations, including communication channels (Broadbent, 1958) and computer 
RAM (Moray, 1967). Later theorists such as Kahneman (1973) and Norman & Bobrow (1975) 
emphasised the singular, amorphous nature of processing resources. This concept had certain parallels 
with mental effort as both resources and effort were assumed to function as an undifferentiated, central 
source of cognitive modulation. In addition, Navon & Gopher (1979) introduced an explicit economic 
metaphor to describe performance trade-offs and utility assessments that may result from inadequate 
resource availability. 
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The investment of resources was closely linked to the investment of mental effort within several 
analyses, e.g. Kahneman (1973). According to Norman & Bobrow (1975), the relationship between 
resources (i.e. effort) and task performance could be classified into two archetypal forms. In the first 
instance, an improvement in performance may require a proportionate investment of resources or 
effort. This relationship describes a situation where the upper limit on performance is determined by 
resource limits. This pattern may characterise performance on a novel task, where increased resource 
investment promotes learning, and learning improves performance. In an alternative scenario, the 
investment of resources or effort may initially improve performance then reach an asymptote. At this 
point, further effort investment has no influence on performance. This scenario may occur if an 
operator attempted to read a degraded visual display, i.e. the upper level on performance is placed by 
sensory or psychophysical limits that were impossible to overcome. In this situation, the limits on 
performance and relationship between resources/effort and performance were termed data-limits. This 
scheme is illustrated in Figure 5 below. 
100% 
~ 
c: 
'" E 
.g 
Cl) 
Q. 
0% 
Resource-
limited Data-limited 
Resource investment 100% 
Figure 5. The relationship between performance and resource investment as described by 
Norman & Hobrow (1975). 
The fundamental claim underlying the resource/data-limited distinction was that mental effort 
investment would not always improve performance. For example, if we are asked to add 2+2 on 
repeated occasions or read a newspaper under conditions of low illumination, increased mental effort 
investment will have no impact on performance. 
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Later theoretical developments were dominated by multiple resource frameworks (Wickens, 1980; 
Wickens, 1984), which emphasised a diversity of modality-specific resources. These theories 
represented a shift away from generalised, amorphous, processing resource and mental effort, which 
was historically associated with the single resource model (Kahneman, 1973). The debate between 
multiple and general resource concepts has occupied a substantive portion of the literature over the last 
fifteen years with no obvious advantage to either camp. Wickens (I 991) reviewed the literature on 
resource theory and drew the following balanced conclusion: "To the extent that most variance in dual-
task decrements is accounted for by structural factors and their interaction with demand factors, 
multiple resources become a more important construct. To the extent that most variance is accounted 
for by the main effects of task demand, a general capacity concept becomes more important" (p. 32). 
In other words, the type of resource theory that gains acceptance may be determined by the generality 
or specificity of resource scarcity. 
This discussion of resource theory fails to shed any light on how mental effort may interface with 
cognitive operations. This may be due to the fact that hypotheses describing the modulatory influence 
of resource investment on performance are as imprecise as the gain function postulated by Wickens, 
(1986b) to describe effort. 
A final fundamental problem with the resource framework concerns the operationalisation of 
processing resources. It is often assumed that resource investment is represented by performance 
variables such as dual-task interference. This presents a problem to the thesis as mental effort is based 
on a consideration of both covert and overt aspects of performance via the concept of efficiency 
(Schonpflug, 1985). The identification of resources with performance was criticised as being highly 
circular by several researchers (Navon, 1984). This controversy may have prompted the usage of 
psychophysiological (PP) measures as an alternative index of resource investment, e.g. heart rate 
variability (Mulder & Van Der Meulen, 1973), pupil diameter (Beatty, 1982b), evoked cortical 
potentials (ERPs) (Donchin, 1984). 
This shifting operationalisation between cognitive conceptions and PP measurement landed the effort 
concept in the "no-man's land" between biological and cognitive traditions (Table 1). Ostensibly, 
resource models are proposed as cognitive theories with a particular emphasis on attention and dual-
task performance. However, empirical work has employed PP measurement and the resource notion is 
entangled with arousal theory, whilst mental effort is entwined with both. Therefore, it is concluded 
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that the resource concept may be identified with mental effort, but this association does not provide any 
additional insight or analysis into the mechanism of influence. The interested reader is referred to 
articles by Gopher & Donchin (1986) and Kramer & Spinks (1991) for in-depth treatment of the 
resource concept. 
Cognitive investigation into visual search and memory has yielded a distinction between automatic and 
controlled information processing (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). These 
authors performed a progranune of experiments using a multiple frame search procedure, where 
subjects searched for target items from an array of distracters. (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) and 
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) varied several aspects of paradigm in a series of experiments. The 
important manipulation for the purpose of the current discussion was the relationship between the 
memory-set items and the items which appeared as distracters. This relationship was systematically 
varied such that there was a consistent mapping (CM) between memory-set and distracters, i.e. no 
items which appeared as targets ever appeared as distracters, or a variable mapping (VM), i.e. distracter 
items occasionally appeared as targets and vice versa. This manipulation had a profound effect on the 
accuracy of performance. The CM condition produced high accuracy scores whereas performance on 
the VM task was much poorer. The former was identified with automatic processing whereas the latter 
was termed controlled processing. 
Several aspects of the automatic/controlled processing dichotomy are significant for procedural aspects 
of mental effort. Automatic processing is described as fast, error-free, capable of functioning in 
parallel and relatively effortless. On the other hand, controlled processing is slow, error-prone, capable 
only of serial processing and is relatively effortful (Fisk, Ackerman, & Schneider, 1987). The 
implications for mental effort are twofold: (a) effortful processing is evoked when the features of 
target stimuli must be explicitly checked under VM conditions, and (b) the process of memory retrieval 
may raise the mental effort associated with the VM condition as targets must be updated, encoded and 
retrieved on a regular basis. 
This section has travelled along a wet-dry continuum from biological concepts to cognitive 
mechanisms (Table 1). On the basis of this consideration, it may be concluded that the biological 
traditions tends towards imprecise definition and operationalisation, whereas the cognitive perspective 
fails to explain the influence of energetical variables such as fatigue and stress on performance 
(Hockey, Coles, & Gaillard, 1986). In addition, the wet-dry continuum begs a question as to whether 
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we are considering alternative mechanisms for effort modulations or merely different levels of the same 
mechanism? 
The fuel metaphor was based on cerebral metabolism and it is logical that cerebral metabolism may 
constitute a biological substrate for controlled processing'. If an individual is forced to increase his or 
her levels of controlled processing, it may be assumed that fuel consumption will increase at the 
synapses. If a higher level of effort is sustained, sympathetic activity may increase in the eNS, which 
may boost psychological arousal. The purpose of this activity may be increase fuel supply to the brain 
via the hormonal mechanisms described earlier. However, the increased rate of fuel expenditure 
combined with sympathetic dominance may be associated with certain costs (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 
1997; Schonpflug, 1983). These costs may include heightened tension due to increased sympathetic 
dominance. 
This section has described how various concepts related to mental effort may be reconciled in order to 
influence performance. It was argued that effort may manifest itself as an increase of controlled 
processing, buttressing performance by increasing the frequency of attentional checking to task activity 
and therefore, aiding concentration on task performance. However, increased controlled processing 
demands higher levels of cerebral metabolism, which in turn accelerate energetical costs such as stress 
and fatigue across time-on-task. This link between controlled processing and energetical variables 
represents a manifestation of the antagonistic dynamic between the need to perform and the desire to 
withdraw (Section 1.2). This dynamic underlies the requirement for mental effort regulation discussed 
in the following section. 
2.2 Mental Effort Regulation and the Formulation of Effort Policy 
This section is concerned with a focused literature review to describe a model of mental effort 
regulation. This review will begin by describing and reviewing the theoretical lineage represented by 
homunculus theories of hierarchical control. According to the proposed model, the regulation of 
mental effort is driven by task-related and energetical feedback. 
, Although it is only fair to add that cerebral metabolism may constitute a biological substrate for any type of cognitive 
activity. 
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t.2.1 The Homunculus 
[he conceptualisation of mental effort as a ubiquitous central capacity (Kahneman, 1973) brought the 
:oncept into alignment with hierarchical models of cognitive control. These models may be termed 
'homunculus" theories that posit the existence of an executive controller exerting widespread influence 
Dver psychological activity. This controller has been caricatured by critics as the GPLCCP (General 
Purpose Limited Capacity Central Processor) (A1lport, 1980) or the little man in the brain (Brown, 
1988). The homunculus models of executive control represent alternative mechanisms for mental effort 
regulation as both are associated with the exercise of ubiquitous control. 
The prototype for the homunculus was the Test-Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE) concept inspired by 
cybernetics and devised by (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). These authors postulated that 
behavioural control was regulated via iteration between Operate activities and Test procedures. An 
important feature of the TOTE unit was its inherent flexibility. TOTE units could operate in a linear 
chain, i.e. the exit stage of TOTE a may act as a cue to produce the initial Test on TOTE b, 
alternatively, the operate phase could expand hierarchically to incorporate subordinate TOTEs. The 
hierarchical linkage between various TOTE units produced a distinction between superordinate 'parent' 
TOTE units (i.e. controllers) and subordinate 'child' TOTEs (i.e. operators). 
The homunculus as an upper level controller made its formal debut in the area of experimental 
psychology. Broadbent (1963) discovered that arousing and de-arousing stressors did not interact in an 
additive fashion with respect to performance, i.e. barbiturates failed to ameliorate the influence of 
sleeplessness. This discrepancy was the central topic of his book "Decision And Stress" (Broadbent, 
1971) which introduced an initial formulation of a two-tier control structure. Within this model, a 
lower mechanism sustained well-established decision processes with the intermittent assistance of an 
upper mechanism. The purpose of the latter was to monitor the performance of the lower mechanism, 
and to buttress performance under both extremes of the arousal continuum. Therefore, a non-additive 
interaction between stressors could be explained as different stressors have a specific impact on either 
the upper or the lower mechanism. The two-tier model proposed by Broadbent (1971) is illustrated in 
Figure 6 below. This concept was refined some years later (Broadbent, 1977) without any explicit link 
to stress and performance. However, the main characteristic of regulation of routine activities by a 
superordinate controller was sustained. 
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UPPER MECHANISM 
which monitors and compensates for .. 
the sub optimal activity of the lower ... 
mechanism 
(influenced by AlcohollBaIbiturates) 
, r 
LOWER MECHANISM 
capable of well-established decision 
.. processes. ... 
INPUT (influenced by noise/sleeplessness) OUTPUT 
Figure 6. Two-tier model proposed by Broadbent (1971). 
The executive controller hypothesised by Broadbent was also included in the model of working 
memory devised by Baddeley & Hitch (1974). This model contained three components, two slave 
systems (phonological Loop and Visuo-Spatial Sketch), each of which were co-ordinated by a Central 
Executive. The purpose of the latter was to select, co-ordinate and plan the activities of the slave-
systems, but these executive functions were not described at any level of detail in the early versions of 
the model. 
The essential aspect of both models is the identification of mental effort with the activity of the upper 
mechanism or central executive. Behaviour at the lower level was characterised as relatively effortless 
whereas effortful control was the domain of the upper level controller. 
These ideas were supplemented by the notion of a unitary, "al1-purpose" executive control1er described 
by Kahneman (1970; 1973). In addition, Kahneman (1973) was the first to bring the notion of effort to 
prominence as the source of executive control. Kahneman's model included three important theoretical 
innovations: (a) the central executive was characterised as a unitary and finite source of 'fuel' that was 
synonymous with mental effort, (b) the amount of available effort was influenced by 
psychophysiological extremes of sleepiness and stress, and (c) distribution of this resource throughout 
the cognitive system was determined by an allocation policy. This conception produced a fluid 
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homunculus, which could be simultaneously characterised as a unitary energy source and a centralised 
point of energy distribution. In addition, Kahneman made an explicit assumption that the executive 
exerted an influence over lower level activities via the regulation of mental effort. 
This theme of higher-level control was continued in other theoretical domains such as action selection 
and control. For instance, in his description of the dominant action system, (Shallice, 1978) argued that 
action selection may be modulated by a higher-level system known as the Supervisory Attentional 
System (SAS). The function of the SAS was to provide an executive input into action planning and 
action selection (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shallice, 1982; Shallice, 1988). The link between mental 
effort and the activity of the SAS is inferred on the basis that those factors responsible for SAS 
intervention are also associated with increased effort, e.g. planning/decision-making, error-correction, 
novel sequences of actions, a degree of danger, and the overcoming of a strong habitual response 
(Shallice & Burgess, 1993). 
The hierarchical model of control developed by Hockey (1986a; 1993; 1997) represented an extension 
of the previous models described by Broadbent and Kahneman. The latest version of Hockey's model 
(Hockey, 1997) is shown in Figure 7. This model proposed that task goals are relayed to the action 
monitor via the supervisory controller. The activity of the lower loop concerns routine/effort-free 
performance as dictated by the goals relayed from the supervisory controller. If these goals cannot be 
maintained by the lower loop (Loop A), performance discrepancies are detected via the Effort monitor 
and relayed back to the Supervisory controller. The modulation of task performance via the upper 
control loop (Loop B) involves one of two strategies, either effort investment (to increase task 
performance levels) or effort conservation (to strategically reduce task goals to be sustainable with 
minimum mental effort). 
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Figure 7. The effort regulation model devised by Hockey (1997). Loop A represents routine 
activity whereas Loop B shows effortful, adaptive control. 
The model proposed by Hockey (1997) illustrates an interaction between top-down supervision and 
bottom-up discrepancy reduction. Hence, the regulation of mental effort results from the iteration 
between the Loop B and Loop A in Figure 7 - supplementing upper-level, top-down control with 
autonomous control subroutines from the lower level. A similar framework was described by Lord & 
Levy (1994) who also included diverse modes of control within their model of self-regulation. 
Specifically, Lord & Levy (1994) contrasted top-down control due to goal activation with bottom-up 
control via discrepancy reduction., i.e. control originating downwards from goals or travelling upwards 
due to the occurrence of errors. These authors postulated that both modes of control were necessary to 
"help maintain one's current cognitive frame as well as a specific, implemental mind-set" (p. 350). 
This iterative model of top-down and bottom-up control places equal emphasis on each and may be 
termed a behavioural heterarchy. 
Nevertheless, all homunculus theories largely subscribe to a hierarchical perspective of behavioural 
regulation. Within this framework, the regulation of mental effort is a top-down activity. Therefore, 
the upper level or executive is the source of goal development and responsible for an appraisal of costs 
and performance quality. The purpose of the hierarchical design is to delegate control in order to limit 
the involvement of the upper mechanismlsuperordinate controller. This strategy of control is justified 
on economic grounds, i.e. it is assumed that upper-level control via Loop B is inherently more effortful 
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than control within Loop A. 
Despite a long theoretical lineage, the homunculus remains a controversial theoretical entity. 
According to Allport (1980), postulation of an executive controller falls into a trap of infinite regress as 
it begs a question with respect to the ultimate level of control (i.e. what controls the controller?). In 
addition, it is difficult to operationalise these theories in a fashion that clearly differentiates upper and 
lower levels of control. For example, ifan upper mechanism expresses itself via the modulation of 
lower levels of activity, how may one level of behavioural control be distinguished from the other? 
-I 
Allport (1980; 1992) has argued that the heterogeneity of attentional mechanisms constitutes an 
argument against the existence ofa GPLCCP. Furthermore he claimed that the concept ofa GPLCCP 
was too imprecise and therefore "provides an inadequate heuristic for driving research" (Allport, 1980) 
(p. 143). An alternative and more moderate approach to the same problem was outlined by Baddeley, 
(1996). This author accepted the existence of the homunculus as a convenient piece of fiction, but 
recommended its retention, both as an organising principle and to represent the "problem" of central 
control. This strategy provides the homunculus with a stay of execution, but only to be dissected by 
further research until it may be declared obsolete. 
2.2.2 The purpose and limitations of mental effort regulation 
This section will revise and expand the model of mental effort regulation illustrated in Figure 4. It has 
been argued that mental effort is finite and therefore, must be allocated according to rationalist or 
economic principles. The purpose of a mechanism for mental effort regulation is: 
• To monitor cumulative levels of mental effort expenditure and reserves in order to predict surplus 
and deficit 
• To monitor feedback from external task sources to estimate requisite level of effort to sustain 
acceptable levels of task performance 
• To monitor feedback from internal energetical sources to estimate costs necessitated by continued 
effort expenditure 
• To formulate effort policy, whether to invest or conserve effort correspondent with two criteria: (a) 
avoid exhaustion of effort reserves, (b) maintain adequate performance, and (c) avoid unacceptable 
levels of task-related stress, fatigue or discomfort. 
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[he formulation of effort policy2 is determined via dual-feedback. However, feedback may only be 
nterpreted with the aid of 'standards' or criteria, which may be derived on the basis of experience. For 
~xample, an experienced operator may anticipate a performance quality of x and a psychophysiological 
status ofy. This interaction represents a crucial transaction between standards that are subjectively 
derived and events in the external world (Frese & Zapf, 1994). 
The introduction of subjective self-appraisal into this process brings a degree of potential bias and 
distortion. The individual can register feedback from either external or internal sources, but his or her 
appraisal offeedback may be neither completely representative nor entirely accurate. For instance, 
there is a wealth of evidence from the study of human error that the act of subjective appraisal is 
associated with inherent limitations, e.g. selectivity, overload, perceptual confusion, incorrect 
inferences etc. (Reason, 1990). 
This transactional aspect of appraisal was encompassed by the framework for the study of stress 
described by Lazarus & Folkman (1984). According to these authors, an individual may appraise 
external events in terms of their personal significance and capacity to react to them. On this basis, 
Lazarus & Folkman (1984) proposed that appraisal took a primary and a secondary form. The former 
corresponded to an evaluation of personal meaning and significance for individual wel\being. 
Therefore, the direction of primary appraisal may be prioritised based on personal relevance and/or 
potential threat to wellbeing. 
The secondary process of appraisal proposed by Lazarus & Folkman (1984) was concerned with 
available coping options to deal with potential sources of stress. This primary appraisal represents an 
assessment of external and internal feedback, whereas secondary appraisal concerns the formulation of 
a policy whether to invest or to conserve mental effort (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997). 
The key to appraisal within the current model of regulation is its essential subjectivity, i.e. an emphasis 
on personal significance, individual bias, attentional selectivity. This transactional perspective runs 
counter to the Objectivist model of volition proposed by Binswanger (1991) in Section 1.1, where 
effort regulation was based on a conceptual faculty operating in a glorious absence of selectivity, 
2 TIlls term is chosen to represent an affiliation with the concept of an effort allocation policy as described by Kahneman 
(1973). 
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rrationality or emotional bias. Within the current framework, the formulation effort policy is 
ietermined by a SUbjective appraisal of external/internal feedback, regardless of accuracy or 
:epresentativeness. 
2.2.3 Feedback from external and internal sources 
The background to this discussion is provided by two theoretical treatments of feedback control; 
homeostasis and cybernetics. The former was described by Cannon (i 932) who outlined a series of 
physiological mechanisms dedicated to the maintenance of a stable cellular environment. This generic 
process of feedback and adaptation was expanded by Wiener (1948) into the multidisciplinary field of 
cybernetics. In his first book on the topic, Wiener (1948) constructed a persuasive thesis positing a 
generic process of feedback and regulation that was apparent in mathematics, communication theory, 
engineering control and psychology, as well as biological activity. 
The negative feedback loop was the core element at the heart of both theories. An important distinction 
between the feedback loop concept as employed by Cannon and Wiener concerns the extent to which 
the perception of feedback may be regarded as either involuntary or voluntary. Cannon employed 
feedback to describe passive, involuntary regulation within the human nervous system, i.e. the 
regulation of the autonomic nervous system do not involve conscious control. On the other hand, 
Wiener applied the control loop metaphor in more catholic terms to emphasise its universality across 
disciplines, as a deterministic element within a mechanic device and a stochastic process within human 
decision-making. 
It is hypothesised that feedback for effort policy may also originate from external and internal sources. 
For example, we may decide whether to continue with a particular task based on our perceptions of task 
quality or success, which originates in feedback from the external world. In addition, we may wish to 
consider internal feedback of our level of wellbeing, e.g. do we feel tired, sick or bored. 
The significance of feedback for the mental effort regulation should not be underestimated. It is 
postulated that the perception of degraded performance or increased discomfort serve an essential 
requirement, i.e. providing cues with respect to the magnitude of desirable effort investment. In 
addition, if subjective discomfort is accelerated, these negative signals function as feedback that finite 
effort reserves are depleted or approaching exhaustion. Therefore, feedback from performance and the 
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self serves a double-function within the proposed model: (a) to supply cues regarding the effectiveness 
of effort policy, and (b) to indicate remaining effort reserves. It is postulated that both functions of 
feedback are combined to constitute an assessment of utility, which is used to determine future effort 
policy. The sources of both external and internal feedback are described and reviewed in the following 
sub-sections. 
2.2.4 Feedback from the external world 
Feedback from the perceptual (external) world is the basis upon which we assess performance and the 
quality of performance. On some occasions, feedback may be very explicit, e.g. proliferation of overt 
errors or catastrophic episodes of task failure. In other cases, feedback from the external world may be 
cross-referenced with an internal performance standard for the purposes of assessment (Frese & Zapf, 
1994), i.e. a comparison with a cognitive standard as hypothesised by Carver & Scheier (1981). The 
presence of internal, performance standards are crucial to the appraisal of feedback. These standards 
represent a range of expectations developed on the basis of past experience (Bandura, 1997). These 
standards are used to provide important contextual cues, to "benchmark" current performance and to 
classify output as normative, sub-normative or supra-normative. 
Those internal standards representative of 'normative' performance may be complex and 
multidimensional. For example, current performance may be referenced against an array of standards 
associated with: (a) the frequency of errors, (b) rate of task progress, and (c) perception of physical 
strain associated with response production. In addition, performance feedback may serve as a 
secondary source of feedback for the perception of task demand, i.e. increased error, sub-standard 
performance, slow progress or physical strain may be appraised as indicators of increased task 
demands. This latter aspect was investigated by Hancock (1989) who studied whether task-naive 
subjects could distinguish variations in task load based on repeated experiences of performance failure. 
An analysis of SUbjective workload measures indicated that subjects perceived increased workload 
(particularly due to frustration) when performance was unsuccessful. 
The occurrence of error represents a common mode of performance discrepancy and feedback to the 
individual. The presence of an error may be detected by the individual in one of three ways: (a) 
discovered via self-monitoring, (b) an overt signal from the environment, and (c) feedback from a 
second individual (Reason, 1990). 
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Several studies of error correction during sequential activity were performed by Rabbitt (1981) to 
describe some limitations of self-monitoring. For example, in an earlier study, Rabbitt, Cumming, & 
Vyas (1978) made a distinction between false identification errors (i.e. indicating that a target was 
present when it was not) and errors of omission (i.e. failing to respond to a target that was present). 
They found that omissions were more common than the false identifications. In addition, more 
omission errors were detected than errors associated with false identification. These findings illustrated 
that individuals may recover from errors associated with inappropriate response selection, whereas 
perceptual errors were more difficult to detect/correct. 
This work was supplemented by a study of skilled typists, who were asked to cease typing as soon as 
an error was detected Rabbitt (1978). The results of this study revealed that typists were capable of 
detection within one or two keystrokes of error commission (approximately 182 msec - see Logan, 
(1985) for discussion and extensions to this area of research). Therefore, error detection may be 
associated with differing levels of demand, but once detected, individuals are capable of a rapid 
response. 
The limitations of self-monitoring are apparent within the GEMS (Reason, 1987) where action slips 
may occur (i.e. inappropriate actions-not-as-planned) if attentional checks are not performed at the 
appropriate times. This aspect of error production has been analysed by Norman (1981) and Baars, 
(1988) with respect to action control. According to the latter, action slips are indicative of an 
intermittent mode of self-monitoring, where routine aspects of action control and performance are 
handled unconsciously and "non-routine choice-points" (Baars, 1993) (p. 281) are subject to attentional 
checking. Therefore, the individual may only monitor performance for discrete periods within a 
stream of response output. 
The process of performance monitoring is complicated during problem-solving activities at the 
strategic level such as plan generatiOn/selection. Allwood (1984) studied error detection during 
statistical problem solving using verbal protocol analyses. This investigation suggested three 
prototypical episodes of error detection: (a) standard checks initiated as a general check on progress, 
(b) error suspicion when the subject was aware of a discrepancy or suspected the presence of a 
discrepancy without identifying the source of the error, and (c) direct error hypotheses formation when 
the subject made an abrupt detection of a presumed discrepancy. These episodes of discrepancy 
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detection were triggered by a range of variables, including a departure from subjective expectations. 
The main difference between the three detection episodes being that standard checks are self-initiated 
progress checks, whereas (b) and ( c) are provoked via feedback from environmental cues. It has been 
suggested by Brichcin (1982) that a strategy of self-initiated checking during performance assessment 
may produce an active (i.e. effortful) mode of performance regulation, which may increase the fidelity 
of goal-feedback comparison. 
A complimentary relationship between internal standards and overt feedback has been demonstrated 
throughout studies of error detection. In addition, self-monitoring of perfonnance quality is an 
important source of information for the assessment of task difficulty or subjective mental workload. In 
this case, individuals employ performance feedback as a barometer of task demand and as a means of 
anticipating changes in task demand. Moray (1982) suggested that subjective perception of 
workload/task demands could be related to the rising probability of failure in the near future. This 
statement found some support from the study conducted by Hancock (1989) described earlier. 
Other researchers have developed more quantitative conceptualisations of subjective workload. For 
example, Tulga & Sheridan (1980) presented a model where subjective workload was estimated based 
on task number, task pacing, task deadlines and human productivity. The temporal character of this 
model is echoed in recent research conducted by Hendy, Liao, & Milgram (1997) and the validated 
model proposed by Hancock & Caird (1993), where subjective workload is represented by two 
dimensions: perceived time for effective action and perceived distance from desirable goal. In all 
cases, the perceptions of the individual and the experience of subjective workload are translated into 
potential consequences for task performance (and therefore, the formulation of future effort policy). 
The importance of the subjective workload concept as a source of regulatory feedback has been 
somewhat undermined by the inconsistent relationship between subjective and performance-based 
measures of mental workload (Derrick, 1988; Gopher & Braune, 1984; Yeh & Wickens, 1988). On the 
other hand, there is a good deal of evidence for correspondence between subjective workload and 
performance (O'Donnell & Eggemeier, 1986). If this were not the case, an appraisal of workload/task 
demand based on performance feedback would be utterly useless for the fonnulation of effort policy. 
Therefore, it is important for an effort theory to account for divergence between subjective estimates 
and actual performance (Muckier & Seven, 1992). 
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An analysis of subjective-performance dissociation was provided recently by Hancock 1996) based on 
a series of studies on tracking performance. Hancock (1996) presented his analysis in the form of a 
table, which is reproduced below (Table 2). The solid arrow moving left-to-right describes those 
instances of complete association, i.e. when high sUbjective workload is associated with worse 
performance and vice versa. The dashed arrow provides examples of complete divergence. Hancock 
(1996) pointed out that higher workload coupled to better performance may be indicative of successful 
compensation for increased task demand. On the other hand, the obverse cell when worse performance 
is associated with a reduction of subjective workload may indicate that the individual has effectively 
"given up" or adopted a lower standard of performance as a means of ameliorating increased workload 
(Hockey, 1997). 
Cell (a) describes a dissociation scenario where stable performance is associated with increased subject 
workload. This divergence may occur when an individual is actively investing effort merely to achieve 
performance stability. Both cells (b) and (c) provide examples of dissociation when subjective 
workload does not respond to an increase or decrease of performance effectiveness. In both cases, the 
subjective appraisal offeedback by the individual is insensitive to changing performance quality. This 
may be due to opaque feedback cues (e.g. perceptual errors described by Rabbitt, Cumming, & Vyas, 
(1978». The cell (d) illustrates how workload may decline whilst performance is sustained at a stable 
level. This pattern of dissociation may occur as the individual develops increasing skill based on task 
experience, i. e. may operate at a higher level of task efficiency. The matrix devised by Hancock (1996) 
provides an orderly, transactional analysis of the relationship between subjective appraisal and 
objective performance. 
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Table 2. A matrix to describe the relationship between task performance and subjective mental 
workload (Bancock, 1996). 
It is hypothesised that the internal model or representation (Stassen, 1989) provides the context for a 
subjective appraisal of task performance. This internal model encapsulates task dynamics, task 
strategies, performance standards and associated expectations. A divergence between the internal 
model and actual task dynamics/demand may be responsible for those dissociations between subjective 
appraisal and performance described in Table 2. According to Hacker, Plath, Richter, & Zimmer, 
(\978), differences with respect to the quality of internal models (i.e. fidelity, representativeness) are 
important source of performance variability. These authors stressed the importance of internal models 
as a means to anticipate changing task demand and to formulate effort policy. The internal model may 
represent the only means of providing context for self-monitoring activities and the subjective appraisal 
of task feedback. The internal model may be the basis for performance standard definition, error 
detection and the appraisal of subjective mental workload. If the internal model is incomplete or 
poorly defined, it is difficult to produce an accurate appraisal of task feedback and to formulate 
appropriate effort policy. 
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The internal model may be the basis for standard formulation at all levels of the behavioural heterarchy 
and therefore, represents the foundation of all instances of discrepancy detection. This point is 
reinforced by Figure 8 below. This diagram is based on the closed-loop, causal model of workload 
developed via fuzzy measurement by Moray, King, Turksen, & Waterton (1987). These researchers 
produced a model of mental workload in order to contrast crisp and fuzzy workload measures. A fuzzy 
approach to workload measurement permitted formulation of a closed-loop model with multiple causal 
links between objective variables and subjective entities uncovered via regression analyses. The model 
proposed by Moray, King, Turksen, & Waterton (1987) is reproduced in Figure 8 with the addition of 
an internal model or task representation by the author'. This model occupies a juncture between 
objective task variables, the appraisal of task difficulty and consequent formulation of effort policy. 
Goals 
objective 
tosk variables 
Internal Task 
1----/ Represeniation 
subjective 
difficulty 
objective 
ormanc:c 
subjective appraisal of 
task feedbock 
Figure 8. A modified version of the hypothetical, closed-loop causal model of workload proposed 
by Moray, King, Turksen, & Waterton (1987). 
The model of workload shown in Figure 8 contains all those elements that constitute the performance 
feedback loop. Feedback from the external world is appraised in terms of task goals, which in turn, 
inform the level of subjective effort deemed necessary to perform at an appropriate level. The internal 
, The original model produced by Moray et al (1987) is identical to Figure 8 in all other respects. 
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task representation provides a locus for the interaction between objective task variables and objective 
performance. In other words, it is formulated and re-formulated by an understanding of the 
relationship between task variables and their consequences for performance. In addition, the internal 
model encapsulates the interaction between subjective effort and estimates of task difficulty. The 
model of the task represents the juxtaposition between internal and external performance standards. It 
is hypothesised that the internal task representation provides the framework for an assessment of 
external, performance-based feedback. 
2.2.5 Feedback from the internal world 
When an individual performs a given task, it is hypothesised that performance is achieved with a 
number of cognitive-energetical costs (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997). For example, the performance 
of a difficult task may be associated with increased sympathetic nervous activity leading to heightened 
alertness and/or the experience of stress. At the other extreme of an arousal continuum, task activity 
under conditions of extreme fatigue or sleep deprivation may be correlated with decreased energy and a 
number of characteristic physiological symptoms, e.g. heavy eyelids, yawning, muscular aches. These 
internal, cognitive-energetical factors are important because they may impinge on performance quality 
if effort is not invested to counteract their influence. 
In Section 2.2.3, a distinction was made between reflexive and perceptual feedback loops with respect 
to physiological homeostasis and other manifestations of cybernetic control. It is natural to associate 
internal feedback with the reflexive process ofhomeostasis, however, this link may be overly 
simplistic. It is postulated that internal feedback has a direct association with homeostatic control when 
thermoregulation, blood pressure regulation and other essentia~ physiological control processes 
breakdown, e.g. when the limits of physiological adaptability are reached (Hancock & Warm, 1989). 
The effort regulation model employs the concept of internal feedback in much broader terms, to 
encompass a range of energetical costs originating internally, which may have an indirect association 
with task performance. These internal symptoms may be registered via reflexive or perceptual 
feedback loops. For example, overt symptoms such as yawning or high perspiration are noted 
automatically, whereas rising levels of irritation or reduced energy represent psychological symptoms 
that are perceived by the individual. 
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These energetical costs are related to the well-being of the individual, which in turn, define the level of 
discomfort accompanying task activity. In conceptual terms, the regulation of energetical costs may be 
associated with the comfort perceptual system described by Bartley (1970). This system was 
hypothesised to liase between the senses and the processes of physiological homeostasis in order to 
maintain psychological wellbeing, i.e. by monitoring and providing feedback with respect to awareness 
of experiential bodily comfort. 
The comfort system corresponds to an internal feedback loop, responsible for monitoring and 
regulating those energetical costs associated with task performance. It may be hypothesised that 
cybernetic control is accomplished via the existence of standards or set-points with respect to internal 
feedback. In other words, any given level or duration of task performance is associated with an 
anticipated energetical cost, which acts as a standard for internal feedback. 
A prominent source of internal feedback is physiological symptoms of discomfort, e.g. aches and pains. 
In a large survey of over one thousand students, Pennebaker & Skelton (1978) found that almost eighty 
percent reported at least one symptom from a list of twelve items, e.g. headache, upset stomach, sore 
muscles, chest pains, nasal congestion, watering eyes, ringing in ears, racing heart, dizziness, sweaty 
hands, flushed face, shortness of breath. It would appear that symptoms of discomfort are relatively 
common even among a healthy population. The surprising proliferation of physiological symptoms 
reported by Pennebaker & Skelton (I978) begs a question - to what extent are people capable of 
providing an accurate report of their internal, somatic states? Preliminary data reported by Pennebaker 
& Skelton (1978) revealed low to moderate levels of correlation, e.g. r = 0.28 between the perception 
of nasal congestion and exhalation rate through the nose. This general finding was originally reported 
by Mandler, Mandler, & Uviller (1958) who distinguished individual traits with respect to over- and 
under-estimation of autonomic reactivity" These data illustrated that the comfort system is essentially 
perceptual rather than reflexive, and therefore prone to those sources of bias' which characterise 
perceptual distortion in the external world, e.g. selectivity, psychophysical distortion. 
The experience of fatigue under operational conditions has been studied intensively using subjective 
ratings, based partly on the frequency of characteristic, physiological symptoms. For example, the 
4 This trnit of differential, autonomic sensitivity was later conceptualised as private body consciousness by Miller et al 
(1981). 
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;ymptom checklist devised by Yoshitake (1971;1978) distinguished: (a) general drowsiness/dullness, 
(b) difficulty concentrating and (c) specific physiological symptoms as components of operational 
fatigue. These factors may constitute energeticaUcompensatory costs (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997) 
during sustained task performance. 
The use of symptom checklists was extended to the study of driver fatigue during prolonged journeys 
by Nelson (1987), Desmond, Matthews, & Hancock (1997) and Nilsson, Nelson, & Carlson (1997). In 
a study of sustained, simulated driving, Nelson (1987) asked subjects to drive until they felt unable to 
continue. He reported that fatigue symptoms such as backache, headache and tired eyes increased in a 
linear fashion with time-on-task. However, certain severe symptoms such as upset stomach and 
dizziness were observed to increase just prior to the subject decided to discontinue the driving task. 
Therefore, qualitative groups of symptoms may be assessed in terms of differential severity. This 
approach was developed by Desmond, Matthews, & Hancock (1997) who performed a factor analysis 
in order to distinguish four groups offatigue symptoms: (a) visual fatigue, (b) malaise (e.g. illness), (c) 
boredom, and (d) muscular fatigue. This factor analysis emphasised the role of psychological 
symptoms (e.g. boredom) alongside traditional physiological symptoms. 
Affective changes in mood represent another source of cognitive-energetical costs associated with task 
performance. Task activity may have a profound effect on mood in terms of subjective alertness, 
tension and positiVe/negative affect. Traditional approaches to mood measurement have involved the 
construction of a self-assessment tool known as the mood adjective checklist, e.g. (Nowlis, 1965). 
This tool was developed by Thayer (1967) to support a two-dimensional conceptualisation of 
psychological arousal, which distinguished two bipolar components of arousal, one concerning 
alertness and another concerning tension. The development of this work, both in tenns of theoretical 
progress and empirical studies, is described in detail by Thayer (1989). 
The development of the mood adjective checklist was advanced by Matthews, lones, & Chamberlain 
(1990) who developed a subjective tool which subsumed three constructs: energetical arousal (alert-
. tired), tense arousal (relaxed-tense) and hedonic tone (happy-sad). The relationship between mood and 
performance was studied extensively by Matthews and his colleagues. In a recent summary of their 
work, Matthews, et al. (1997) contrasted the influence ofa vigilance task, e.g. sustained attention over 
48 minutes (N=229), and a working memory task, e.g. memorisation of digit strings combined with 
counting for 12 minutes (N = 151) on the three components of mood. It was found that vigilance 
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significantly reduced energetic arousal and to slightly reduce hedonic tone, but had little effect on tense 
arousal. Performance of the working memory task was associated with increased energetic and tense 
arousal, but exerted little influence on hedonic tone. These findings are indicative of increased 
sympathetic nervous activity associated with effortful working memory activity, creating an increase of 
alertness and tension, e.g. compensatory costs (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997). A detailed 
consideration of the relationship between mood and performance may be found in Matthews (1992). 
A range of energetical costs associated with task performance was operationalised in the form of a 
comprehensive stress state questionnaire devised by Matthews, et al. (1997). This questionnaire is 
composed often constructs, which have been factor-analysed into three meta-constructs: engagement, 
distress and worry. 
The first meta-construct of engagement provides an index of "the capacity of the task to provoke a 
commitment to effort and application" (Matthews, et al., 1997) (p. 13). This construct of engagement is 
composed of three scales, energetic arousal (as described in the previous paragraph), task motivation 
and the level of concentration. (Matthews, et al., 1997) correlated engagement scores with several 
indices of performance collected from different experimental studies. Data from two exemplar studies 
are included in the current discussion: (a) the working memory task described in the previous 
paragraph, and (b) a successive vigilance task, e.g. sustained attention combined with a load on 
working memory (Warm & Dember, 1998). It was found that energetic arousal had a positive 
relationship with task performance for both tasks. In addition, the level of concentration exerted by the 
individual was a significant predictor of vigilance performance. Therefore, reduced engagement 
constitutes a distinct source of energetic cost, resulting in reduced energy associated with declining 
motivation and concentration. 
The second meta-construct described by Matthews, et al. (1997) was called distress which relates to 
"overload of capacity to perform successfully" (p. 14). This factor is related to the transactional 
definition of stress defined by Lazarus & Folkman (1984). An individual suffers from symptoms of 
distress when he or she feels that adequate performance may be beyond current capability. This meta-
construct is composed of three constituents: tense arousal, hedonic tone (both were described earlier in 
this section) and confidence. Matthews, et al. (1997) reported that hedonic tone showed a significant 
correlation with task performance during both working memory and successive vigilance activities. 
Therefore, individuals who perform to an adequate level experienced positive affect and vice versa. In 
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addition, it was found that confidence was a significant predictor of working memory performance, but 
this relationship was not significant during successive vigilance. The experience of distress may be 
associated with performance under demanding conditions. Based on the analysis provided by 
Matthews, et al. (1997), energetical costs would manifest themselves in a distressed individual via 
increased tension, negative affect and declining confidence in the ability to perform. 
The third meta-construct of worry is related to a theoretical model of self-directed attention devised by 
Wells & Matthews (1994), known as the Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model. In brief, 
the S-REF model postulates a hierarchical cognitive architecture composed of three levels: (1) 
automatic/reflex processing units, (2) controlled/voluntary processing units, and (3) stored knowledge 
and self-beliefs. The second level of architecture is responsible for monitoring low-level activity at 
level (1) and to liase with high-level knowledge concerning self-beliefs (3). The model assumes that 
monitoring activity at level (2) encompasses a range of potential discrepancies, including external 
stimulus information, cognitive information such as plans and errors, and bodily state information (e.g. 
heart activity, temperature, pain). The fidelity of the feedback monitoring process was measured by 
Matthews, et al. (1997) using one of the three scales devised by (Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & 
Shearin, 1986) to operationalise the concept of Cognitive Interference (Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 
1995). This concept refers to the relative frequency of task-relevant and task-irrelevant thoughts during 
performance. Cognitive interference increases when task relevant thoughts decline at the expense of 
increased task-relevant thoughts and the individual has a reduced awareness of task activities. 
According to the S-REF model (Wells & Matthews, 1994), when a discrepancy is detected at the 
lower-level (1) on the basis of external feedback, it is appraised by the S-REF at the second level (2). 
This act of appraisal will initiate a discrepancy-reduction activity, which affects the sensitivity of the 
monitoring level (2) to specific stimuli at the lower level (1), i.e. a bias towards discrepancy-relevant 
stimuli. In addition, activation of the S-REF (via discrepancy-reduction) may involve consultation and 
elaboration with the upper level (3) of self-knowledge and self-beliefs. The purpose of this liaison is to 
modify the upper level (3) based on bottom-up feedback from levels (2) and (1). This possibility is 
indexed by Matthews, et al. (1997) using scales to measure self-focus and self-esteem, derived 
respectively from Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss (1975) and Heatherton & Polivy (1991). The existence 
of persistent discrepancies with respect to external feedback may trigger increased self-focus and in 
some cases, even threaten self-esteem. 
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These elements of the S-REF model have been incorporated into the third meta-construct of worry by 
Matthews, et al. (1997). In this context, worry refers to the act of self-evaluation, e.g. "a re-assessment 
of personal qualities and goals" (p. 14). It has been hypothesised that the opportunity for self-reflection 
and worry are determined by task characteristics. For instance, a demanding task may involve 
sufficient time pressure to suppress self-evaluation activities (Matthews, et al., 1997). This hypothesis 
was reinforced by empirical data from performance on the working memory task, which indicated no 
significant association with any aspect of worry. However, both level of self-focus and frequency of 
task irrelevant thoughts exhibited a significant, negative relationship with successive vigilance 
performance, i.e. where task activity was sustained and temporal demands were lower. 
The relationship between the categories of energetical costs encapsulated in each of the three meta-
constructs described by Matthews, et al. (1997) may exhibit different qualitative patterns across 
different task categories. This approach and analysis is based on the 'state patterning' approach to 
describe the effects of stress devised by Hockey & Hamilton (1983). Table 3 is adapted from 
Matthews, et al. (1997) and summarises the influence of different task manipulations on the three meta-
constructs of engagement, distress and worry. These data incorporate four studies of working memory, 
a vigilance experiment, a study of prolonged simulator driving (Desmond & Matthews, 1997) and a 
study of simulated driving, where control was reduced via the introduction of 'black ice' to induce 
unavoidable episodes of skidding (Matthews, Sparkes, & Bygrave, 1996). The table illustrates how 
different qualitative patterns of energetic costs were associated with performance under all four 
conditions. Short-term, demanding performance on working memory increased both engagement and 
distress, whereas long-duration vigilance performance depressed engagement. Performance of a 
prolonged drive had a similar effect to vigilance performance, however subjects also felt distressed. 
The reduction of control during performance did not influence engagement but increased both distress 
and worry. 
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Task type Engagement Distress Worry 
Working + + -
memory 
Vigilance - 0 0 
, Prolonged drive 
- + 0 
Loss of control 0 + + 
(Black ice) 
Table 3. The relationship between the three categories of energetical costs and task performance 
across four experimental scenarios (adapted from Matthews, et al. (1997). NB: + = increase, 0 = 
no change, - = decrease. 
This conceptualisation of energetical costs indicates the range of internal data that may be incorporated 
into internal feedback, e.g. awareness of self-directed cognition, physiological symptoms. In addition, 
there is evidence that categories of costs may show characteristic patterns of association and 
dissociation due to different task demands. For example, Duval & Wicklund (1972) postulated that 
self-focus declined during an absorbing task activity, i.e. when engagement increased. Similarly, 
Desmond, Matthews, & Hancock (1997) reported that declining levels of engagement and rising 
distress were significantly correlated with physiological symptoms offatigue, e.g. visual fatigue, 
malaise, muscular fatigue. 
Feedback from internal sources may manifest a range of energetical costs associated with performance 
(Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997). The frequency and magnitude of these costs represent the level of 
energetical expenditure associated with task performance. These costs may be operationalised in the 
form of physiological checklists andlor a psychological scales with respect to engagement, distress and 
worry (Matthews, et aI., 1997). It is postulated that increased compensatory costs may be typified as 
declining engagement andlor rising levels of distress and worry. 
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2.2.6 The assessment of external and internal feedback 
The previous sections reviewed sources of external and internal feedback. Both factors are influential 
for the formulation of effort policy, i.e. a decision whether to invest mental effort or not. 
It is postulated that both internal and external feedback sources are amalgamated into a cognitive-
energetical assessment of behavioural efficiency as defined by Schonpflug (1983; 1985). This concept 
was discussed in Section 1.1. This proposition is based upon two related hypotheses: (a) that effort is 
a cognitive-energetical entity in the sense that mental effort functions as a cognitive moderator which is 
energetical in character (Gaillard, 1993), and therefore, (b) effort policy must be based on an appraisal 
which is sensitive to both cognitive and energetical variables. 
An appraisal of cognitive-energetical efficiency requires a context for assessment, which is provided by 
standards or set -points based on past experience. Therefore, an individual have expectations associated 
with an appraisal of efficiency, i. e. performance effectiveness x is achieved at energetical cost y. This 
two-dimensional space provides a flexible rationale for the assessment of behavioural efficiency. 
The following table provides a continuum of externaVinternal appraisals based on feedback from 
performance and energetical costs (Table 4). This analysis is based on Schonpflug (1985) and those 
modes of state control proposed by Hockey (1986b). When behaviour is efficient, effective 
performance is achieved either at reduced or 'standard' energetical cost. If the level of performance 
effectiveness is matched by the associated level of energetical costs, this is called correspondent 
efficiency. Inefficient behaviour is defined by those occasions when performance effectiveness is only 
achieved at accelerated energetical costs. 
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Performance Energetical Description Behavioural 
Effectiveness costs Efficiency 
+ - Exceptional performance Best Efficiency 
achieved with a reduction of 
energetical costs 
+ 0 Exceptional performance Efficient 
achieved at a 'standard' 
energetical cost 
0 
-
Standard performance achieved Efficient 
in combination with reduced 
energetical costs 
+ + Exceptional performance Correspondent 
achieved with high energetical 
costs 
0 0 Standard performance achieved Correspondent 
at a standard energetical cost 
- -
Poor performance in Correspondent 
combination with reduced 
energetical costs 
0 + Standard performance is only Inefficient 
achieved in combination with 
increased energetical costs 
-
0 Poor performance in Inefficient 
combination with standard 
energetical cost 
- + Poor performance in Worst 
combination with increased Inefficiency 
energetical costs 
Table 4. The assessment of behavioural efficiency using external (performance effectiveness) and 
internal (energetical costs) feedback in combination. NB: + = positive discrepancy (higher than 
standard). 0 = no discrepancy (standard achieved). - = negative discrepancy (lower than 
standard). 
A cognitive-energetical monitor is proposed as an executive or supervisory controller (Hockey, 1997) 
(Figure 7) for feedback appraisal. This monitor receives dual-feedback from external and internal 
sources. Feedback from overt performance may take the form of overt errors, or a perceptual appraisal 
of productivity, task failure or the perception of subjective mental workload (Section 2.2.4). Internal 
feedback is based on CNS activity, physiological symptoms, mood and similar indicators of energetical 
state (Section 2.2.5). The combination of both sources offeedback yields the two-dimensional 
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appraisal of task efficiency represented in Table 4. This process of self-appraisal is not intended to 
represent an introspective evaluation of efficiency as a value judgement in its own right, i.e. the 
individual does not ask himself or herself "how efficient is my behaviour?" The assessment of 
efficiency is an emergent feature from two distinct sources of feedback. 
The most important point to note concerning the appraisal of efficiency is that assessment of feedback 
is inherently phenomenological, representing the experiential world of the individual. Therefore, an 
individual must rely on his or her experience and powers of observation, perception and introspection 
to make consistent and reliable self-assessments. 
The process of self-appraisal may be inherently fallible with respect to both external and internal 
feedback. The subjective appraisal of cognitive-energetical efficiency may be prone to at least three 
categories of bias or distortion. In the first instance, the appraisal of either internal or external feedback 
is subject to allentional selectivity. For example, Matthews, Carver, & Scheier (1982) pointed out that 
"selectively attending to aspects of oneself appears to produce effects that are conceptually identical to 
those produced by selectively attending to aspects of one's environment" (p. 167). In other words, we 
may attend to internal feedback at the expense of external feedback and vice versa. This particular 
aspect is a central hypothesis of the S-REF model (Wells, 1994), where it is argued that activation of 
level (3) concerned with self knowledge via the experience of worry distracts attention from the 
practical business of task monitoring and performance at level (I) (for detailed explanation, see (Wells, 
1994)}. The inverse case may occur if a particularly demanding or engrossing biases attention to 
external information at the expense of internal feedback (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Matthews, et al., 
1997). In this case, neglect of internal feedback may produce substantial fatigue after-effects following 
task performance (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997), i.e. accumulated energetical costs may only impose 
themselves on self-appraisal in a retrospective fashion following cessation of task performance. 
The second limitation on feedback appraisal is represented by possible confounding between internal 
and external feedback. It is evident from the previous section that increased task difficulty may be 
associated with rising energetical costs. For example, Carver & Scheier (1990) linked positive and 
negative affect with respective increases and decreases of task progress. On the other hand, Matthews, 
et al. (1997) has reported a strong correlation between the subjective assessment of task workload and 
energetical costs in the form of engagement, distress and worry. Therefore, increased energetical costs, 
induced via biological or environment stressors tend to amplify the subjective appraisal of task 
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demands and workload (Hancock & Warm, 1989). This link is intuitive, as the net result of declining 
engagement coupled with rising distress and worry would be to increase the difficulty of task 
performance. These energeticai costs may create a psychological inertia by creating an increasing 
disinclination to continue performance (Bartley & Chute, 1947), therefore, increased levels of mental 
effort are required to overcome any 'mental inertia' (Table 4). 
The net influence of distress and worry is the proliferation of distracting psychological stimuli linked to 
reduced confidence, task irrelevant thoughts (Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986), 
negative affect and anxiety-related self-appraisal (Wells, 1994). Therefore, an individual experiencing 
rising energetical costs must invest a higher level of mental effort in order to compensate for reduced 
energy and increased distraction, which develops into a vicious circle of spiralling demands on mental 
effort, i.e. given that future effort investments may be associated with rising energetical costs. 
The framework described by Hancock & Warm (1989) provides a conceptual means of reconciling task 
demands and the demands induced by energetical factors. According to Hancock & Warm (1989), 
both increased task demand and energetical costs function as sources of input stress on the individual, 
and the response to either is co-ordinated on an adaptive basis. Therefore, both internal and external 
factors must be incorporated within a single, cognitive-energetical strategy as effort policy. However, 
this conceptual unity does not alter the confounding influence of internal on external feedback and vice 
versa. If the subjective appraisal of either internal or external feedback is very susceptible to the 
influence of the other, this creates problems for the cognitive-energetical monitor, which is attempting 
to identify and to adapt effort policy to specific internal and external factors. An example of an internal 
~ external bias was reported by Bartlett (1943), who noted that operators exhibited an increased 
tendency to blame inadequate apparatus and/or instrumentation for error as a function of increased 
fatigue. This process of internal/external assessment is particularly problematic as both sources must 
be integrated in order to estimate efficiency, therefore, tremendous potential exists for a form of 
'crosstalk' that may produce inaccurate self-appraisal. 
The final category of attentional distortion is linked to the influence of energetical costs on the 
appraisal process itself. The evolution of fatigue/sleepiness has been associated with a range of 
influences on human information processing (Bartlett, 1953; Bartlett, 1943; Bills, 1931; Dinges & 
Kribbs, 1991; Easterbrook, 1959; Hockey, 1986a). These attentional effects have included lapses or 
blocks (i.e. short periods when attentional processing appears to cease), tunnelling (i.e. high selectivity 
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which neglects peripheral or secondary stimuli) and an increased 'indifference range' (i.e. the tolerance 
of increased levels of error prior to corrective action). The influence of these effects on performance 
has been well documented. However, as pointed out by Brown (1994), if the capability to perform is 
jeopardised by energetical factors, then logically, our capability for self-appraisal may be similarly 
impaired. Therefore, the ability to monitor and respond with respect to either internal or external 
sources of feedback may be susceptible to lapses, tunnelling and increased indifference. The influence 
of energetical costs on the process of self-appraisal may lead to flawed estimates of efficiency. 
This section has described how external and internal sources of feedback may be reconciled within a 
self-appraisal of behavioural efficiency. Furthermore, it is argued that emergent efficiency from dual-
feedback is the essential concept guiding the subsequent formulation of effort policy. The following 
section will describe the formulation of effort policy in detail. 
2.2.7 Effort policy 
The dual appraisal of internal and external feedback is converted into an assessment of cognitive-
energetical efficiency, which gives rise to a specific effort policy. This policy may be described with 
reference to whether effort is invested or conserved. 
The decision to invest or to conserve effort was described by Hockey (1986b) as modes of state control. 
The investment of mental effort represents a generalised policy where mental effort is increased in 
order to improve or to sustain performance effectiveness, i.e. a "try harder" response. An effort 
investment policy is the natural response to a perceived increase of task demand or a decline of 
performance effectiveness. The conservation of mental effort represents the withdrawal of mental 
effort or the suppression of continued effort investment. In this case, performance quality may be 
sacrificed to prevent further accumulation of energetical costs such as stress and fatigue. On the other 
hand, conservation may occur when a desirable standard of performance effectiveness may be attained 
with lower effort expenditure, e.g. when skill develops, performance quality may be possible with 
lower effort investment. 
The formulation of effort policy is an adaptive process, responding dynamically to sustain task 
performance and prevent unacceptable levels of stress andlor fatigue. An investment policy will 
improve or protect performance effectiveness at the expense of energetical costs. A conservation 
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policy performs the opposite function. Therefore, effort policy must be devised on an adaptive basis to 
compensate for declining performance/rising energetical costs (Hancock, 1986; Hancock & Warm, 
1989). This dynamic underlines the importance of self-appraisal with respect to both internal and 
external sources of information. The framework for effort policy is illustrated below in Figure 9. This 
framework is based on an analysis of workload and performance by (De Waard, 1996) and the model 
of sustained attention and stress produced by Hancock & Warm (1989). 
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Figure 9. A framework for mental effort policy based on analyses by De Waard (1996) and 
Bancock & Warm (1989). 
According to this framework, a stable equilibrium is apparent when energetical costs are minimal and 
performance is maximal at the centre of the horizontal continuum. Therefore, the individual may 
dynamically formulate effort policy in order to remain as close to the central region as possible. This 
may be accomplished by alternating periods of effort investment and conservation, to allow those 
energetical costs, which may have accumulated during effortful periods to dissipate during periods of 
conservation. At both edges of the horizontal continuum, poor performance effectiveness co-exists 
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alongside maximum energetical costs. This undesirable situation may arise due to excessive 
investment (on the right-hand side of the diagram) or unrestrained conservation (on the left side). 
In both cases, the formulation of effort policy occurs within finite limits determined by: (a) capability 
for performance effectiveness, and (b) energetical capacity. The former is determined by individuals' 
level of performance efficiency. This concept was originally proposed by Eysenck (\ 982) and 
operationalised by Meijman (1995) to represent the relationship between effort (energetical input) and 
performance quality (overt output). Efficient individuals attain good performance at low effort 
investment, whereas less efficient individuals must expend greater effort to attain the same level of 
good performance. This capacity for performance may be determined by an individual's level of skill, 
which in turn, sets upper and lower limits on performance effectiveness. 
Hockey (1993; 1997) described a number oflatent decrements which may occur prior to primary 
performance breakdown. These decrements represent strategies or heuristics to enhance performance 
efficiency without sacrificing performance quality. The successful deployment of latent decrements 
may extend the lower limit of performance capacity. One response to declining performance capacity 
is termed subsidiary task failure. This decrement is similar to attentional tunnelling (Easterbrook, 
1959), where performance concerning peripheral perceptual stimuli or subsidiary task elements is 
neglected in order to protect performance involving central stimuli or crucial task elements. This 
decrement represents an adaptive attentional strategy to preserve performance in the face of either high 
task demands or extreme energetical costs. The second decrement is termed strategic adjustment, 
which is described as a within-task shift to simplistic task strategies. Therefore, the individual may 
adapt task strategy to a routinised, regular sequence that may be inefficient but is relatively robust and 
resistant to errors (Sperandio, 1978). Alternatively, iftask pacing can be controlled, the individual may 
wish to slow the task. This decrement has also been observed in experimental subjects working in the 
presence of noise (Schonpflug, 1983). The third decrement is termedfatigue after-eJjects and refers to 
a preference for low-effort strategies, which may follow a period of high task demand or an exhausting 
work activity. This decrement represents a period of effort conservation following a work period that 
has incurred high energetical costs, and therefore, may correspond to an attempt to restore equilibrium 
(Figure 9). 
The latter concept of energetical capacity is more complex, being equivalent to the level of remaining 
effort reserves and the individuals' tolerance for discomfort (pribram, 1980), i.e. reduced effort 
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reserves = increased discomfort. This capacity for discomfort may be determined by goal 
characteristics (e.g. commitment to the task goal) and individual traits, i.e. Matthews, Schwean, 
Campbell, Saklofske, & Mohamed (in press) provide a review and synthesis of personality literature, 
which indicates that neurotic individuals may be more sensitive to energetical costs than non-neurotics. 
The framework for mental effort investment illustrated in Figure 9 is subject to limitations due to 
respective capacity of the individual to adapt effort policy to external and internal feedback. This 
adaptive capability (Hancock & Warm, 1989) is limited by the level of effort reserves available to the 
individual. However, a number of other limitations may be considered. It is postulated that effort 
policy may be executed in a fashion that is either efficient, correspondent or inefficient (Table 4). 
A correspondent investment policy would improve performance effectiveness and increase energetical 
costs, whereas efficient investment results in the same improvement of performance without any 
subsequent increase of energetical costs. On the other hand, no influence on performance or declining 
performance coupled with increased costs would indicate an inefficient effort investment policy. The 
same logic may be applied to effort conservation policies, i.e. an efficient conservation policy would 
reduce energetical costs without affecting performance effectiveness. 
It is proposed that the limitations of effort policy are synonymous with the limitations on performance 
efficiency. Inefficient performance will produce a greater number of errors and/or high costs at a faster 
rate per unit time than efficient task performance. The linkage between effort policy, efficiency and 
limitations is considered within the adaptive framework originally outlined by (Hancock & Warm, 
1989) and illustrated in Figure 10 below. 
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Figure 10. Appended version of effort policy framework. Abbreviations: C = comfort zone 
(based on Bancock & Warm (1989», ECIEI = efficient conservation/investment, CC/Cl = 
correspondent conservation/investment, Icm = inefficient conservation/investment. 
The use of the comfort zone to indicate complete equilibrium is taken from the model devised by 
Hancock & Warm (1989). This zone indicates an absence of either investment or conservation in 
combination with minimum energetical costs and maximum performance. This zone represents an 
ideal that may not be possible to sustain for a significant period. The movement to the left and right of 
the horizontal continuum moves through zones associated with efficiency, correspondence and 
inefficiency. When a policy is efficient, it is achieving a primary goal without incurring costs or 
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degraded performance. An inefficient effort policy fails because it does not achieve a primary goal and 
still incurs costs or degraded performance. Once this point has been reached, the individual is at the 
limits of their performance capability and tolerance for discomfort. 
Mental effort policy may be described in terms of investment or conservation. The primary goal of the 
former is to improve performance effectiveness, whereas the latter is concerned with the reduction of 
energetical costs. The adaptive, dynamic formulation of mental effort policy is based around the 
antagonism between investment and conservation. Both mental effort investment and conservation 
may be assessed in terms of efficiency. 
2.3 A model o/mental effort regulation 
A model of mental effort regulation is proposed based on the concepts and literature reviewed in the 
previous sections (Figure 11). This model is hierarchical and based on the two-tier framework outlined 
by Broadbent (1971) and Hockey (1997) (Section 2.2.1). 
This model was devised to investigate mental effort regulation under specific circumstances. It is 
assumed that the individual is an experienced operator and capable of acceptable task performance, i.e. 
the model does not consider the acquisition of skill. It is also assumed that the individual is performing 
the task over a sustained period, e.g. 30min or above, and therefore, the exhaustion of finite effort 
reserves is a distinct possibility. 
The cognitive-energetical monitor represents the upper-level, supervisory controller, capable of 
monitoring and regulating mental effort. The purpose of this mechanism is to avoid catastrophic task 
failure and unacceptable levels of discomfort due to stress and fatigue. In terms of the effort economy 
described in Section 1.2, the goal of the monitor is to avoid the collapse of performance and the 
exhaustion of finite mental effort reserves. 
This task of monitoring and controlling is achieved via dual-feedback from internal and external 
sources. Those internal symptoms of sleepiness, physical discomfort, fatigue, distress and worry 
originate from the energetical state (Section 2.2.5). This concept represents the internal psycho-
physiological status of the individual based on physiological symptoms, eNS activity and mood. This 
Page 53 
information is supplemented by feedback originating from the impact of overt performance in the 
external world (Section 2.2.4). This feedback is composed ofan appraisal of performance 
effectiveness based on the frequency of errors and the perception of subjective mental workload. An 
amalgamation of internal and external feedback takes is performed within the cognitive-energetical 
monitor (Figure 11). 
The assessment of internal and external feedback yields a two-dimensional continuum of high/low 
energetical costs and goodlbad performance (Table 4). In general, increased errors lead to the 
formulation of an effort investment policy. This policy will increase the proportion of controlled 
processing and improve the sensitivity and precision of perceptual-motor behaviour, i.e. by increasing 
the speed/accuracy of target detection, increasing the frequency of attentional checks during response 
preparation. In addition, effort investment may be associated with a degree of sympathetic activation, 
which may give rise to energetical costs. If effort were invested continuously for a sustained period, 
the resulting accumulation of energetical costs may induce an experience of fatigue, stress or a 
combination of both for the individual via the internal feedback loop. In this case, the individual may 
reduce the level of effort investment in order to alleviate the discomfort associated with energetical 
costs. This strategy is known as switching to it policy of effort conservation. It is presumed that a 
reduction of effort investment will at least halt the continued accumulation of energetical costs. 
There is a degree of mutual dependence between the assessment of external and internal feedback. If 
error rate is high, the individual may experience task-related stress due to perception of task failure. 
Hence, an appraisal of external feedback may exacerbate the accumulation of energetical costs. A 
similar phenomenon is observed when changes in energetical status impinge on task performance. For 
example, a sleep-deprived individual may experience lapses in concentration that provoke an increased 
frequency oftask errors. Similarly, the experience of stress states such as distress and worry may 
distract attention from the task at hand, leading to an increased frequency of errors due to cognitive 
interference. This inter-dependence means that effort must be invested to protect performance from the 
debilitating influence of energetical costs. Therefore, rising energetical costs may be ambivalent with 
respect to their influence on effort policy and much depends on feedback from external sources. 
It is hypothesised that the appraisal of internal and external feedback is a perceptual process and subject 
to a degree of inherent bias. These sources of bias may be described as attentional or energetical in 
nature. For example, a highly demanding task may focus attention on the external feedback loop at the 
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expense of the internal assessment of energetical costs. On the other hand, the presence of energetical 
stressors such as sleep deprivation and alcohol may influence the appraisal of external and internal 
feedback. Certain categories of stressor variables such as sleep deprivation may emphasise the inherent 
discomfort of sustained performance. Whereas chemical agents such as alcohol may increase weIl-
being and reduce awareness of errors with consequences for the formulation of effort policy. 
Once an effort policy is formulated, several outcomes are possible. If an investment policy is 
successful, overt performance should improve or stabilise and energetical costs may rise. If investment 
is efficient, improved or stable performance may be achieved in conjunction with reduced energetical 
costs. (Figure 10). A successful policy of effort conservation would result in reduced energetical costs. 
In this case, the goal of the monitor is to alleviate the energetical discomfort of continued task activity. 
In both cases of investment and conservation, the ideal for the cognitive-energetical monitor is to 
maximise performance and minimise energetical costs, i.e. the comfort zone in Figure 10. The obverse 
case of unsuccessful and/or inefficient effort policy is apparent when investment fails to improve or 
stabilise performance effectiveness, or when conservation has no impact on energetical costs. 
This process offeedback appraisal and policy formulation is highly dynamic and may fluctuate on a 
minute-by-minute basis. The feedback from energetical state and overt performance represents the 
success or failure of the current effort policy. Hence, inefficient or failed effort policies manifest 
themselves via feedback to the cognitive-energetical monitor, which adapts effort policy appropriately. 
It has been argued that the process of mental effort regulation is perceptual and prone to a variety of 
attentional biases and distortions (Section 2.2.6). These factors may lead to the inappropriate 
formulation of effort policy. For example, a workaholic may attend to external feedback at the expense 
of internal feedback, hence risking the threat of stress-related illness. Similarly, a hypochondriac may 
monitor internal symptoms and sensations to the extent that events in the external world pass 
unnoticed. In addition, it may be difficult for the monitor to establish causality due to confounding 
between internal and external signals. It is likely that certain energetical states such as extreme 
sleepiness or exposure to drugs are capable of degrading perceptual-motor behaviour and subsequent 
performance. In this case, the monitor wiIl receive feedback of high costs coupled with poor 
performance, where the latter is a direct result of the former. Similarly, the experience of repeated 
errors or task failure may provoke a stress reaction from an individual leading to an identical scenario. 
Therefore, the monitor may encounter significant difficulties when formulating effort policy under 
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certain circumstances. 
The proposed model of mental effort is illustrated below in Figure 11. The cognitive-energetical 
monitor receives feedback from internal and external sources. This process of dual-appraisal is used to 
formulate effort policy, i.e. whether to invest or conserve mental effort. An investment of mental effort 
may lead to increased energetical costs, hence the dashed line in Figure 11. It is assumed that effort 
investment influences perceptual-motor performance directly and overt performance indirectly. The 
enactment of an effort policy will influence both overt performance and the internal, energetical state 
and hence, the feedback loop will begin once more. It should be noted that both internal and external 
feedback is subject to a degree of mutual interference. High error rates during overt performance may 
induce energetical changes due to the experience of distress and worry. It is also hypothesised that 
extreme energetical costs (such as fatigue and stress) may directly influence perceptual-motor 
behaviour with consequences for task performance. This inter-dependence is illustrated via the grey 
feedback loops at the bottom of Figure 11. 
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3 INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL WORK 
3. J Hypotheses arising from the model of effort regulation 
The previous chapter concluded with a description of a model of mental effort regulation. This model 
represents the basis ofthe empirical programme described in the following four chapters. The central 
predictions encapsulated within the effort regulation model are as follows: 
I. The decision whether or not to invest mental effort is based on a cognitive-energetical appraisal 
from two sources offeedback: (a) performance cues from the external world and (b) internal cues 
regarding psycho-physiological, energetical state. 
2. The individual may adopt one of three effort strategies based on an assessment of external errors 
and internal costs: (a) effort may be invested, (b) effort may be conserved or withdrawn and (c) 
effort may be sustained. 
3. Competent performance is achieved by higher levels of effort investment and rational effort 
investment, based on an awareness of both external and internal feedback. 
4. The presence of stressors detrimental to sustained performance, such as sleep deprivation, may 
require effort investment to protect task performance from the influence of energetical costs. 
5. The presence of chemical stressors, such as alcohol, may influence the process of appraisal of 
external and internal feedback. 
6. The presence of performance feedback will highlight the salience of external feedback and lead to a 
tendency for effort investment. 
7. High task demands emphasise the salience of the external feedback loop and the subsequent 
regulation of mental effort. 
Each experiment will emphasise a different aspect of these effort hypotheses. In addition, several 
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~perimental tasks and testing environments have been adopted for the study of mental effort. This 
ipproach to the research is described in the following section. 
3.2 Test environments and experimental tasks 
The thesis has focused on sustained perceptual-motor performance as a broad category of task activity. 
Two different categories of perceptual-motor task are used during the empirical programme described 
in the following chapters. The first was a computer-based task that incorporated a zero-order, lateral 
tracking activity with a visually-based, cognitive/successive, vigilance task (Warm & Oember, 1998). 
This type of task was used in the studies described in Chapters 7 and 4. The latter studies are 
representative of applied research using a simulated driving task as a perceptual-motor task. The 
experiment described in Chapter 5 employed a fixed-base driving simulator (i.e. stationary vehicle with 
original controls, computer-generated driving scene projected onto a large screen), whereas the 
investigation in Chapter 6 utilised a modest approximation of the driving task (i.e. a PC-based driving 
task in conjunction with a steering wheel console). 
Both testing environments and tasks were employed to fulfil different research requirements. The use 
of a laboratory-based tracking task permits tight control over important experimental variables, despite 
the nature of the task being essentially meaningless and having limited correspondence to real-world 
activities. On the other hand, the employment of a simulated driving environment represents an 
attempt to duplicate a real-world activity within an artificial setting. The driving simulator task is a 
complex task environment relative to the tracking task, associated with a greater range of experimental 
variables. In addition, the subjects have greater control over performance in this simulated 
environment and behaviour is at least partially determined by prior training and experience with an 
everyday task. The increased range of task variables in conjunction with higher subject control and 
experience may conspire to reduce the degree of control over behaviour wielded by the experimenter. 
This antagonistic relationship between ecological validity and experimental control across testing 
environments was described by Parkes, Fairclough, & Ross (1991). 
Both task categories have a long research history with respect to dynamic task performance and the 
study of energetical variables such as fatigue. Literature reviews on tracking tasks for the study of 
control dynamics have been performed by Hammerton (1981) and Wickens (1986a). The use of 
laboratory tasks and other driving simulations for the investigation of driver fatigue was reviewed by 
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Haworth, Triggs, & Grey (1988). 
Both types of task share a number of common features. For example, both are concerned with manual 
control and lateral movement (i.e. tracking, steering). Both tasks also include an implicit response time 
component, i.e. target detection, braking to obstacles or other vehicles. In addition, it could be 
reasonably argued that both tasks conform to a similar profile according to the multiple resource 
framework (Wickens, 1980; Wickens, 1984), i.e. both task are visual, involve processing of spatial data 
and demand a manual response. 
However, there are areas of substantial divergence between tracking and driving behaviour. Firstly, 
subjects may manipulate speed and task pacing during the latter activity, whereas no such facility was 
available during the tracking task. In addition, tracking activity may be classified as two distinct types: 
pursuit tracking (i.e. replicating the speed/direction of a target) or compensatory tracking (i.e. detecting 
the deviation of a cursor from a target position and making an appropriate correction) (Hammerton, 
1981). The laboratory task used in this experimental research was designed as a pursuit tracking task, 
whereas driving behaviour may be characterised as principally compensatory in nature, i.e. we correct 
for dynamic deviations from lane boundaries. It should be added that control dynamics differ 
substantially between the tracking task and simulated driving (Wickens, 1986a). The former is 
characterised as zero-order control, i.e. the magnitude and direction of the input device movement are 
translated directly to cursor movement onscreen. On the other hand, simulated driving involves 
steering wheel input that contains an additional velocity component, i.e. cursor movement is a product 
of steering direction, magnitude and velocity. This type of control dynamic is termed first-order 
tracking. 
A large amount of research has been conducted into the links between psychological impairment (due 
to alcohol, drugs and fatigue) and driving safety. For ethical reasons, a substantive proportion of this 
research is not conducted in the field on the real road. Researchers must rely on laboratory tasks, 
driving simulators and closed-course facilities in order to test performance within acceptable ethical 
constraints. This climate has fostered a degree of methodological conflict between individual 
researchers. On one hand, laboratory-based researchers believe that driving behaviour is too complex 
to yield consistent data in the field. Therefore, they propose to decompose the driving task into its 
constituent components (e.g. visual search, manual control, decision-making) and to investigate each 
component in isolation within a laboratory setting, e.g. (Clayton, 1980). The strategy represents the 
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application of reductionism as a means of establishing a high degree of experimental control. Those in 
opposition object to this approach on the grounds of ecological validity. They argue that sub-
components of the driving task are not enacted in isolation, but as a complex act of co-ordinated 
control. Therefore, these researchers believe that studies of driving behaviour should aim for realism 
and representativeness. This approach begs a number of ethical questions if taken to an extreme. For 
the most part, these researchers argue that simulators and closed-courses represent a compromise 
between ecological validity and ethical investigation, e.g. (Gawron & Ranney, 1988). This 
methodological issue was addressed and discussed in more detail by Sanders (1985). 
The methodology adopted during the current research has attempted to study mental effort with 
reference to an artificial laboratory task and a simulation of a real task. The use of mixed test 
environments may have a number of advantages over the exclusive use of one or the other, namely: (a) 
it is possible to identify key variables with greater clarity within the less complex laboratory setting, (b) 
it is possible to manipulate variables with greater precision in the laboratory setting, i.e. because task-
pacing is computer-controlled, (c) the usage oflaboratory and applied testing environments provides an 
indication of the ecological validity of hypotheses under investigation, and (d) the inclusion of real-
world skills permits an assessment of the relevance of hypotheses for well-learned tasks, i.e. a contrast 
between performance within a novel domain and performance in a real-world domain, where subjects 
bring real-world experience and training to the study. 
The current document is concerned with mental effort regulation as basic theoretical research and as 
applied topic with real-world relevance. It is anticipated that the inclusion of different test 
environments will reinforce the relevance of effort regulation in both domains. 
3.3 The measurement of mental effort 
The quantification of mental effort is described with reference to measures of brain metabolism, 
hormonal activity and psychophysiological function. With respect to the empirical chapters, it was 
only possible to quantify mental effort via psychophysiological activity. However, a brief review of all 
three categories of measurement is warranted for the sake of completion. 
3.3.1 Brain metabolism and mental effort 
Brain metabolism is the logical candidate to provide a quantification of mental effort. The 
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measurement of cerebral metabolism represents the fundamental substrate of effortful activity. This is 
both a strength and a weakness, as cerebral metabolism is the fundamental substrate of psychological 
activity. These techniques were not employed in the empirical studies, however, a brief review is 
warranted for the sake of completion. 
As stated earlier, the energy storage capacity of the human brain is very limited, therefore glucose is 
supplied to the brain from the blood on a continuous basis. The major location for glucose metabolism 
is at the synapse, and Positron Emission Topography (PET) techniques may be used to index the 
cerebral metabolic rate for glucose (CMRglu). The principles of PET measurement are based on the 
fact that biologically active elements, e.g. fluorine, oxygen, carbon, have neutron-deficient 
radioisotopes. These radionuclides have a limited half-life (i.e. around 110 minutes) during they decay 
by the emission of positrons. Using these elements as markers in combination with appropriate 
scanning apparatus, it is possible to quantify the rate of brain metabolism across different areas of the 
brain (Pawlik & Heiss, 1989). 
Cohen, et al. (1988) performed a study of the localisation ofCMRglu rates within the brain during a 
sustained attention task. These authors performed an independent samples design where the PET data 
from a "resting" group (N=9) with a group who performed a sustained, auditory discrimination task 
(N=27). This task involved the subject listening to a series of LOs duration tones, presented at three 
levels of intensity and having to press a button when the lowest volume tone was detected. Subjects 
performed this task for 35 minutes. Contrary to earlier findings (i.e. Reivich, Aiavi, Gur, & Greenberg 
(1985», this study revealed only regional differences in the prefrontal cortex due to sustained attention 
(i.e. global CMRglu rates were not significantly different). These authors attempted to correlate the 
number of hits and false alarms with regional CMRglu rates. Negative correlations between false 
alarms and CMRglu rates were noted in the medial, left anterior and right anterior frontal cortex. 
Haier, et al. (\988) performed a similar study, contrasting PET data for three independent subject 
groups over three activities: an abstract reasoning task, a visual vigilance task and a control group (who 
received only non-target stimuli from the second task). The visual vigilance task consisted of a 30 
minute vigil where subjects were exposed to degraded exposures of single digits (one every 2.0s) and 
instructed to respond to the digit O. The abstract reasoning task was conducted over a similar duration. 
The data revealed a significant increase of CMRglu rate in the right hemisphere for both experimental 
tasks, however, no particular area was implicated. An examination of the relationship between cerebral 
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metabolism and performance revealed a negative correlation was found for CMRglu rates and 
performance on the abstract reasoning task (i.e. poor performance was associated with high levels of 
CMRglu rate). Whilst correlations between sensitivity (d') and CMRglu rates in the right, inferior, 
temporal lobe were positive, i.e. higher cerebral glucose metabolism was associated with accurate 
performance. 
Techniques to measure cerebral blood flow (rCRF) were originally devised to map brain vascular 
physiology, rather than to index neuropsychological function. Nevertheless, there is a strong 
association between rCBF and energy metabolism in the brain (pawlik & Heiss, 1989). 
A recent pioneering study into the relationship between cerebral blood flow and the vigilance 
decrement was conducted by Mayleben, et al. (1998). These authors used transcranial Doppler 
sonography (TCD) to monitor the velocity of cerebral blood flow in the left and right hemispheres 
during two categories of vigilance task. The first type of task involved SUCCESSIVE vigilance where 
subjects were asked to make an absolute judgement regarding the presence of exceptional target items, 
based on their memory of the normative stimulus characteristics, i.e. subjects presented with two lines 
and asked to respond when both were 3mrn taller than usual. The second SIMULTANEOUS vigilance 
task involved a comparative judgement, where subjects were presented with two lines and asked to 
respond when one line was 2mm taller than the other. Warm & Dember (1998) have provided 
evidence that successive tasks are inherently more demanding than their simultaneous counterparts due 
to a working memory component. Ten participants performed 30min vigils of both types of vigilance 
task, the stimuli were monitored at a high rate 000 events per minute and 3% of the events contained 
targets. 
The results of this study are illustrated below in Figure 12. As expected, SUCCESSIVE vigilance tasks 
produced a higher vigilance decrement over time compared to the simultaneous tasks. However, these 
performance data were mirrored by changes in the velocity of cerebral blood flow. Furthermore, the 
velocity of cerebral blood flow was higher in the right hemisphere than the left hemisphere during the 
SUCCESSIVE vigilance task only. 
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Figure 12. Performance data and mean cerebral blood flow velocity (right, middle cerebral 
artery) for both sucessive and simultaneous vigilance tasks across a 30 minute vigil (Mayleben, et 
al., 1998). 
These data illustrate a correlational relationship between perfonnance and cerebral metabolism. In 
addition, the relationship over time and task demands appears compatible with a fuel metaphor for 
mental effort, i.e. increased metabolism in response to increased task demands, decline of metabolism 
with time-on-task. 
3.3.2 Hormonal changes associated with mental etTort 
Data on honnonal or endocrine changes are usually collected via urinanalysis. Rather than blood 
sampling (which is rarely used and difficult to implement), urinanalysis techniques rely on the 
metabolites ofhonnonal activity to index endocrine changes (Benton, 1987). 
Frankenhaeuser and her colleagues have conducted a programme of research into the relationship 
between honnonal excretion and human perfonnance for over two decades (Frankenhaeuser, 1980). 
Frankenhaeuser and her colleagues perfonned various experimental manipulations to assess the 
catecholamine response to conditions of "over stimulation" and "understimulation." Their hypotheses 
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were based on the assumption that both extreme boredom and extreme excitement created a disturbance 
of the individual's cognitive-emotional equilibrium. The subjective response to this disturbance was 
deemed to be characterised by increased stress and an investment of effort (in order to correct the 
disturbance). 
For example, in one study (Frankenhaeuser, Nordheden, Myrsten, & Post, 1971) 28 subjects 
paticipated n three experimental sessions: (a) a sensory vigilance task where the subject had to 
discriminate an increase oflight intensity, (b) a multitasking task involving manual responses to 
concurrent visual and auditory reaction time tasks and (c) a control session where the subjects sat 
reading magazines. All sessions lasted for 3 hours. Data analysis revealed an increase of 
catecholamine release for both experimental tasks compared to the control session. Levels of 
adrenaline showed a slight increase during the vigilance task and a pronounced decline during 
multitasking, whereas noradrenaline declined during vigilance and showed an increase when the 
subject was multitasking (all catecholamine data was indexed by urinanalysis). In addition, 
Frankenhaeuser, Nordheden, Myrsten, & Post (I 970)discovered that those subjects with the highest 
scores on the vigilance task showed elevated levels of adrenaline, whereas lower execretion of 
adrenaline was associated with superior performance during the multitasking condition. Therefore, it 
would appear that adrenaline may modulate performance when the individual is "understimulated", 
whereas noradrenalin exerts a influence in the "overstimulation" situation. 
In a later study, Frankenhaeuser and Johannson (1971) studied performance during a variant of the 
Stroop task. In this study, subjects were asked to respond to both a "single-conflict" (i.e. conventional 
Stroop colour-word interference) and a "double-conflict" (i.e. the names of colours were presented to 
the subject via auditory means during Stroop presentations). These authors noted that the more 
effortful "double-conflict" produced a pattern of reduced performance combined with elevated 
adrenaline excretion and subjective distress. 
A number of studies have been performed to examine the role of catecholamine excretion during 
performance under environmental stressors. For example, Lundberg & Frankenhaeuser (1978) studied 
the ability to perform mental arithmetic under different noise conditions. In this study, subjects either 
experienced high orlow levels of personal control over noise intensity, i.e. subjects allowed to set noise 
intensity themselves (high control) or had the level of intensity set by a 'yoked' partner (Iow control). 
Urinanalysis revealed elevated levels of noradrenaline and cortisol excretion during the low control 
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condition. No differences in adrenaline excretion were found. 
The issue of personal control obviously had a large impact on subjects' perceptions and performance 
during the noise study. The primacy of personal control was highlighted by two later studies designed 
to induce low and high control situations. In the low-control study (Lundberg & F orsman, 1979), 
subjects performed a sensory vigilance task involving high monotony and unpredictability. The high-
control experiment (Frankenhaeuser, Lundberg, & Forsman, 1980) involved a choice-reaction time 
task, where subjects had the opportunity to choose and modify the stimulus rate (in order to optimise 
performance) throughout the experimental session. In both cases, self-rated distress and effort was 
compared with cortisol and adrenaline excretion. Data from both studies are illustrated in Figure 13 
below. 
It was noticeable that conditions oflow control promote an elevation of both subjective effort and 
distress. Therefore, subjects were invested effort under conditions of discomfort. This pattern of 
behaviour was associated with a combined elevation of cortisol and adrenaline. When subjects were 
provided with a high degree of personal control, this pattern was altered. In terms of hormonal activity, 
adrenaline excretion increased whilst cortisollevsls were reduced. Frankenhaeuser (1987) described 
the former "effort with distress" pattern as characterising a stressful working situation. However, the 
"effort without distress" pattern which typifies task involvement in a positive fashion is characterised in 
the high control situation. The positive experience of "effort without distress" is evident by the 
subjective ratings where effort is higher than the low control situation, but is accompanied by a decline 
of distress. 
The consequences of elevated cortisol for subjective stress have been confirmed elsewhere. For 
example, in the review by Wesnes & Warbuton (1983) evidence was presented that corticosteroid 
elevation is intimately associated with the degree of subjective uncertainty experienced by the 
individual, i.e. as provoked by real-life emergency situations. In addition, the injection of 
corti co steroids into subj ects produces a tense, alert state marked by irritability and emotional lability. 
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Figure 13. Subjective ratings and catecholamine excretion under conditions oflow (Lundberg & 
Forsman, 1979) and high control (Frankenhaeuser, 1987). 
These data illustrate three important points: (1) that adrenal-medullary excretion is associated with task 
involvement whilst adrenal-cortical excretion is linked to distress, (2) that not all experiences of 
effortful activity or fuel consumption are perceived in a negative fashion by the subject, and (3) that the 
appraisal of the task situation is crucial factor which determines the interaction between adrenal-
medullary and adrenal-cortical activity. This interaction determines whether "cognitive fuel" is 
consumed under negative or positive conditions. 
The investment of mental effort is perceived to be synonymous with controlled processing described by 
Schneider & Shiffrin (1977), and (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Paus, Mates, Radii, Hampl, & Husek 
(1988) performed a replication of their basic paradigm, where a consistent mapping task (CM) involved 
detecting letters from an array of digits, contrasted with a variable mapping task (VM) where random 
digits were located from an array of digits. Nine subjects participated in the experiment, performing a 
60min vigil under both CM and VM conditions. As expected, the number of hits in the CM condition 
was significantly higher than the VM condition. In addition, urinanalysis revealed elevated levels of 
noradrenalin and dopamine during the VM task (involving controlled processing and mental effort). 
The elevation of dopamine is suggestive given its proposed linkage to motor action control. No 
equivalent effect was found for either adrenaline or cortisol. 
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3.3.3 Psychophysiological measures of mental effort 
Kahneman (\973) dealt with the problem via the proposition that any prospective physiological index 
of processing load (i.e. mental effort) should fulfil three criteria to distinguish itselffrom miscellaneous 
sources of arousal, these criteria were as follows: (a) be sensitive to within-task variations in task 
demands, (b) reflect between-task differences elicited by qualitatively different cognitive operations, 
and (c) should capture individual differences in processing as individuals of different abilities perform 
the same cognitive task. 
Through extensive research and review, Kahneman (1973) selected pupillary dilation as the best 
candidate measure with respect to all three criteria. He reported a number of studies using a digit 
transformation task in conjunction with pupillary measurement (Kahneman, 1973). Using a number of 
manipulations, Kahrieman (1973) demonstrated that pupillary dilation increased steadily during digit 
presentation (i.e. assuming task demands are additive with each sucessive digit). 
This work was fortified by Beatty (I 982a) who studied the relationship between auditory vigilance 
performance and pupillary response. His analysis distinguished between two components of the 
pupillary response: (a) aphasic, pupillary dilation in response to targets and non-targets, and (b) the 
tonic or baseline pupillary diameter. Beatty (1982a) found the archetypal vigilance decrement (i.e. 
reduced sensitivity, conservative shift in response criterion) over 48 minutes of monitoring. These 
changes in performance were mirrored in the pattern of tonic pupillary diameter, but not in the baseline 
pupillary diameter. Beatty (1982b) reviews these findings amongst other data to endorse pupillary 
dilation as a measure of mental effort in line with the three criteria proposed by Kahneman (1973). 
A second candidate psychophysiological candidate to index mental effort (as opposed to arousal) was 
proposed by Mulder & Van Der Meulen (1973). These authors suggested that heart rate variability 
(indexed as the interbeat interval (IBI) of the heart in the time domain) may be a suitable candidate 
measure. However, further work suggested that raw IBI variability was too global a measure (i.e. 
susceptible to general activity in the eNS) and in a series of papers (Mulder, 1979a; Mulder, 1979b; 
Mulder, 1985; Mulder & Mulder, 1981), Mulder and colleagues suggested a two-step process whereby 
the raw IBI data is treated via power spectrum analysis to yield: 
(a) a low-frequency band (O.02-0.06Hz) where energy represents vasomotor activity involved in the 
regulation of body temperature 
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(b) a mid-frequency band (O.07-0.14Hz) where energy represents the short-term regulation of arterial 
blood pressure 
(c) a high-frequency band (O.15-0.50Hz) where energy reflects the effects of respiratory activity on IBI 
regularity. 
These authors have claimed that the mid-frequency band (also known as the O.IHz sinus arrhymia) is 
sensitive to the influence of mental effort. The conception of mental effort used by these researchers 
differs slightly from the one employed by Kahneman (1973). However, Mulder (1986) proposed that 
mental effort increased if task demands rise (as claimed by (Kahneman, 1973» or if performance must 
be maintained in the presence of stressors such as noise and sleeplessness. 
The O.IHz measure of sinus arrhymia has demonstrated sensitivity to a number of dimensions 
concerning stimulus evaluation, these have included: (a) the number of dimensions in a 
multidimensional classification task, (b) the number of comparisons in a sentence comprehension task, 
and (c) the number of items to be retained in a continuous working memory task (Mulder, 1979a; 
Mulder, 1979b; Mulder, 1985; Mulder & Mulder, 1981). These findings were replicated by Van 
Dellen, Aasman, Mulder, & Mulder (1985) and Aasman, Mulder, & Mulder (1987) who also employed 
a continuous working memory task (i.e. subjects asked to memorise a set of target items to be identified 
during subsequent presentation) and found that target loads of 4 or more caused power in the mid-
frequency bandwidth to significantly decline. 
It has been suggested that the sensitivity of the O.IHz component outside of these memory 
manipulations may be rather limited (lorna, 1992). Hqwever, several authors have successfully used 
the O.IHz component to study other aspects of performance. For example, Weimann (1989) presented 
subjects with a novel, mathematical problem-solving task following a period of training. His results 
revealed a negative correlation between mental effort (as indexed by the O.IHz component) and time of 
solution for each problem. This finding suggested that subjects tended to reduce effort investment if 
the solution time for a problem was particularly protracted. A detailed investigation of effortful 
activity during applied performance was conducted by Tattersall & Hockey (1995). Eleven trainee 
flight engineers participated in a 3-hour working session in a simulated flight cockpit during this study. 
The various duties of the subjects were classified into three grades of task activity: (a) supervisory 
monitoring (e.g. Iow-level checking and routine maintanence), (b) fault rectification (e.g. detection and 
diagnosis offamiliar fault states), and (c) problem-solving (e.g. detection and diagnosis of unfamiliar 
or abnormal fault states). This taxonomy was based on the tripartite classification produced by 
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(Rasmussen & Jensen, 1974) of skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based levels of behaviour. For 
the purpose of the current discussion, we are concerned with the latter activity of problem-solving. 
These authors also employed the O.lHz component ofHRV as an index of mental effort. Their results 
revealed higher levels of mental effort during problem-solving than either supervisory monitoring or 
fault rectification. This study corroborated the notion that higher levels of strategic mental effort may 
be necessitated during novel problem orientation than plan selection within a known task context. 
The O.lHz component has also been used to study the influence of biological stressors such as stress 
. and sleeplessness on performance in the field. For instance, O.lHz was used to quantify mental effort 
during a post-work battery of human performance tests (Mulders, Meijman, O'Hanlon, & Mulder, 
1982). The authors found that effortful performance in the post-work phase (as indexed by O.lHz) was 
indicative of absenteeism and work-related stress. Similar studies have been conducted in recent times 
to study the relationship between work activity and mental effort for driving instructors (Meijman, 
1995; Meijman, 1997). 
The empirical chapters will use the O.lHz component of HR V in order to index psychophysiological 
effort. The following section will describe each individual study and its associated hypotheses. 
3.4 Introduction to individual studies and associated hypotheses 
Four experimental studies are described in the following four chapters. Each will focus on different 
aspects of the mental effort regulation model within the task context of sustained perceptual-motor 
behaviour. 
The initial study described in Chapter 4 represents an investigation into individual differences, sleep 
deprivation and mental effort regulation. Based on performance during the control session, these 
subjects were divided into two groups of 'good' and 'bad' performers. The model would predict that 
good performance is achieved via mental effort investment coupled to an awareness of external 
performance. However, it may be difficult for those in the good performance group to sustain a 
successful policy of effort investment in the presence of sleep deprivation. This hypothesis is based on 
the assumption that sleep deprivation accelerates the magnitude of internal, energetical costs (e.g. 
reduced alertness), which requires compensatory effort at the expense of task-related effort. 
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Meanwhile, those in the poor performance group may invest effort at a significantly reduced level 
because their awareness of internal feedback is elevated relative to external feedback. It is anticipated 
that sleep deprivation will inflate this tendency and lead to a further reduction of task-related effort 
investment. 
The first study hypothesised that sleep deprivation accelerated the evolution of energetical costs over a 
sustained period of task activity. This aspect of effort regulation was investigated further in the second 
study described in Chapter 5. This experiment was concerned with how the magnitude and category of 
biological stressor affected mental effort regulation. Therefore, subjects performed a sustained, 
perceptual-motor task in presence of different degrees of sleep deprivation (i.e. a night of 4 hours sleep 
compared to a full night without sleep). It is hypothesised that a full night without sleep would inflate 
energetical costs and lead to effort conservation relative to partial sleep deprivation, i.e. magnitude of 
stressor would be proportionate to the inflation of energetical costs. The model of effort regulation 
emphasises the significance of feedback and awareness of internal and external cues. This second 
study contrasted the influence of sleep deprivation with alcoholic intoxication in order to explore how 
biological stressors impinged on the process offeedback appraisal. It is postulated that feedback 
appraisal may be subject to perceptual bias due to this line of influence, which may limit the 
effectiveness of subsequent effort policy. In addition, the second study is concerned with the 
impairment of a real-world, perceptual-motor task - driving behaviour. 
The issue of perceptual bias and feedback appraisal is explored further via the study described in 
Chapter 6. This experiment was also concerned with the role of effort regulation and driver 
impairment. It is postulated that the perception of external cues during driving may be distorted by the 
presence of stressors such as alcohol and fatigue. Furthermore, driving represents an example of 
skilled performance where the occurrence of errors may be low and/or individuals may have a tendency 
to appraise performance as superior to objective assessment. It was hypothesised that the provision of 
objective performance feedback would counteract these sources of perceptual bias. In addition, 
performance feedback should increase the salience of external cues and promote a policy of effort 
investment. 
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The final study (Chapter 7) will investigate the process offeedback appraisal during sustained 
performance under conditions oflow and high task demand. It is hypothesised that demanding tasks 
emphasise external cues at the expense of internal feedback. However, if a task is undemanding, effort 
regulation tends to focus on internal feedback of energetical state. A second aspect of this study is 
concerned with the dual demands on effort regulation exerted by the task schedule (i.e. demand x 
duration of task activity). It is proposed that a demanding schedule will increase the antagonism 
between the need to invest effort and the desire to reduce effort. This aspect of effort regulation is 
explored via a manipulation of task schedule. In addition, this laboratory study extends the variety of 
subjective variables in order to present a more coherent index of energetical costs. 
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4 OPERATOR CAPABILITY, SLEEP DEPRIVATION AND SUSTAINED 
PERCEPTUAL-MOTOR PERFORMANCEs 
4.1 Abstract 
A study was conducted to investigate the influence of sleep deprivation on sustained perceptual-motor 
performance. Fifteen male subjects performed sixty minutes of tracking in combination with a 
secondary RT task under two conditions: (a) following a normal night of sleep, and (b) following a 
night without sleep. Data were collected with respect to primary task performance, psychophysiology 
and subjective indices. The subjects were divided into two groups of high- and low-competence 
performers with respect to tracking accuracy during the control condition (a). On this basis, two related 
hypotheses were tested: (i) are high-competence (HC) subjects characterised by higher investment of 
mental effort during sustained performance, and (ii) if so, does the greater expenditure of effort and 
associated costs put HC subjects at a disadvantage in the presence of an additional stressor such as 
sleep deprivation? Both hypotheses were contradicted by the results of the experiment. Low-
competence (LC) subjects invested a higher level of mental effort regardless of experimental condition. 
This effect may have reflected a compensatory strategy in response to lower levels of electrocortical 
arousal as indexed by occipital alpha from the EEG record. By contrast, HC subjects were 
characterised by a higher level of performance efficiency. In addition, the pattern of costs associated 
with performance under both conditions revealed a number of significant differences between the two 
groups. The consequences of operator capability for effort policy are discussed, with a particular 
emphasis on the role of internal and external sources of feedback for the formation of effort policy. 
4.2 Introduction 
Few studies have addressed the interaction between individual differences and mental effort strategies. 
The paucity of this empirical data is unfortunate because effort policy incorporate important 
interactions between stable traits or habits and cognitive-energetic mechanisms. For example, 
individuals who inherently gravitate towards higher levels of goal aspiration may expend higher levels 
of mental effort relative to those with lower aspirations (Locke & Latham, 1990; Weiner, 1985). 
5 A partial report of this study was published as Fairclough, S. H., & Ward, N. 1. (\996). A protocol for the assessment of 
subjective sleepiness. In H. F. Society (Ed.), Human Factors and ErgonomiCS Society 40th Annual Meeting (Vol. 2, pp. 
1283). Philadephia: Human Factors Society .. 
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According to Schonpflug (1986b), there are three major sources of individual differences which may 
influence mental effort policy: (a) personality traits, (b) acquired principles of mental effort regulation, 
and (c) the habitual focus of mental effort regulation. 
The scale developed by Dornic, Ekehammar, & Laaksonen (1991) to measure tolerance for mental 
effort investment is the only example of a trait questionnaire (to the author's knowledge), where effort 
regulation is explicitly addressed as a stable source of individual differences. In most research on 
individual differences, effort regulation is only implicated in an indirect sense. For example, as a 
manifestation of underlying personality temperament (Strelau, 1985), or a factor within the interaction 
between personality traits and vigilance performance (Davies, Jones, & Taylor, 1984; Matthews, 
Davies, & Holley, 1993) or test anxiety (Eysenck, 1982; Eysenck, 1986). The link between personality 
traits and effort regulation was demonstrated by Schultz & Schonpflug (1982). These authors divided 
subjects into extroverts or introverts, and low and high anxiety subjects. During task performance, it 
was found that introverts and low anxiety subjects showed much slower levels of task disengagement 
(i.e. effort conservation) relative to extroverts and anxious subjects respectively. 
Individuals may acquire specific principles of mental effort regulation based on previous experience. 
For example, extremes of the self-efficacy continuum are characterised by Bandura (1997) as 
contrasting perspectives on the nature of ability, i.e. efficacious individuals believe that ability is 
acquirable, whereas individuals with low self-efficacy assume that ability is inherent. The belief that 
ability may be acquired via persistence and experience may be a necessary precondition for mental 
effort investment under certain circumstances. By contrast, an assumption that all ability is inherent 
may provoke only a token investment of mental effort followed quickly by conservation if success is 
not apparent. Karasek (1979) hypothesised along similar lines, according to his model, highly 
competent individuals only tended to conserve effort under extreme demands (e.g. extreme fatigue or 
stress, repeated failure), whereas those less competent tended to adopt a strategy of effort conservation 
much earlier. 
It may be hypothesised that all three groups (traits, principles, focus) may interact to influence mental 
effort policy. For example, a person predisposed towards test anxiety may habitually adopt a low-
efficacy strategy based on indirect control, i.e. a sensitivity to internal feedback concerned with 
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symptoms of sympathetic arousal. This cyclic chain of causality was inherent within the Self 
Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model proposed by WelIs & Matthews (1994) (see Section 
2.2.5 for description). Within the tripartite architecture of the S-REF model, the focus of effort 
regulation originates on the basis ofIower-level feedback or from self-knowledgelbeliefs at the upper 
level, which is translated into a coping response or principle of effort regulation at the middle level, 
which in turn, is based on stable traits inherent in upper-level self-knowledge. The difficulty associated 
with this conceptualisation is to pinpoint the proportionate influence of each of the three groups within 
this bi-directional cycle of causality. 
The ability of an individual to sustain performance may be characterised according to their maximal 
capacity with respect to expenditure/replenishment ratio. This concept has been termed the 'coping 
capacity' of the individual, i.e. a set of resources which may be devoted to task performance 
(Schonpflug, 1983). This coping capacity of the individual is a similar concept to the zones of 
maximal adaptability prominent in the model of stress and performance proposed by Hancock & Warm 
(1989). This original conceptualisation was reformulated in Section 2.2.7 (Figure 10) as the capacity of 
the individual to respond to the demands of performance and to compensate for those energetical costs 
associated with performance. 
The focus of the current experiment is on the principles and the focus of mental effort policy, 
particularly in relation to competence or proficiency. According to Schonpflug (1983), the competence 
of an individual refers to a repertory of mental and motor skills that are stable over time. The 
interaction between competence and mental effort expenditure is important, as the relationship between 
investment and performance may be mitigated by the competence of the individual. If a person is 
highly skilled, it may be predicted that less effort would be required to raise the level of performance 
effectiveness. Schonpflug (1983) also claimed that the total competence of the individual may define 
the maximal capacity of that individual. In other words, the limits of our coping capacity with respect 
to either performance or costs are determined by our level of competence. 
In the same paper, Schonpflug proposed that the level of mental effort investment determined the 
proportion of total competence, which may be utilised in any given situation. Therefore, high 
competence should improve the efficiency and effectiveness of performance (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) 
and this is the means by which competence may extend the limits of our adaptability to stress, i.e. 
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'stress' as used in a generic sense to describe the influence of task demand and 
environmentaVbiological stressors (Hancock & Warm, 1989). 
The precursor to this study was an earlier investigation conducted by Schultz and Schonpflug (1979) 
and described in a later paper by the second author (Schonpflug, 1983)6 These authors had their 
subjects perform 'mental tasks' of differing levels of difficulty in the presence of different noise 
intensity. The subjects were consequently divided into three groups according to the frequency of 
errors (high, intermediate and low) and the data were re-analysed. This second analyses revealed no 
differences between the groups in terms of either task difficulty or noise level. However, the 
researchers discovered that the less competent group had the shortest response time even when making 
a correct response. In addition, these subjects were the least affected by either increased task demand 
or higher levels of noise. On this basis, it was concluded that subjects in the low competence group 
had adopted a conservation strategy, i.e. low outputllow activity, which effectively insulated them from 
the influence of either noise or task demand. On the other hand, the high competence group sustained 
aspiration level and performance accuracy, but were forced to reduce their level of aspiration under the 
high noise condition. Therefore, the presence of noise had a substantive influence on this group 
because they were engaged in effortful activity. 
The study performed by Schultz and Schonpflug illustrated how the level of competence of an 
individual may influence effort policy and therefore, exert a profound influence on performance in the 
presence of stressors. In this case, those who exerted mental effort found their coping capacity 
overextended in the presence of an environmental stressor. Paradoxically, those who were less 
competent did not suffer to the same degree. 
The current study represents a partial replication of the SchuItz and Schonpflug study. In this case, 
subjects performed a sustained, perceptual-motor task under two conditions, following a night of 
normal sleep or sleep deprivation. Therefore, subjects must regulate mental effort over a prolonged 
period of performance with or without the presence of a second stressor. In an early study of sleep 
deprivation, Wilkinson (1962) reported that subjects with the best performance following a period 
without sleep, exhibited a higher level of muscular tension. This study supported the view that subjects 
exerted higher levels of effort in order to compensate for the debilitating influence sleep deprivation on 
6 The original was only available in tbe original Gennan at tbe time of writing. 
Page 76 
performance. Therefore, in accordance with the logic ofSchultz and Schonpflug's finding, if 
competence is associated with high effort expenditure per se, we may expect the presence of an 
additional stressor such as sleep deprivation to have a greater impact on the performance and effort 
policy of the most competent individuals. 
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Experimental design. 
The study was designed as a repeated measures design. The subjects performed an identical tracking 
task under two conditions: (a) following a night of normal sleep, and (b) following a night without 
sleep. In addition to the main effect of sleep deprivation, time-on-task (TOT) was measured by 
comparing data obtained during the initial fifteen-minute period of the task with data from the final 
fifteen minutes of the task. Two subject sessions were scheduled per day, one in the morning (10:00) 
and the other in the afternoon (14:00). All subjects participated at the same schedule time (either 
morning or afternoon) for each session. The order of presentation for (a) and (b) was counterbalanced 
across the subject group. 
4.3.2 Apparatus and Experimental Task. 
The perceptual-motor task utilised for this experiment was written in Think's CTM and ran on a 
Macintosh Quadra 700 with a 14" colour monitor. Subjects were required to track lateral target 
movements using the mouse. Specifically, the mouse controlled a white 'subject' cursor moving within 
a darker rectangle representing the software-controlled cursor. If the subject cursor made contact with 
the computer cursor, a tone sounded and the colour of the subject cursor turned from white to red. All 
subjects controlled the mouse with their right hand. A depiction of the computer screen is shown 
below in Figure 14. The speed of the tracking target was set to an intermediate level and its movements 
were determined by a random seeding process, i.e. that determined the frequency oflateral reverses 
performed by the computer-controlled tracking target. The movement of the computer-controlled 
cursor was stable across the whole task session. 
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target is controlled by the computer mouse 
area where 
targets will appear 
Figure 14. A representation of the screen image of the experimental task. 
The subjects were also asked to perform a cognitive, vigilance task (Warm & Dember, 1998) in 
conjunction with tracking activity. The targets for this task appeared in the upper portion of the screen 
above the tracking task (Figure 14). The cognitive, vigilance task took the form of a letter 
identification activity. The subjects were presented with a Landolt C, which was shown in four 
different orientations (north, west, east, south). The subjects were instructed to recognise the easterly 
orientation as a target and all other orientations as non-targets (Figure IS). Subjects responded by 
pressing the mouse button and a response was only required in the presence of a target (Figure IS). In 
addition, each stimulus appeared onscreen for 600 msec, the event rate was 1.5 per minute and twenty 
percent of all RT stimuli were legitimate targets. The sampling rate used to collect data was 16000 Hz. 
Target Non - targets 
c u 
Figure 15. The stimuli used for the target detection task. 
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The subjects performed the perceptual-motor task continuously for sixty minutes. An eight-channel 
analogue-to-digital converter (MacLab TM) was used to collect electroencephalograph (EEG) and 
electrocardiogram (ECG) data. This apparatus was connected to bioamplifiers and Chart™ software 
running on a Macintosh Powerbook™. 
4.3.3 Subjects 
Fifteen male subjects participated in the experimental study. The subject group were recruited from the 
local population and were paid for their participation. All subjects had 20120 near visual acuity with 
the exception of two subjects, who had 20/40 acuity. The average age of the subject group was 32.4 
years old (s.d. = 12.4, maximum = 59, minimum = 20). None of the subjects were shift workers nor on 
permanent medication. All subjects were asked to abstain from tea or coffee for 4 hours before the trial 
and only to consume a light meal before the test session. 
4.3.4 Experimental Measures. 
A number of data collection techniques were deployed during the study. These techniques have been 
divided into three distinct groups. 
Primary task measures included data to index both tracking and RT performance. With respect to the 
former, these included: Root Mean Square error (RMS) and frequency of collisions, i.e. when the 
subject-controlled cursor made contact with the computer-controlled cursor. For the RT task, the level 
of target accuracy (% of hits, false alarms and misses) and mean reaction time (in ms) to targets and 
non-target were captured on the basis of raw data'. 
Psychophysiological measures constituted electrocortical arousal as indexed by the EEG record and 
heart rate variability from the ECG data. EEG data were collected at 100Hz from a single bipolar 
1 The level of RT accuracy was generally quite low. TIris finding is indicative of inadequate pilotiug of difficulty levels and 
instructions to subjects. Post·hoc feedback from subjects indicated that the event rate was too high and subjects elected to 
disregard the RT task in to sustain adequate tracking perfonnance. It is difficult to assess the RT data as this task was 
largely ignored by subjects who bad received no task prioritisation instructions. Therefore, these data were not analysed in 
the results section. 
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connection at C3 - O2 referred to Al at the left earlobe (International 10-20 System). The resulting data 
were subjected to a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) analysis in order to calculate the level of power in 
three EEG bandwidths, i.e. theta (4-7Hz), alpha (8.5-12.5Hz), and beta (14-25Hz). These data were 
subjected to the bursts analysis described by Kecklund & Akerstedt (1993). Using this analysis, EEG 
power spectra were quantified for each consecutive 5 second period and baselined to pre-test 
performance. A burst of either theta, alpha or beta activity corresponded to the number of 5 second 
periods during every five minute period where energy spectra were equal to or greater than 125% of 
baseline. 
The electrocardiogram trace (ECG) was recorded at 100Hz. The subsequent inter-beat interval (IBI) 
was subjected to power spectrum analysis in order to distinguish three bandwidths (upper, middle and 
lower). This analysis was performed using CARSP ANTI' analysis software (Mulder & Schweizer, 
1993). The mean power in the mid-frequency bandwidth (0.07 - 0.14Hz) was calculated to represent a 
psychophysiological index of mental effort (Aasman, Mulder, & Mulder, 1987; Mulder, 1979a; 
Mulder, 1979b; Vicente, Thornton, & Moray, 1987). 
Subjective measures were administered during pre-test and post-test periods. These measures included 
the UWIST Mood Adjective Scale (Matthews, Jones, & Chamberlain, 1990), the raw version of the 
NASA-Task Load Index (Byers, Bittner, & Hill, 1989; Hart & Staveland, 1988), and a bipolar Effort 
scale (Zijlstra & van Doom, 1985). 
4.3.5 Experimental Protocol. 
The subjects were asked to complete a number of consent forms in the week before participation and 
were instructed with respect to the sleep deprivation protocol. The subjects were informed that they 
would be expected to remain awake throughout the night prior to one of the two experimental sessions. 
The subjects verified their compliance with the sleep deprivation regime by telephoning an answering 
machine (which logged time and date) every hour between midnight and 8AM". In addition, subjects 
signed a consent form in which they agreed not to drive a vehicle or engage in any activity that may be 
considered dangerous following a night of sleep deprivation (until they had obtained a period of sleep). 
Finally, the subjects were asked to specify if they wished to be brought to the Institute by taxi on the 
8 Al 9AM, !he subjects were contacted by !he Institute every hour Wltil !heir experimental schedule 10 confinn that !hey 
remained awake. 
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day of their sleep deprivation session, or if they wished to make their own transportation arrangement, 
i.e. to be brought and collected by a spouse, family member or friend. 
On arrival at the Institute, the subjects were presented with written instructions, to describe the 
experimental task and the requirements of the study. The subjects perused this document whilst EEG 
and ECG electrodes were attached. Subjects were then seated in a separate room and observed by the 
experimenter via a one-way mirror. An intercom was used in order to communicate with the subject. 
The subjects were allowed to practice the experimental task for fifteen minutes. During the control 
condition, this period was used to collect baseline psychophysiological data. When the training session 
had concluded, the subjects completed a pre-test index of subjective measures. Once the questionnaires 
had been completed, an opportunity was provided to resolve any queries or uncertainties on the part of 
the subjects. 
The subjects performed the tracking task continuously for sixty minutes in both conditions. Once the 
task was terminated, the subjects were required to complete a post-test index of subjective 
questionnaires. The subjects' electrodes were removed following this point and the subjects were both 
debriefed and paid or scheduled for their next session. There was a period of seven days between each 
subject session. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Classification of high- and low-competence subjects. 
The subject group was divided into two groups of six high-competence and low-competence 
individuals. This distinction was based on tracking performance during the control session (i.e. 
following a night of normal sleep), specifically on the number of collisions made by each subject. 
High-competence (HC) subjects were classified as those subjects who made 60 collisions or less during 
the control condition. Low-competence (LC)subjects were identified as those individuals who made 
120 collisions or more. There were six subjects in each group. Three subjects who fell into the >60 
and <100 collisions zone were omitted from all future analysis. A frequency distribution chart for 
these data is shown below in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. Frequency distribution for total number of collisions during the control conditions 
(N=15). 
This classification of the subjects was checked against experimental scheduling information to check 
for possible confounding due to the time-of-day variable, i.e. given that half the subjects were tested in 
the morning and half during the afternoon. No evidence was found that time-of-day exerted an 
influence over the membership of either subject group, i.e. four of the HC group were tested during the 
afternoon, whereas LC subjects were equally split between morning and afternoon sessions. In 
addition, a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test was performed to test for age differences between the 
two groups. No significant age differences were found between the two groups. 
4.4.2 Primary task performance 
These data were averaged during the initial and final fifteen-minute period of each experimental 
session, i.e. to investigate time-on-task effects (TOT). A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOV A (GROUP x CONDITION 
x TOT) was performed to confirm the group classification and to investigate the influence of other 
main effects for the frequency of collisions. As anticipated, these analyses revealed a significant main 
effect due to GROUP [E(l, 10)=7.0, n < 0.05] in the expected direction. In addition, both CONDITION 
[E(l, 10)=13.9, n < 0.01) and TOT [E(l, 10)= 9.9, n < 0.05] were significant main effects, i.e. collision 
frequency significantly increased in the presence of sleep deprivation and due to TOT. 
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An identical analysis was applied to the RMS error data in order to consider tracking performance not 
exclusively associated with error. This ANOV A revealed identical significant main effects due to 
GROUP [E(I, 10)=9.9, 11 < 0.05], CONDITION [E(l,IO)= 20.4,11 < 0.01], and TOT [K(1,1O)=269, 11 < 
0.01] as the previous analysis. In addition, a significant 2 x 2 x 2 interaction was present [E(1,10)=4.9, 
11 = 0.05]. Post-hoc testing (via Tukey HSD) indicated that RMS error was not significantly different 
during the initial period of the control and sleep deprivation sessions for highly competent subjects. 
4.4.3 Psychophysiology 
A series of2 x 2 x 2 ANOV As were performed to explore the influence of the three main effects on the 
frequency of theta, alpha and beta bursts. No significant effects were observed in the analysis of theta 
bursts. The analysis of alpha bursts revealed a significant main effect due to GROUP [E(I, 10)=5.1,11 < 
0.05], which indicated that the frequency of alpha bursts was significantly higher for the low 
competency subjects. This effect is illustrated in Figure 17. There was also a significant main effect for 
TOT [E(I, 10)=8.1,11 < 0.05], i.e. the frequency of alpha bursts tended to increase between the initial 
and final period of task performance. The analysis of beta bursts revealed only a significant main 
effect for TOT [E(I, 10)=14.2, 11 < 0.01], i.e. the frequency of beta bursts declined between the initial 
and final period of task performance. 
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Figure 17. Mean frequency of alpha bursts (per 5 minute period) between high and Le subjects 
in both conditions (N=12). 
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The mean power in the middle bandwidth of heart rate variability was subjected to log transformation 
and baselined to the training session of the control condition. A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOV A revealed a main 
effect of marginal significance for GROUP [E(1,10)=4.3, Q = 0.08]. This effect indicated that the LC 
subjects exerted a higher level of psychophysiological effort relative to the HC group, regardless of 
experimental condition. In addition, there was a significant main effect due to TOT I!( I, I 0)= 43.2, Q < 
0.01], i.e. the level of psychophysiological effort was significantly lower during the final fifteen 
minutes of performance. 
4.4.4 Subjective data 
The data from the subjective index of questionnaires were subjected to 2 x 2 x 2 ANOV A analyses 
(GROUP x CONDITION x TOT). In this particular case, TOT was measured in terms ofpre- and 
post-test scores on all subjective scales. 
The analysis of the bipolar Effort scale revealed a significant main effect due to TOT [E( I, I 0)= 11.9, Q 
< 0.01], i.e. subjective estimates of mental effort were higher following task activity (M = 62.9) than 
during the pre-test period (M = 46.3). In addition, there was a significant 2 x 2 interaction between 
GROUP and CONDITION [E(I,IO)= 5.2, Q < 0.01]. Post-hoc testing revealed that HC subjects 
perceived a higher level of mental effort during the sleep deprivation condition, whereas the LC group 
perceived no distinction between the experimental conditions with respect to subjective effort. This 
interaction is illustrated below in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Mean ratings of subjective effort from the sUbjective effort scale (Zijlstra & van 
Doom, 1985) for each experimental condition for both groups of subjects (N=12). Note: written 
labels included from the scale. 
The analysis of the raw NASA-TLX data revealed a number of significant effects. The results of the 
TLX analyses are shown below in Table S. It was apparent that subjects perceived an increase of 
mental workload between the pre- and post -test administrations. In specific terms, subjective estimates 
of mental demand, physical demand and frustration all increased over TOT. 
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Variable GROUP CONDITION TOT INTERACTIONS 
A B C 
Mental demand .E(1,10)=IS.6 AxBxC 
Q < 0.01 1':(1,10) = 7.5 
0<0.05 
Physical .E( 1, 10)=21.2 
demand 0<0.01 
Temporal AxBxC 
demand 1':(1,10) = 14.3 
0<0.01 
Performance AxB 
1':(1,10) = 4.4 
I1 < 0.05 
Effort 
Frustration 1':(1,10) =19.3, 1':(1,10) = 7.9 
10<0.01 I1 < 0.05 
Subjective 1':(1,10) = IS.3 
mental Q < 0.05 
workload 
Table S. Results of Raw Task Load Index (RTLX) analyses (N=12). 
The only main effect due to the GROUP variables observed during the RTLX analysis was the finding 
that LC subjects experienced a higher level of fiustration, regardless of experimental condition, 
compared to the HC group. 
A number of interaction effects were found during the analyses of the RTLX as shown in Table 5. The 
post-hoc testing of the mental demand data revealed that pre·test ratings of the LC subjects were 
significantly lower than their HC counterparts, but only during the sleep deprivation condition. 
A similar effect was observed with respect to temporal demands. This interaction is shown in Figure 
19. Post-hoc testing revealed that pre-test ratings of temporal demands were lower for LC subjects 
relative to the HC group during sleep deprivation. In addition, LC subjects perceived temporal 
demands to increase during the sleep deprivation session, whereas HC subjects did not. It was also 
apparent that post-task ratings of temporal demands increased for the high competent subjects (Q < 
0.05). 
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Figure 19. Subjective ratings oftemporal demands from the RTLX for both groups across both 
conditions (N= 12). 
The operator performance sub-scale of the RTLX assessed subjects' perceptions of their own level of 
performance. The significant interaction between GROUP x CONDITION (Table 5) was subjected to 
post-hoc analysis, which revealed that HC subjects perceived their performance to be significantly 
superior in the control condition but worse following a night without sleep. However, the LC group 
did not perceive any similar decline due to sleep deprivation. This interaction is shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20. Subjective ratings of operator performance from the RTLX for both groups across 
both conditions (N=12). 
The UWIST mood scale was analysed in tenns of three principle components: energetic arousal (EA), 
tense arousal (TA), and hedonic tone (HT). The analysis of EA revealed only a significant interaction 
of GROUP x CONDITION. Post-hoc testing indicated that HC subjects experienced a decline of EA 
due to sleep deprivation whereas the LC group did not. The analysis of TA revealed a significant main 
effect of CONDITION [I(l,IO)= 5.9, Il < 0.01], i.e. tense arousal was significantly higher in the sleep 
deprivation condition, but no other significant effects. With respect to the final mood component, it 
was found that HT was significantly reduced due to TOT, i.e. all subjects experienced higher negative 
affect with increasing TOT. 
4.4.5 Performance Efficiency Index. 
The efficiency of performance was operationalised by representing the relationship between 
psychophysiological effort and primary task perfonnance. This representation is based on the analysis 
described by (Meijman, 1995). 
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The O.IHz data were expressed as a percentage change from initial data collected during the training 
session of the control condition, i.e. increasing positive percentage values being indicative of increased 
mental effort (Meijman, 1995). The quality oftracking performance was represented by the number of 
collision for each group. Both groups of data were quantified at 5-minute intervals (excepting the 
initial 5-minute period) and are plotted for both groups across both conditions in Figure 21. 
The efficiency analysis in Figure 21 illustrates how sleep deprivation made a more substantive impact 
on tracking performance rather than the level of mental effort. It is also apparent that high competent 
subjects were characterised by a higher level of efficiency (i.e. lower mental effort, superior 
performance) regardless of the experimental condition. It should be noted that sleep-deprived, HC 
subjects generally achieved a higher level of efficiency than fully rested, LC subjects. 
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Figure 21. Performance efficiency as represented by the relationship between tracking 
performance (frequency of collisions) and psychophysiological mental effort for both groups 
across both conditions (N=12). Note: high x-values are synonymous with poor performance 
whereas high y-values are associated with an increase of mental effort. 
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4.5 Discussion 
The data analysis revealed that the lower level of tracking performance exhibited by LC subjects was 
accompanied by a decline in electrocortical arousal (Figure 17) and an increase in psychophysiological 
effort relative to the HC group. These findings contradict one of the main hypotheses of the study, i.e. 
that HC subjects attain superior performance via higher effort investment. 
The subjective data indicated that LC subjects were less affected by the sleep deprivation manipulation 
than the HC group. For instance, LC subjects did not mobilise subjective effort in response to sleep 
deprivation (Figure 18). In addition, LC subjects perceived neither a decline of energetic arousal nor a 
fall in the quality of performance (Figure 20) when deprived of sleep. This insensitivity to the sleep 
deprivation manipulation contrasted to the perceptions ofHC subjects, who generally assessed a 
decline of energy and performance and sought to invest subjective effort as a means of compensation. 
Therefore, the magnitude of energetical costs associated with performance showed a relative increase 
due to sleep deprivation, but only for HC subjects. 
There is a caveat to this statement concerning the main effect due to GROUP associated with perceived 
frustration (Table 5). It was apparent that LC subjects perceived their level of frustration to be higher 
than those in HC group regardless of the experimental condition. This cost was not accompanied by 
any other affective change (from the UWIST Mood Scale), however, it does provide circumstantial 
evidence that either: (a) LC subjects were aware of their frequent error count and were frustrated by 
their inability or unwillingness to improve performance, or (b) LC subjects were less comfortable than 
HC subjects within the test scenario per se and experienced frustration due to test anxiety (Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992). With respect to hypothesis (a), it was apparent that LC subjects assessed their 
performance to be inferior to HC subjects, but only during the control condition (Figure 20). 
The analyses of performance, psychophysiology and subjective measures indicated that the poor 
performance ofLC subjects was associated with a higher rate of effort expenditure. However, this 
additional effort investment did not improve performance effectiveness (Figure 21). Therefore, it is 
hypothesised that LC subjects exhibited a higher rate of effort expenditure in order to compensate for 
reduced electrocortical arousal (Figure 17). Psychophysiological evidence from the EEG supported 
this conclusion, the frequency of alpha bursts was significantly higher for LC subjects regardless of 
Page 90 
sleep deprivation. It may be postulated that an increased susceptibility to boredom or daytime 
sleepiness may represent candidate trait variables responsible for the poor performance exhibited by 
LC subjects. A number of trait questionnaires have been produced such as the Boredom Proneness 
scale (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986) and the Epworth scale to quantify susceptibility to daytime sleepiness 
(Johns, 1992). In addition, the former scale has been linked to individual differences with respect to 
performance in the vigilance domain (Sawin & Scerbo, 1995). It is important to note that both 
increased psychophysiological effort and reduced electrocortical arousal characterised the LC subjects 
in both experimental conditions. This factor may be presented as evidence that a stable trait variable 
was responsible for differences between LC and HC subjects. 
In the Schultz and Schonpflug study (Schonpflug, 1983), LC subjects were characterised by an 
acquired principle of effort conservation. When these subjects encountered resistance from a stressor, 
they systematically reduced levels of aspiration and activity with a consequent decline of performance. 
The LC subjects in the current study were characterised by poor performance in combination with 
relatively higher levels of psychophysiological mental effort, alpha activity and subjective frustration. 
These multidimensional indicators indicate that LC subjects in the current study were characterised by 
a highly inefficient strategy of mental effort investment, where maximum effort is paired with 
performance of minimal effectiveness. 
The effort policy enacted by the LC group may be described as inefficient investment in both 
experimental conditions. For example, the efficiency index shown in Figure 21 illustrates how sleep-
deprived HC subjects performed with greater efficiency than fully rested LC subjects. These findings 
indicate that the relationship between performance capacity and effort investment was different for HC 
and LC subjects. Given that performance capacity may be described in terms of trait and state 
variables, there are two possible explanations for this distinction: (a) that the HC group had an 
advantage with respect to trait characteristics such as superior sensory capabilities or perceptual-motor 
ability, (b) that the LC group were at a disadvantage due to transient state variables, or (c) a 
combination of both trait and state factors. The hypothesis (a) is almost impossible to investigate on a 
post-hoc basis and seems unlikely (given subjects were tested for visual acuity and no age differences 
were found between the two groups), but cannot be ruled out completely. However, there was 
evidence to support an influence of state variables as described in hypothesis (b). Based on the analysis 
of psychophysiology, it was apparent that LC subjects must invest effort in order to compensate for 
higher levels of alpha in the EEG record, i.e. which has been linked with a general degradation of 
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sustained performance (Gale, 1977; O'Hanlon & Beatty, 1977; Thackray, Bailey, & Touchstone, 
1977), however this link may not be consistent (parasuraman, 1983). 
This investment of compensatory mental effort may effectively limit the maximum performance 
capacity of those LC individuals. Given that maximum capacity is influenced by the level of task-
related effort (Schonpflug, 1983), the diversion of mental effort to compensate for high alpha activity 
may ultimately represent a limitation on effort investment into task-related activity. On the other hand, 
the HC subjects do not have to compensate for this category of energetical cost to the same extent and a 
higher proportion of the effort invested by HC subjects is devoted to task activities, resulting in 
superior levels of performance efficiency. A diagram to represent this relationship between effort and 
capacity is shown below in Figure 22, based on the analysis ofSchonpflug (1983). Therefore, efficient 
HC subjects must only invest 50% of mental effort to achieve maximum capacity. Whereas the LC 
subjects require 100% of the available mental effort to achieve a lower level of performance (relative to 
HC subjects), i.e. to perform the task and to compensate for increased alpha in the EEG. 
High-Competence Group Low-Competence Group 
r 
100'Yo 
Mental Effort 100'Yo Mental Effort 100'Yo 
Figure 22. Hypothetical relationship between capacity and mental effort for both groups of 
subjects. 
It was noted that the HC subjects showed greater sensitivity to the subjective costs associated with 
sleep deprivation than the LC group, e.g. reduced energy, poorer performance, higher level of effort 
investment. It was also found that LC subjects perceived mental and temporal task demands to reduce 
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during the pre-test period of the sleep deprivation session (Figure 19). This perceived decline of task 
demands might indicate a reduced sensitivity to the increase of workload induced by sleep deprivation. 
These interaction effects may be used as evidence that: (a) LC subjects were unaware of the influence 
of sleep deprivation on energy and performance, therefore, made no attempt to increase effort, or (b) 
that awareness of low energy and poor performance peaked during the control condition for the LC 
subjects, and these individuals were subsequently insensitive to the supplemental demands of sleep 
deprivation. This latter hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 22, i.e. the difference between both 
conditions is minimal for the LC subjects. This increased separation for the HC group is intended to 
represent the higher adaptability of these subjects, i.e. they have the option of several degrees of effort 
investment above the control condition. On the other hand, the only effort policy available to the LC 
subjects is one of maximum effort investment, regardless of the presence of sleep deprivation. The 
lack of adaptability or control over effort regulation for those LC subjects may account for a reduced 
sensitivity to those additional costs introduced by sleep deprivation. This analysis emphasises the link 
between performance efficiency and adaptability of effort policy. A similar analysis was performed by 
Hancock (1986) to illustrate the interaction between competence and resistance to heat stress during 
performance, i.e. competent subjects were more capable of resisting the debilitating influence of heat 
stress on performance. 
It is postulated that a fundamental link exists between the two hypotheses (a) and (b) - the connection 
between awareness (offeedback) and adaptability of effort policy. According to the model of effort 
regulation in Chapter 2, the adoption of a mental effort principle is based on an assessment of 
efficiency, originating from external (task performance) and internal (self) sources offeedback. The 
mechanisms underlying this model are based on control theory, therefore, the individual must be aware 
of feedback in order to exert control. The same logic would predict that an awareness of feedback 
(with respect to either external or internal sources of information) is a necessary precondition of 
adaptive effort regulation. This chain of causality indicates how reduced awareness of feedback may 
undermine adaptive effort regulation, with respect to either hypothesis (a) or (b) in the previous 
paragraph. 
In order to investigate this issue in detail, a supplementary analysis was performed to explore how 
psychophysiological effort was regulated by each of the two subject groups. Two particular influences 
on effort regulation were included in this correlational analysis: 
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• alpha bursts (internal feedback) 
• the frequency of collisions (external feedback) 
It was hypothesised that increased alpha activity might prompt effort investment in order to compensate 
for energetical costs based on internal feedback. With respect to external feedback, a collision between 
subject- and computer-controlled cursor was associated with overt visual and auditory feedback of 
performance effectiveness. A series of correlation coefficients were quantified to describe the pattern 
of association between data pairs based on consecutive five-minute windows. These analyses were 
based on baselined values of psychophysiology and performance. The latter were baselined to the 
initial five-minute period of the control condition, hence only eleven of the twelve possible five-minute 
periods per session were included in the analyses. 
The analysis of correlated data is illustrated in Figure 23 for the control condition. The pattern of data 
for the HC subjects (Figure 23a) indicates that psychophysiological effort generally had a positive 
correlation with the frequency of alpha bursts. Although these coefficients failed to reach significance, 
the pattern is consistent throughout the session. There is some indication that increased effort was 
associated with a reduction of collisions between 20 and 35 minutes, but this trend was sporadic. It is 
difficult to detect any consistent pattern of correlation for the LC subjects in Figure 23b. There are 
some indicators of negative correlation between effort and collisions/alpha bursts, but these trends are 
inconsistent and sporadic. The surprising aspect of these supplementary analyses was the association 
between alpha activity and effort for the HC subjects. Based on previous data analyses, it would be 
expected that LC subjects would exhibit this trend, as this group experienced the higher level of alpha 
activity. In addition, it was anticipated that compensation for increased alpha would be more 
prominent during the sleep deprivation condition. 
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Figure 23. Correlation coefficients for psychophysiological effort and EEG/performance for (a) 
High-Competent subjects and (b) Low-Competent subjects during the Control condition (N=12). 
NB: R values above 0.8 are significant at I! < 0.05. 
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Figure 24. Correlation coefficients for psychophysiological effort and EEG/performance for (a) 
High-Competent subjects and (b) Low-Competent subjects during the Sleep Deprivation 
condition (N=12). NB: R values above 0.8 are significant at I! < 0.05. 
The same analysis was conducted on data from the sleep deprivation condition (Figure 24). In this 
particular condition, the HC subjects appear to use external feedback from collisions as their primary 
spur for effort investment (Figure 24a), i.e. between 2S and 4S minutes. The pattern of negative 
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correlation indicates that those He subjects with the highest effort investment produced the lowest 
number of collisions or vice versa. The pattern of correlational data for the Le subjects shown in 
Figure 24b is not indicative of any consistent pattern. There is some evidence that effort investment 
increased in line with frequent alpha bursts between 10 and 25 minutes, and consequently reduced the 
number of collisions - but this trend was not sustained. As in the previous analysis, the pattern of 
correlational data was not in the expected direction. It was anticipated that effort would be invested in 
order to compensate for increased alpha activity due to the sleep deprivation. However, the only 
consistent pattern indicated a relationship between effort investment and external feedback from 
tracking performance (Figure 24a). 
The correlational analysis should be treated with caution, the subject numbers in each group were very 
low and therefore, any pattern of association is highly unstable. In addition, it has been argued that 
effort regulation is based on the perception of internal and external feedback (Section 2.2.3), whereas 
this analysis was based on 'raw' sources of energetic and performance data. It would be unjustifiable 
to suggest that actual increases in alpha activity or collisions are necessarily perceived by the 
individual, e.g. the Le subjects do not perceive performance to decline or alpha to rise during the sleep 
deprivation condition, however, objective data sources indicated otherwise. Both caveats should be 
borne in mind during the following discussion of the correlation analyses. 
The pattern of correlation coefficients for the He group presented in Figure 23a and Figure 24a 
provided some evidence that the effort regulation was performed in line with external and internal 
sources of feedback. However, this pattern was surprising in the sense that effort was regulated in line 
with alpha activity during the control condition, and in response to collisions during sleep deprivation -
the opposite trend would have been predicted. In addition, it was apparent that one source of feedback 
was used almost exclusively in each experimental condition, i.e. subjects did not seem to switch 
between internal and external sources during different phases of the experimental session. On this 
basis, it is hypothesised that either external or internal sources offeedback may be prioritised for effort 
regulation. It is logical to suggest that prioritisation may be determined by the source of feedback most 
closely associated with the most salient form of stress (Hancock & Warm, 1989). During the control 
condition, the He subjects may perceive the most significant threat for sustained performance to 
originate from electrocortical arousal, i.e. that the ability to sustain alertness was threatened to a greater 
extent that the ability to sustain performance during the control condition. However, the introduction 
of sleep deprivation failed to reinforce this trend. It was apparent from the subjective data analyses, 
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that sleep deprivation increased mental workload as wen as reducing HC subjects' levels of energy. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that sleep deprivation threatened the performance capability of the 
HC subjects, which led to a shift of effort regulation to emphasise external feedback from task 
performance. 
The analysis of the LC subjects correlation data shown in Figure 23a and Figure 24a did not exhibit any 
consistent pattern. These data appear to contradict the earlier hypothesis that LC subjects were less 
efficient due to their need to compensate for increased alpha activity. No evidence for this 
compensatory effort was found during the correlational analysis. Therefore, it may be suggested that 
LC subjects increased effort investment without any clear focus for regulation. This hypothesis is 
suggested by their low awareness of either external or internal sources of feedback, both in the 
correlational analyses and with respect to subjective data. Therefore, the LC subjects exhibit a higher 
level of effort expenditure that fails either to improve performance or to alleviate energetic costs. 
One major drawback with this study was the small size of the original subject sample. Each subject 
group only constituted six individuals in total, which is sufficient to threaten the integrity of the 
correlational analyses. In addition, the distinction between the two subj ect groups appeared to be 
uneven. The LC subject group encompassed a huge range of performance variability relative to the HC 
subjects (Figure 16). A larger subject sample would have permitted a more cogent means of partition 
for subject discrimination. The use of multidimensional measures to characterise effort policy 
represents an improvement on the method used by Schultz and Schonptlug (Schonpflug, 1983), where 
strategy was assumed based on primary task measures alone. However, the inclusion of real-time 
measures to capture subjective perceptions of performance, aspiration and internal costs would have 
provided the opportunity to investigate the level of association between perceived feedback and actual 
feedback. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The experiment indicated that LC subjects invested a higher level of mental effort and experienced a 
significant decline of electrocortical arousal relative to the HC group. This trend was apparent 
regardless of the experimental condition and no evidence was found that effort was invested to 
compensate for increased alpha in the EEG record. Therefore, it may be concluded that LC subjects 
were characterised by a stable trait variable, which was not responsive to state changes. These 
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conclusions suggest that the poor performance ofLC subjects resulted from either: (a) a source of 
degraded perceptual-motor ability that remained impervious to effort investment, or (b) an insensitivity 
to internal and external sources of feedback, which resulted in an inefficient and ineffectiveness effort 
policy. 
The HC subjects exhibited superior performance effectiveness and efficiency in conjunction with lower 
alpha activity in both experimental conditions. These subjects appeared to have two primary 
advantages over the LC group: 
• The HC subjects were capable of a higher level of performance efficiency. This superior level of 
efficiency was responsible for maximising coping capacity. In practical terms, reduced efficiency 
may aid the individual by expanding his or her adaptability to sources of stress. Therefore, the HC 
subjects were able to sustain relatively low levels of error in the presence of sleep deprivation 
without notable effort investment (Figure 21). This conclusion contradicts the hypotheses that HC 
subjects achieve proficiency via an increase of mental effort and suffer increased costs in the 
presence of an additional stressor. According to the current study, proficiency is simultaneously a 
cause and consequence of increased performance efficiency. 
• The HC subjects exhibited a rationale allocation of mental effort expenditure based on an 
awareness of both external and internal feedback. During the control condition, HC perceived the 
greater threat to performance to originate from increased alpha activity and responded accordingly. 
When the HC subjects were sleep-deprived, collisions were interpreted as the principle symptom of 
increased drowsiness and effort was invested in line with external feedback. In addition, the HC 
subjects exhibited increased sensitivity to the influence of sleep deprivation on workload and 
energetical costs, relative to the LC group. It is hypothesised that awareness of feedback played an 
important role to ensure maximum levels of performance efficiency. 
It is concluded that competence plays an important role with respect to capacity to sustain performance 
in the presence of a stressor. However, it is difficult to pinpoint whether competence results from trait 
factors, habitual effort strategies or the awareness of feedback. For example, does competence arise 
from higher achievement motivation, increased self-efficacy or a superior awareness of internal and 
external feedback? As described by Wells & Matthews (1994), these factors are cyclic and causality is 
difficult to establish. 
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The model of effort regulation postulates that awareness of internal and external feedback is central to 
an appraisal of efficiency, which drives future effort policy. This study has provided some supporting 
evidence for this model, with respect to the significance of external and internal feedback. It was 
suggested by the correlational analyses that HC subjects focused on external feedback at the expense of 
internal feedback and vice versa during different conditions. This hypothesis suggests that internal and 
external sources of feedback may be prioritised in order to permit a consistent formulation of effort 
policy. 
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5 IMPAIRMENT OF DRIVING PERFORMANCE DUE TO SLEEP 
DEPRIVATION OR ALCOHOL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY'. 
5.1 Abstract 
A study was conducted to assess the relative impact of partial sleep deprivation (restriction to 4 hours 
sleep prior to testing) and full sleep deprivation (no sleep on the night prior to testing) on simulated 
driving, compared with an alcohol treatment (mean % Blood Alcohol Content = 0.07). It was 
predicated that both sleep deprivation and alcohol would influence internal and external sources of 
feedback and influence subsequent effort policy. The level of task demand was varied within the two-
hour journey. Sixty-four male subjects participated in the study. Three categories of data were 
collected from the primary driving task, psychophysiology and subjective self-assessment. The results 
revealed that a full night of sleep deprivation produced the greatest magnitude of performance 
impairment, followed by the alcohol manipulation, whereas the performance of the partial sleep 
deprivation group was equivalent to control subjects. In addition, the partial sleep deprivation group 
exerted the highest level of psychophysiological effort. These results are discussed with reference to 
performance impairment, self-appraisal and the role of effort policy. 
5.2 Introduction 
It is significant that the dangers associated with driver fatigue have not found equivalent expression in 
the public arena as related concerns, such as drunk driving. The reasons why fatigue has traditionally 
played a secondary role in road transport safety research and policy were outlined by Brown (1994), 
namely: (a) that evidence of a causal influence of fatigue in accidents is often circumstantiaL (b) a lack 
of political will to research the limitation of the hours of work for professional drivers, but 
underpinning both is the fact that, (c) fatigue is a complex and ambiguous concept with no standard 
measurement index. The absence of definition lies at the crux of the fatigue problem, in terms of both 
research and policy. 
9 This study has been published as Fairclough, S. H., & Graham, R (1999). Impairment of driving performance caused by 
sleep deprivation or alcohol: A comparative study. Human Factors, 41(1), 118-128. v41 (I), pp. 118-128. 
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In the case of impairment due to alcoho~ the Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) measure constitutes a 
broadly linear scale (based on physiological data) with a demonstrated correspondence to road accident 
involvement (Walls & Brownlie, 1985). Despite a long and varied research history (Bartlett, 1953; 
Bartley, 1965; Broadbent, 1979; Craig & Cooper, 1992; Crawford, 1961; Muscio, 1921; Thorndike, 
1900), no equivalent index of fatigue has been forthcoming. This failure may be simply a conceptual 
limitation. Fatigue, like any affective construct such as happiness or anger, is a state spontaneously 
perceived by the individual, in the absence of any explicit verbal or numeric framework. All 
endeavours to measure fatigue represent an attempt to superimpose a continuum upon a psycho-
physiological entity and as such, are capable of providing only a better or worse level of symbolic 
description (Hancock & Verwey, 1997). In the absence of an anchor scale (such as BAC in the case of 
alcohol or body temperature in the case of impairment due to thermal stressors), the multi-dimensional 
measurement of fatigue renders the concept susceptible to a certain amount of indeterminacy. 
Inevitably, ambiguity at the conceptual level creates related problems of data interpretation. This 
limitation is particularly striking during attempt s to measure the impact of multivariate fatigue on a 
complex, skilled behaviour such as driving. 
The iterations within the trinity of stress postulated by Hancock & Warm (1989) render it difficult to 
make generic statements regarding how a defined task may impact on operator stress/fatigue or 
performance. The difficulty of this prediction is linked to the formulation of effort policy and its 
variable impact on performance effectiveness. It is suggested that this variability may account for the 
elusiveness of a consensual definition of operational fatigue and the development of any quantifiable 
and objective index. 
The current study is concerned with the link between biological stressors and skilled performance as 
mitigated by mental effort policy. It is hypothesised that mental effort may be invested as means of 
protecting primary task performance against the influence of biological stressors (Hockey, 1993; 
Hockey, 1997; Mulder, 1986). Furthermore, the measurement of compensatory mental effort may 
constitute an appropriate basis on which to assess the influence of stressors on performance. 
The effectiveness of compensatory mental effort may be assessed via the frequency and magnitude of 
those latent decrements, which may accompany degraded primary task performance (Hockey, 1993; 
Hockey, 1997). These decrements include: subsidiary task failure (i.e. a selective impairment of 
peripheral task components, both in the sense of physical localisation or low priority within the task 
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hierarchy), strategic adjustment (i.e. a shift to routinised task strategies where mental effort is 
minimised), compensatory costs (i.e. increase of sympathetic nervous activity and related subjective 
appraisal), and fatigue after-effects (i.e. once mental effort has been invested for a sustained period, a 
subsequent increase of fatigue may reduce effort). Therefore, a consideration oflatent decrements may 
reveal quantitative and qualitative patterns induced by stressors. 
Mental effort was initially considered within the context of driving behaviour by N aatanen & Summala 
(1975). These authors suggested that effort investment was intimately associated with driver fatigue. 
Their principle claims are summarised as follows: (a) the necessary regulation of attention during 
driving is synonymous with effort investment, (b) a continuous process of effort investment leads to 
driver fatigue, and (c) that drivers may respond to rising fatigue by "trying harder" andlor adopting a 
cautious driving style, i.e. decreasing speed and increasing time headway to increase the safety margin. 
Evidence to justify the first hypothesis appeared in the years following the publication of this paper. 
De Waard (1991) found psychophysiological data (from analysis ofO.1Hz component of heart rate 
variability) indicating an increase of mental effort coinciding with a negotiation of highly demanding, 
roadway feature (i.e. an entrance to a high speed, highway). A similar investigation by Hancock, Wulf, 
Thorn, & Fassnacht (1990) revealed a sporadic increase of workload and mental effort when drivers 
were involved in the negotiation of curves. A study of following behaviour by Fairclough, May, & 
Carter (1997) included a time of day manipulation, as a means of contrasting rush hour and off-peak 
levels of traffic density. Data from subjective workload and psychophysiology (the O.IHz component 
of heart rate variability) indicated a higher level of workload and mental effort investment during the 
rush-hour journey. These studies indicate that driving necessitates a dynamic investment of mental 
effort, in response to the ebb and flow of task demands in the roadway environment. 
There is substantial evidence that a prolonged period of driving increases subjective estimates of 
fatigue and mental effort (Dureman & Bodell, 1972; FulIer, 1984; Kecklund & Akerstedt, 1993; 
Riemersma & Biesta, 1978). In a study of professional drivers, Fairclough (1997) had subjects 
complete alSO - 180 minute highway journey following a night shift. He found increased subjective 
effort over time, in line with parallel increases of inattention, boredom and sleepiness. In other words, 
subjects invested higher levels of mental effort to neutralise fatigue and discomfort. However, studies 
of prolonged driving using psychophysiological estimates of mental effort (i.e. mean Inter-Beat Interval 
(illI) variability or O.IHz sinus arrhymia from the electrocardiogram) exhibited a different picture. For 
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example, Brookhuis & De Waard (1993) found an increase of heart rate variability that was associated 
with increased time-on-task (indicative of decreasing levels of mental effort). 
This adaptive mechanism of mental effort regulation places huge reliance on the accuracy of subjective 
assessment. The ability of the individual to monitor accurately external task feedback and the internal 
feedback from the self places an upper limit on the adaptability of mental effort policy. In addition, 
there is evidence that self-assessment may become increasingly inaccurate under conditions of high 
task demand and fatigue. For example, those operating conditions that produce dissociation between 
subjective estimates of workload and performance have been described by (Yeh & Wickens, 1988). 
This dissociation between appraisal and performance may be particularly marked for skilled performers 
(Baars, 1992; Langar & Imber, 1979). Brown (1994) and McDonald (1987) made a similar point 
concerning the influence of fatigue on self-monitoring of internal feedback. They claim that the 
detrimental effect of fatigue may extend beyond the impairment of performance, and degrade the 
quality of self-monitoring per se. Therefore, an impaired individual may be less able to assess 
accurately external and internal feedback, in order to make an appraisal of efficiency and mental effort 
may be misregulated as a consequence. 
The appropriate regulation of mental effort hinges on the accuracy of feedback provided by self-
monitoring and appraisal. The current study is intended to investigate how two different biological 
stressors (sleep deprivation and alcohol) influenced driving behaviour, latent decrements and self-
appraisal. 
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5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Design. 
The study was designed to compare the effects of a between-subjects factor (treatment group) across 
two within-subjects factors (time-on-task and driving scenario). 
The four treatment groups are described as follows: a Control group (subjects received a full night 
of sleep before the trial and did not receive alcohol), a Partial Sleep Deprivation (partSD) group 
(subjects instructed to sleep for four hours between midnight and 0400 hours on the night before the 
trial and did not receive alcohol), a Full Sleep Deprivation (FuIlSD) group (subjects were instructed to 
remain awake throughout the night before the trial and did not receive alcohol), and the Alcohol-
Impaired (Alcohol) group (subjects had a full night of sleep on the night before the trial and received an 
alcoholic drink (a mixture of vodka and lemonade) prior to the experimental session. The amount of 
alcohol administered was calculated based on the subject's body weight, according to the Widmark 
Equation (as described by Walls & Brownlie (1985». Subjects received sufficient alcohol to 
approximate a peak Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) level in the range of 0.08 - 0.1 per cent (mg/g». 
The time-on-task associated with the journey was measured at three levels, each corresponding to a 
cumulative forty minute period within the two hour journey. 
The driving scenarios encountered during the journey formed a second within-subjects factor. The 
scenarios were designed to induce differing degrees of task demand. Each forty-minute block was 
divided into six different scenarios and each scenario lasted for five minutes. The scenarios are 
described in the experimental task section. 
5.3.2 Subjects 
Sixty-four subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects were male and had normal or corrected 
20/20 vision. Each subject was designated into one of four experimental groups, each containing 
sixteen subjects. The allocation of subjects into group was performed to balance the demographic 
variables of age, driving experience, annual mileage, driving frequency, average alcohol intake and 
average hours sleep per night across the four groups (Table 6). None of these demographic variables 
was statistically different between the four subject groups. On average, the subjects as a whole drove 
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everyday, reported an annual mileage of greater than 10000 miles and less than 15000 miles, and slept 
for an average of 8 hours per night. All were paid for their participation. 
SUBJECT GROUP Age (yrs) Driving Experience' Average Alcohol 
(vrs) Intake' 
CONTROL 30.63 12.8 16 
(8.9) (8.5) (11.0) 
PARTSD 30.63 9.94 17 
(9.0) (5.60) (9.1) 
FULL SD 30.63 11.3 14 
(9.8) (10.1) (12.0) 
ALCOHOL 30.68 12.5 16 
(9.8) (9.0) (l0.5) 
Table 6. Demographic characteristics of the four groups expressed as means and standard 
deviations (N=64). I number of years subjects held a full driving license, 1 self assessment of units 
of alcohol consumed per week. 
5.3.3 Apparatus 
The experiment was performed using a fixed-base driving simulator. Subjects were seated inside a 
Ford Scorpio and viewed a large projector screen (approximately 3 x 4m). A Pentium PC was used to 
simulate the vehicle model and to generate the driving scene. The computer-generated scene was 
projected onto the screen via a Sony Multiscan projector. The vehicle interior and the experimenter's 
location were linked via an intercom system. Electrocardiograph (ECG) data was collected via an 
analogue to digital converter (MacLab™) connected to a Macintosh Powerbook™ computer. 
5.3.4 Experimental Task 
The simulated driving scene consisted of a straight, two lane, left-side drive road flanked by road signs 
(which advised a 70mph speed limit), vegetation and marker posts. Off-road areas were coloured a 
uniform green on either side of the road boundary. The upper portion of the scene was coloured blue to 
emulate daytime driving. Vehicle dynamics included a small "wind gust" factor that was activated 
randomly throughout the session. Every alternate five second period, one of three outcomes occurred 
randomly: (a) no wind gust, (b) a wind gust approximating two steering degrees to the left sustained for 
five seconds and (c) a wind gust approximating two degrees to the right sustained for five seconds. 
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Unfortunately, the simulator software was not capable of providing interactive sound, but subjects were 
exposed to a recording of in-vehicle sound collected from a real vehicle travelling at an approximate 
speed range of 60-70mph on a motorway. 
The subjects completed three forty-minute journeys in the course of an experimental session. Each 
block contained six driving scenarios as follows. The presentation order of the scenarios was fixed 
within each forty minute block, but different between the three blocks. The scenarios were as follows: 
Open road (the subject travelled in the left lane of an empty two-lane road that contained no other 
traffic), Following (the subject followed a lead vehicle in the left lane travelling at a steady speed of60 
mph), Passing (the subject travelled in the left lane whilst vehicles overtook in the right lane, the rate of 
vehicles passing the subject was approximately one every fifty seconds, Following/Passing (this 
scenario was a combination of both scenarios 2 and 3, i.e. the subject followed a vehicle in the left lane 
whilst vehicles overtook in the right lane), Low sinusoidal following (both sinusoidal following 
scenarios were based on an experimental manipulation reported by Brookhuis, De Waard, & Mulder 
(1994). In this scenario, the subject followed a lead vehicle in the left lane that systematically varied its 
speed sinusoidally between 55mph and 65 mph with a cycle time ofJO seconds), and High sinusoidal 
following (the lead vehicle again varied its speed sinusoidally. However, the amplitude of the speed 
change was twice that encountered in scenario 5, varying between 50mph to 70mph with the same 
cycle time.) 
Each forty minute block began with a ten minute Open scenario in which no data was collected. 
5.3.5 Experimental measures. 
Three categories of experimental measures were used during the study: (a) primary vehicle control, (b) 
psychophysiology and (c) subjective measures. 
Primary Vehicle Control. 
Measurement of the driving task was divided into three categories: (a) lateral control (i.e. lane 
tracking), (b) longitudinal control (i.e. collision avoidance), and (c) speed control (i.e. a sub-task having 
substantial influence over lane tracking and collision avoidance). 
Lateral control was measured at several levels of criticality: (1) frequency of "accidents" defined as 
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those occasions when all four "wheels" left the left side lane edge, or when the subject either travelled 
across the right lane boundary and c011ided with a passing vehicle, or when the subject left the road on 
the right side lane edge, (2) frequency and mean duration oflane crossings when two vehicle wheels 
made contact with the left lane edge or the right lane boundary, and (3) frequency of incidents when the 
minimum Time-To-Line Crossing (TLC) (Godthelp, Milgram, & Blaauw, 1984) was 1 or 2 or 3 
seconds. The calculation of minimum TLC (minTLC) excluded lane crossings. Thus, this 
classification scheme sub-divided lane tracking into a number of variables which varied along a 
continuum of severity. In order to index subjects' steering input to lateral control (the number of zero-
crossings of the steering wheel as defined by McLean & Hoffman (1975) was measured. 
Measures of longitudinal control or co11ision avoidance were only relevant to the sub-set of driving 
scenarios where a lead vehicle was present. The most critical ( and obvious) indicator of impairment 
was the frequency of rear-end c011isions. In addition, mean time headway (i.e. inter-vehicle distance 
divided by speed) was calculated. 
All measures of primary driving performance were originally sampled at 10Hz and reduced to 2Hz for 
the purpose of analysis. 
Psychophysiology. 
ECG data was collected via three disposable electrodes attached to the subject's chest. R-peaks of the 
ECG trace were detected and corrected for artefacts. The resulting data was analysed with respect to 
mean Inter-Beat Interval (IBD and IBI variability (heart rate variability, HRV). The HRV variable was 
subjected to spectral analysis, to decompose the HR V signal into three bandwidths (Mulder, 1979a; 
Mulder, 1979b; Mulder & Van Der Meulen, 1973): a low frequency band (0.02-0.06Hz) identified 
with the regulation of body temperature, a mid frequency band (0.07-0. 14Hz) related to short-term 
blood pressure regulation and a high frequency band (0.15 - 0.50Hz) influenced by respiratory 
regulation. The mid-frequency band has been successfully employed to index mental workload in 
laboratory experiments (Aasman, Mulder, & Mulder, 1987) and during studies of driver mental 
workload (De Waard, 1996). In addition, analyses of the mid frequency band have yielded effects due 
to the influence of time-on-task (De Waard & Brookhuis, 1991; Mascord & Heath, 1992). 
Subiective Measures. 
The study employed a battery of subjective measurement questionnaires. Subjects completed multiple 
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administrations of: (a) the UWIST Mood Adjective Scale (Matthews, Jones, & Chamberlain, 1990), (b) 
the NASA-Task Load Index calculated on the basis of raw ratings (RTLX) (Biers & McInerney, 1988; 
Byers, Bittner, & Hill, 1989; Hart & Stave land, 1988), (c) the Karolinska Sleepiness scale (Kecklund & 
Akerstedt, 1993), (d) a Cognitive Interference scale (Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986) 
and (e) an eight-point sobriety scale devised for the study (1= no noticeable effect, 2=slight increase of 
well-being, more relaxed, 3=definite increase of well-being and relaxation, 4=some minor impairment 
of judgement and reactions, 5=definite impairment of judgement and reactions, 6=significant 
impairment, 7=gross impairment, difficulty responding and 8=00 longer able to drive). 
5.3.6 Experimental procedure. 
The subjects came to the Institute on two occasions, the first being a Practice session followed by a 
Test session on a different day. On most occasions, the Practice session took place in the morning prior 
to the day of the Test Session. 
During the Practice session, subjects were weighed, completed a test of visual acuity and were fitted 
with ECG electrodes. Before the subjects entered the simulator, they received a set of standard 
instructions which emphasised the following points: (a) to stay in the left lane unless overtaking, and 
(b) to maintain a following distance of a maximum of three vehicles length to the lead vehicle and to 
keep the lead vehicle in sight at all times. The subjects performed a twenty-two minute "training" 
journey, which included short versions of the six driving scenarios. 
Following the training journey, subjects completed the index of subjective questionnaires. The final 
phase of the Practice session involved a twenty-minute baseline journey to index subjects' "normal" 
behaviour in the simulator. The baseline condition contained only the Open Road and Steady 
Following scenarios (each scenario lasted for ten minutes), and primary vehicle performance and ECG 
data were collected. On completion of the baseline journey, subjects completed a second set of 
subjective questionnaires. 
The two sleep deprivation subject groups were instructed to stay awake on the night before the Test 
Session. PartSD subjects were instructed to sleep for four hours between midnight and 0400, whereas 
FullSD subjects were instructed to remain awake during the whole of the night. To ensure subjects 
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remained awake, they were required to leave a time-stamped message on a telephone answenng 
machine once every sixty minutes, up until an hour before the Test Session. 
All subjects were provided with transport to and from the Institute on the day of their Test Session. 
This arrangement was made to ensure the integrity of the alcohol placebo. The Test Sessions took 
place twice daily during the early afternoon (beginning after noon) and in the mid-afternoon from 
15:00. The number of early afternoon and late afternoon sessions were equivalent among the four 
subject groups. 
On arrival for the Test Session, all subjects were provided with a drink. The Control group and the two 
sleep-deprived groups received a placebo containing lemonade with a tablespoon of vodka floated on 
the surface to provide an alcoholic smell. In addition, the Alcohol group received specific instructions 
to eat a light meal at least an hour before the Test Session. Once the drink had been consumed, 
subjects were taken to the simulator where they completed a ten-minute "familiarisation" journey. 
Following familiarisation, all subjects completed a pre-test set of subjective questionnaires and were 
breathlysed using an alcometer (Lion Laboratories Alcometer S-D2). During the Test Session, the 
subjects were told that they would receive a modest financial punishment for every accident which 
occurred during the session (i.e. either if the car left the road or collided with another vehicle). This 
instruction was a deception intended to motivate the subjects to maintain performance (no subject 
actually suffered any financial penalties regardless of performance). Then the subjects completed the 
first forty-minute block of the simulated journey. On completion of the journey, subjects completed a 
second set of subjective questionnaires and were breathlysed once more. Both the subjective 
questionnaires and breathalyser tests were administered following completion of the second and third 
forty minute blocks. The recess between each journey block was restricted to five minutes duration. 
On completion of the Test Session, subjects were debriefed, paid for participation and transported to 
their homes. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Alcohol Manipulation 
Administration of alcohol using the Widmark equation is an inexact procedure and the means, standard 
errors and standard deviations of actual %BAC figures obtained during the study are shown in Figure 
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1. These data illustrate that the Alcohol subjects were on a descending BAC curve through the 
experimental session, dropping from a mean of 0.08% to 0.05% across the two hour journey. 
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Figure 25. Box and whiskers chart illustrating the percentage Blood Alcohol Content levels 
recorded for the Alcohol group across the Test Session (N=16). 
5.4.2 Primary task performance. 
The raw vehicle data were averaged across a five-minute time window for each driving scenario and 
data were analysed using MANOV A techniques. When appropriate data were available from the 
baseline session and providing the test contained a maximum of three main effects, MANCOVAs were 
employed, i.e. using baseline data as a covariate. If the test contained more than 3 factors, this caused a 
substantial problem of interpretation, therefore the covariate was not included. Within-subject 
significance was reported using the Wilks Lambda [ t, w] statistic to overcome problems of sphericity 
(Vasey & Thayer, 1987). All data were tested for the existence of outliers (defined as raw values 
further than 2.5 standard deviations away from the mean). All post-hoc testing was performed via the 
Tukey HSD test. 
Fifty-one "accidents" occurred in the course of the study. However, as only 10 subjects accounted for 
the total number of accidents, these data were not subjected to statistical testing. 
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The analysis of lateral control is presented with respect to two categories of data, those concerned with 
vehicle position and those capturing steering control. Descriptive statistics revealed the presence of an 
outlier in the lateral control data, therefore one subject from the Control group was not included in 
these analyses. All variables were subjected to a 4 (CONDITION) x 3 (TIME-ON-TASK) x 6 
(SCENARIO) MANOVA. A significant main effect for CONDITION 1£(3,59)=4.58, n<O.OI] revealed 
that the frequency oflane crossings was higher for the FullSD group (M = 5.8 per 5 min) and the 
Alcohol group (M = 4.8), compared to the PartSD group (M = 3.4) or the Control group (M = 3.6). 
There was a significant effect of TIME-ON-TASK [bw(2,118)=0.76, n<O.OI], i.e. the mean frequency 
oflane crossings rose by one per five minutes from the beginning to the end of the journey. The main 
effect of SCENARIO revealed that the highest frequency of lane crossings occurred during the Open 
and Passing scenarios [bw(5,295)=0.44, n<O.OI]. A significant interaction between CONDITION x 
TIME-ON-TASK showed that the frequency oflane crossings was significantly lower in the Alcohol 
group compared to the FullSD group during the final 40 minutes ofthejoumey [bw(6, (18)=0.79, 
11<0.01 ]. 
The frequency of near-lane-crossings was indexed by those occasions when TLC fell below 2 seconds, 
i.e. the lateral velocity of the vehicle meant that it was 2 seconds away from a lane crossing. These 
data revealed a marginal effect due to CONDITION 1£(3,59)=2.60, n<0.06] which indicated a higher 
frequency of near-lane-crossings for the PartSD group (M = 4.6 per 5 min) compared to the other three 
groups. 
Steering control was analysed as the steering wheel reversal rate per minute. Multivariate analysis 
revealed a significant main effect for CONDITION 1£(3,59)=26.6, n<0.05], indicating that mean 
steering wheel reversal rate was higher for the Control and Alcohol groups (M = 15.6 and 14.3 
respectively) compared to the PartSD and FullSD groups (M = 11.2 and 10.9 respectively). A 
significant main effect for SCENARIO [bw(5,295)=0.56, n<O.OI] revealed that levels of steering 
activity were higher during the High Sinusoidal and Following scenarios (M = 15.0 in both cases) than 
the Open scenario (M = 12.6). 
The main effects for all three measures oflateral control across the four experimental groups are 
represented in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26. Lateral vehicle control as represented by: mean frequency of lane crossings, mean 
frequency of near lane crossings and steering wheel reversal rate across the four treatment 
groups (N=63). 
Analysis of mean time headway was confined to those four scenarios in which a lead vehicle was 
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present. Six subjects were omitted from this analysis due to the occurrence of accidents or merely 
losing sight of the lead vehicle. This analysis showed a marginal effect for CONDITION lE (3,54) = 
2.22,11=0.08]. Post-hoc tests revealed a significant difference between the Alcohol (M = 3.lOs) and 
FullSD groups (M = 3.98s). There was also a significant effect for TIME-ON-TASK [!,.w(2, 108) = 
0.88,11< 0.05]; mean headway decreased by 0.5s between the initial 40 minutes and the final 40 
minutes ofthejoumey. 
Speed variability was measured as standard deviation of speed (across a 5 minute time window). The 
analysis showed a significant main effect for CONDITION [E (3,59) = 4.56, 11 < 0.01]. Post-hoc 
testing revealed that speed variability was lower for the Alcohol group (M = 4.2 mph) than either the 
PartSD or FullSD groups (M = 5.7 mph for both). In addition, there was a significant main effect for 
TIME-ON-TASK [bw(2, 120) = 0.89,11 < 0.05] providing evidence of an increase in speed variability 
over time. 
5.4.3 Psychophysiology 
It is known that alcohol has a confounding effect on mean IDI and the O.IHz component ofHRV 
(Gonzalez-Gonzalaz, L1orens, Novoa, & Valeriano, 1992). Therefore, ECG data from the subjects in 
the Alcohol group were not subjected to statistical testing. In addition, ECG data was lost from 7 
subjects across the three remaining subject groups due to measurement artefacts. 
The raw IDI data was subjected to analysis using CARSP AN software (Mulder & Schweizer, 1993) to 
isolate the mid-frequency component of heart rate variability. This data was subjected to a natural log 
transform and a baseline conversion prior to parametric MANCOV A analysis as described by 
(Meijman, 1995). 
There were significant main effects for CONDITION lE (2,32)=2.52,11 =0.05] and TIME-ON-TASK 
[!,.w(2,64) = 0.64,11 < 0.01]. It was apparent that the mid-frequency component was significantly 
suppressed for the PartSD group compared to the Control group (p<0.05). In addition, mean power in 
the mid-range frequency increased between the first and third period ofthe journey (p<0.05). These 
findings are indicative of a higher level of mental effort investment for the PartSD group compared to 
Control subjects. This main effect is illustrated in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27. Mean power in the mid-frequency bandwidth of heart rate variability for three 
experimental groups across the test session (N=41). 
5.4.4 Subjective Data. 
Subjects completed the questionnaires on four occasions through the Test session, including a pre-test 
administration. The subjective data were analysed in a series of 4 (CONDITION) x 4 (TIME-ON-
TASK) MANCOV As with data collected from the end of the practice session used as a covariate. 
The results of these analyses are shown in Table 2 (it should be noted that there were no significant 
interaction effects). 
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CONDITION TIME ON TASK 
E(3,60) ~ !"w (2,120) ~ 
MOOD Energetic 5.88 <0.01 0.54 <0.01 
arousal 1.43 NS 0.94 NS 
Tense arousal 1.34 NS 0.65 <0.01 
Hedonic Tone 
WORKLOAD Mental demand 1.09 NS 0.92 NS 
Physical demand 4.41 <0.01 0.5 <0.01 
Time demand 4.06 <0.05 0.95 NS 
Performance 2.73 0.05 0.80 <0.01 
Effort 3.16 <0.05 0.87 <0.05 
Frustration 4.51 <0.01 0.61 <0.01 
Mean workload 2.63 0.05 0.68 <0.01 
COGNITIVE Task Relevant 4.23 <0.01 0.60 <0.01 
INTERFERENCE Task Irrelevant 1.29 NS 0.45 <0.01 
SLEEPINESS Karolinska scale 11.37 <0.01 0.39 <0.01 
SOBRIETY Self-Ratinl! 12.11 <0.01 0.81 <0.05 
Table 7. Results of the MANCOVA analyses of subjective scales (N=64). 
Measurement of subjective mood revealed a significant decline of energetic arousal for the two sleep-
deprived groups compared to Control subjects. In addition, sleep deprivation raised subjective 
workload via increased effort and reduced estimates of performance efficacy. The FullSD group only 
experienced increased temporal demand and physical demand. The effect of Alcohol was to reduce the 
level of frustration experienced by subjects, as compared to the other three groups. It was found that 
the frequency of task relevant thoughts was higher for the FullSD group than either the Control or 
Alcohol groups. The PartSD group exhibited a similar pattern, but frequency was only significantly 
higher than the Control group. Both subjective ratings of sleepiness and sobriety were included to 
reference the experimental manipulations. The mean values for these scales are shown in Figure 28. 
Subjective sleepiness was significantly higher for both sleep-deprived groups compared to the Control 
group (but did not differentiate between PartSD and FullSD). Self-rated drunkenness was highest for 
the Alcohol group. 
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Figure 28. Mean values for subjective ratings of sleepiness and sobriety for all four subject 
groups (N=64). 
The TIME-ON-TASK effects for SUbjective measures were all in the expected direction, i.e. workload 
factors, task-irrelevant thoughts and subjective sleepiness all increased across the trial duration; 
whereas energetic arousal, hedonic tone and task-relevant thoughts all decreased. 
5.4.5 Performance Efficiency Index 
The analysis of performance efficiency involves the interaction between performance effectiveness and 
psychophysiological mental effort (Meijman, \995). In this case, it was not possible to obtain 
appropriate psychophysiological data from those subjects who had received alcohol. Performance 
efficiency is represented in Figure 29 by indexing psychophysiological mental effort (subjected to the 
% baselining procedure described by Meijman) against the frequency of right-side lane crossings per 5 
minutes. 
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Figure 29. Performance efficiency index for three experimental groups across time-on-task 
(N=48). NB: increase of x-values = poor lateral control of vehicle, increase of y-values = 
increased mental etTort. 
The analysis of performance efficiency revealed that the accuracy oflateral control exhibited by the 
PartSD subjects was equal to, and even slightly superior to the Control subjects. However, it was 
significant that the PartSD group had to exert a substantially higher level of mental effort in order to 
achieve equivalent performance to the Control subjects. The FullSD subjects also invest a high level of 
mental effort during the initial period of the simulated journey. Despite this trend, the FullSD subjects 
were unable to improve the accuracy of lateral control. Once the FullSD group passed the 80min mark, 
they were unable to sustain mental effort and performance effectiveness was observed to decline 
accordingly. 
5.5 Discussion 
The effects of sleep deprivation and alcohol on driving performance may be categorised in terms of 
safety critical changes (i.e. driver errors likely to increase the probability of accident) and non-safety 
critical changes (i.e. alterations in vehicular control which do not increase the probability of accident). 
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It was apparent that a full night without sleep was sufficient to impair those subjects with respect to 
both categories. The FullSD group exhibited the highest frequency oflane crossings (Figure 26) and 
the highest mean time headway separation to a lead vehicle. The former effect may have been the 
direct result of a reduced level of steering input, whereas the latter may have been an adaptive strategy 
to counteract an increased risk of rear-end collision. 
The effects ofa reduction of sleep were more paradoxical in the case of the PartSD group. These 
subjects exhibited normal lateral control (relative to the Control group), whilst functioning on the 
reduced level of steering input which characterised the FullSD group (Figure 26). The only evidence 
of impairment for the PartSD group was an increased frequency of near-lane-crossings (Figure 26). 
These data suggest that PartSD subjects exhibited a proactive strategy oflateral control. This strategy 
was described with reference to the categorisation oflatent decrements described by (Hockey, 1993; 
Hockey, 1997). 
The types of driver errors induced by functional impairment were designated with respect to criticality. 
This analysis of lane-keeping behaviour is illustrated in Figure 26. Alcohol and full sleep deprivation 
manipulation produced the highest number of accidents and lane crossings. The PartSD group 
committed no accidents and was indistinguishable from the Control group in terms of the number of 
lane crossings observed. However, the analysis of minTLC revealed a higher number of near-crossings 
for the PartSD group. This pattern revealed a subsidiary degradation of lane-keeping with respect to 
near-crossings for the PartSD subjects, which did not produce either a higher number of lane crossings 
or accidents. This finding is presented as an example of subsidiary task failure (Hockey, 1993; 
Hockey, 1997). In this case, it is hypothesised that lane-keeping performance was allowed to degrade 
to a pre-critical point prior to error-correction. This pattern of performance is similar to the widening 
of the indifference range due to fatigue reported by Bartlett, 1953; 1943). 
A similar effect was observed with respect to lane crossing errors. Given that the right lane was devoid 
of vehicles for the majority of the journey, the risk of an off-road accident was greater for crossings the 
left-side road boundary (as opposed to a right-side lane boundary). An analysis oflane crossing 
frequency revealed that crossing at the right-side boundary occurred more frequently than the left-side 
road boundary (respective means = 6.6 and 2.2 per 5 minutes). In addition, crossings on the right-side 
boundary were, on average, over twice as long as those on left-side road edge (respective means = 11.5 
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and 5.4 seconds). Therefore, the degradation of simulated driving occurred in a manner that minimised 
the risk of accident. This finding illustrated how risk perception plays a role in the utility assessment 
underlying subsidiary task failure. The driver prioritises sub-goals and performance standards in a 
rational manner. This process determines which error forms are less-critical and therefore constitute 
"acceptable" categories of performance degradation. 
In contrast to their sleep-deprived counterparts, the impairment of performance exhibited by the 
Alcohol subjects was limited to safety-critical changes such as more frequent lane crossings (relative to 
Control and PartSD subjects) and a reduction of mean time headway (relative to the FullSD group). A 
second feature which distinguished the FullSD and Alcohol subjects was an interaction with time-on-
task. The results revealed that impairment due to sleep deprivation tended to increase with time-on-
task, i.e. lane crossing frequency peaked for the FullSD group during the final forty minutes. By 
contrast, the impaired lateral control due to alcohol was stable across the journey despite a descending 
alcohol absorption curve (Figure 26). 
The latent decrement described by Hockey (1993; 1997) as strategic adjustment represents a 
conservation strategy to minimise mental effort investment. However, this does not necessarily imply a 
primary performance decrement or even a subsidiary task failure. The assessment of strategic 
adjustment focuses on the efficiency of task performance (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). For example, 
consider the data in Figure 26 as a bottom-up chain of control input, i.e. from input as steering wheel 
activity to various errors of lateral control. The patterning of data (considered as a whole) as relative to 
the Control group is quite striking. The FullSD subjects have the highest number of accidents and lane 
crossings, coupled with a low level of steering activity (indexed by reversal rate). Therefore, a low rate 
of steering input accounted for the high number of errors committed by the FullSD group. The Alcohol 
group has a higher number of accidents and lane crossings comparative to both the PartSD group and 
the Control group. However, the Alcohol group has sustained a level of steering wheel input that is 
equivalent to the Control group. The implication here is that Alcohol subjects performed highly 
inefficiently with respect to lateral control, i.e. high amount of input coupled with a low quality of 
lateral control performance. By contrast, the PartSD group revealed a very efficient level of lateral 
control. These subjects provided a low level of steering input equivalent to the FullSD group, but were 
capable oflateral control as accurate as the Control group. A pattern of reduced task activity 
characterised mental effort conservation and was apparent in both sleep-deprived groups. The 
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difference between the groups was that the PartSD group was capable of an effective and efficient 
performance strategy. 
An analysis of time headway indicated that FullSD subjects increased the following distance to a lead 
vehicle, whereas the Alcohol group exhibited a slight decrease of time headway. These changes are 
characteristic of an adaptive response at the tactical level in response to an awareness of falling 
standards of operational performance for the FullSD group (Van Winsum, 1996). The implication was 
that awareness of poor performance caused a strategic increase of the safety margin for the FullSD 
group. The response of the Alcohol group was to reduce the safety margin, thereby illustrating a 
characteristic lack of sensitivity at the operational level (Van Winsum, 1996). These findings 
illustrated the importance of external feedback for adaptive driver behaviour. 
The six driving scenarios were included to induce a variable level of mental workload throughout the 
simulated journey. The presence of a lead vehicle was the crucial feature, which differentiated the 
level of lateral control across all groups. The absence of a lead vehicle during Open and Passing 
scenarios caused an increased frequency oflane crossings. The improvement of lateral control 
associated with a lead vehicle may have been due to either (a) a perceptual effect (i.e. the presence of 
vehicle on the simulated view functioning as a perceptual cue), or (b) a workload effect (i.e. the lead 
vehicle functioning as a potential hazard, and demanding a higher level of attention and control), or a 
combination of both effects. The analysis of psychophysiology provided no evidence of increased 
mental effort when a lead vehicle was present. However, steering wheel reversal rate was elevated for 
scenarios which included a lead vehicle (e.g. Following, High Sinusoidal) compared to the Open 
scenario. Therefore, the presence of the lead vehicle appeared sufficient to stimulate steering activity, 
if not to raise mental effort. 
It is postulated that any compensatory response to sleep deprivation was triggered by increased 
subjective discomfort and an awareness of reduced performance efficacy, which accompanied 
operational fatigue (Table 2 and Figure 28). These subjects responded by mobilising subjective effort 
to counteract the influence of sleep deprivation. This response was demonstrated by the analyses of 
subjective workload ratings (i.e. increased effort, increased frequency of task-relevant thoughts - Table 
7). 
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A strategy of mental effort compensation was apparent from the psychophysiological data, where the 
PartSD group exhibited higher mental effort relative to the Control subjects (Figure 27). The 
psychophysiological data analysis suggested that PartSD subjects were capable of sustaining the higher 
level of mental effort necessary to counteract sleepiness throughout the simulated journey, whereas the 
FullSD group could not. This interpretation was supported by the analysis of performance efficiency 
(Figure 29). This index clearly indicates that PartSD subjects exerted high levels of mental effort in 
order to achieve equivalent performance to the Control subjects. This pattern represents an effective 
but inefficient strategy of mental effort investment, i.e. adequate performance effectiveness obtained 
but only via increased effort investment. On the other hand, the FullSD group initiates a high level of 
mental effort investment but are unable to improve performance. The data from the FullSD group 
represents a strategy of mental effort investment that is both ineffective and inefficient. 
It was apparent from the analysis of subjective data that a differential awareness of subjective 
discomfort was one feature that distinguished the sleep-deprived subjects from the Alcohol group. 
Aside from decreased sobriety, the Alcohol subjects exhibited reduced frustration comparative to the 
other treatment groups (Table 7). It is hypothesised that this effect originated from the increase of 
well-being induced by alcohol. In addition, the Alcohol subjects rated subjective estimates of 
performance to be superior to the two sleep-deprived groups across the simulated journey as a whole 
(Table 7), when performance measures indicated that this group performed as poorly as the FullSD 
subjects (Figure 26). It is known that alcohol tends to promote an inflated sense of confidence (Walls 
& Brownlie, 1985) and this factor may have accounted for the distorted perception of performance that 
typified the Alcohol subjects. 
It was unfortunate that it was not possible to obtain psychophysiological measures of mental effort or to 
include the Alcohol subjects within the performance efficiency index. Based on the model of mental 
effort regulation (Chapter 4), it would be anticipated that any stressor such as alcohol, which is capable 
of distorting both internal and external sources of feedback, would completely disable the process of 
effort regulation. The current analyses illustrated that the Alcohol subjects perceived lower levels of 
discomfort (relative to all groups) and higher performance effectiveness (relative to the sleep-deprived 
subjects). Therefore, there was no increase of subjective effort because these subjects did not perceive 
either an internal or an external spur for effort investment. However, this hypothesis was only 
supported by subjective measures within the current study. 
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The analysis of subjective data shown in Table 7 illustrates a level of equivalence between the two 
groups of sleep-deprived subjects. Both groups perceived increased sleepiness, reduced energy, 
declining performance and increasing levels of frustration. In addition, both groups attempted to 
counteract these detrimental influences by increasing subjective effort and the frequency of task-
relevant thoughts. Despite these similarities, the PartSD group was able to sustain mental effort and 
primary task performance whereas the FullSD subjects could not. 
There were several points of dissociation between the two sleep-deprived groups and these deviations 
may indicate the differences between an effective and an ineffective strategy of effort investment. 
First, the FullSD group perceived both physical demand and temporal demand sub-scales of the TLX to 
increase whereas the PartSD group did not (Table 7). The increase of physical demand may have 
indicated accelerated symptoms of muscular fatigue induced by continuous steering input (Sheridan, et 
aI., 1991). It was interesting that FullSD subjects perceived the temporal demands of the task to be 
relatively accelerated compared to other groups. This finding may be interpreted as evidence of 
increased cognitive inertia due to sleep deprivation, e.g. increased frequency of 'blocking' (Bills, 
1931), slowing of overt responses (Dinges & Kribbs, 1991) - which may provide the illusionary 
impression that task pacing is accelerated. Both findings illustrate that the symptoms of sleepiness are 
more pervasive in the case of the FullSD subjects relative to the PartSD group. This distinction suggest 
that our perceptions of our capability to sustain performance or 'coping capacity' (Schonpflug, 1983) 
or Distress (Matthews, et al., 1997) may be at the root of an effective effort investment strategy. 
5.6 Conclusions 
The study contrasted the influence of different qualitative stressors (alcohol, sleep deprivation) as well 
as the quantitative influence of partial- and full-sleep deprivation on driving behaviour. It was apparent 
that a full night without sleep degraded subjects' lane-keeping performance to approximately the same 
extent as an illegal amount of alcohol. However, this quantitative similarity was superficial as 
degraded performance originated from different causal factors. In the case of the sleep-deprived 
subjects, these individuals were aware of degraded performance, increased sleepiness, and therefore, 
attempted to invest effort to protect performance. This strategy proved ineffective and consequently, 
these subjects incurred costs in form of heightened frustration. The Alcohol group did not perceive 
performance to degrade and experienced an increased sense of wellbeing as was evident from their low 
level of frustration. This comparison indicated the significance of internal and external feedback cues 
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as inputs to effort regulation strategy. If these cues are not available, an appropriate strategy to 
counteract the influence of stressors on performance may not be possible. 
The comparison between sleep-deprivation conditions illustrated the distinction between successful and 
unsuccessful effort strategies. The PartSD group was capable of sustaining equivalent lateral control 
performance to the Control subjects by increased psychophysiological effort. In addition, these 
subjects operated at a lower level of steering input and made more frequent near-errors, i.e. their level 
of vehicular control was the most efficient of all four groups. It is hypothesised that a combination of 
increased mental effort and efficient vehicular control allowed these subjects to sustain performance 
throughout the task. 
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6 THE INFLUENCE OF PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK ON DRIVER 
BEHAVIOUR 10. 
6.1 Abstract 
Eighteen male subjects were requested to perform a simulated driving journey until "they felt unable to 
continue at an acceptable level of performance." Financial incentives were offered for time spent 
"driving" and subjects were informed that they would be financially punished if they "crashed" the 
driving simulator. The subjects performed this task under three conditions: (a) in the presence of a 
Discrete Display where subjects were provided with discrete impairment feedback, (b) a Continuous 
Display condition where subjects were provided with continuous impairment feedback, and (c) a 
Control condition where no feedback was made available. Feedback was based on an on-line analysis 
of steering control and lateral control, and was updated every 30 seconds. Both displays provided three 
levels of feedback, i.e. normal «=40% impairment), minor impairment (41-70% impairment) and 
major impairment (>71% impairment). It was found that the presence of feedback had no effect on 
average duration of the simulated journey, and exerted little influence over the decision whether or not 
to terminate the journey. However, subjects produced a higher level oflateral accuracy when provided 
with warning feedback. There was no evidence that feedback presence increased the level of mental 
effort, exerted any influence on mood or subjective fatigue, or increased subjective workload. It is 
concluded that Feedback affected the qualitative investment of mental effort without increasing the 
quantity of effort, i.e. performance effectiveness was increased without additional effort investment. 
6.2 Introduction 
A survey of drivers in the UK conducted by Maycock (1995) revealed that 29 percent of his survey 
sample (N=4600) had felt close to falling asleep at the wheel during the previous twelve months. 
However, only 7 per cent of the same sample reported fatigue as a contributory factor in accident 
involvement (adjusted by Maycock to implicate fatigue in between 9 and 10 per cent of accidents for 
the sample). The general point, which may be gleaned from this discrepancy, is that an extreme 
experience of fatigue does not have a one-to-one correspondence with accident involvement. This is 
10 A version of this study has been snbmitted for review in Transportation Human Factors. 
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unsurprising in itself Individual drivers may employ various strategies during naturalistic driving to 
counter the influence of fatigue which may be employed at more or less regular intervals, e.g. open car 
window for fresh air, stop the vehicle and take a walk. 
In his writing on the topic of driver fatigue, Brown (1994) revised the perspective of earlier theorists 
(Bartley & Chute, 1947), which characterised operational fatigue as a subjective disinclination to 
continue performance. It is presumed that this 'subjective disinclination' increases as a function of 
time-on-task and serves to provide feedback to the individual regarding the magnitude of fatigue. Once 
a driver perceives their disinclination to rise above a critical level, they may decide to take a break from 
the driving task. However, there may also be a number of reasons for the driver to ignore the 
accumulation of driver fatigue and remain on the road, e.g. lack of suitable stopping place, tight 
journey schedule, desire to reach destination. 
The decision whether or not to break from the driving task may be viewed within an adaptive 
framework originally postulated by Cameron (1973) and advanced by (Hancock & Warm, 1989). The 
latter authors claimed that the act of sustaining attention may be treated as a source of stress in its own 
right hinging on three iterative foci: the input stress (i.e. task demand, sleep deprivation, noise), the 
adaptive or compensatory response to input stress and the resultant influence on the goal-directed 
outputs of the individual. Within this conceptualisation, the input stress of a 2-4 hour car journey 
would be identical for all drivers. However, individual differences would be apparent when a range of 
more or less successful compensatory strategies were employed. A successful strategy will achieve 
two related goals related to performance efficiency (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Schonpflug, 1985), i.e. to 
sustain an adequate level of performance whilst minimising mental effort expenditure and associated 
costs such as stress or discomfort. 
The previous chapter contrasted the influence of various stressors on driving performance. This study 
concluded that the accuracy of external feedback was crucial for mental effort regulation. Those 
subjects deprived of sleep exhibited a higher awareness of performance impairment than intoxicated 
subjects. This awareness had a knock-on effect for the appraisal of internal costs. 
Little research has been performed to investigate the role of external feedback within the domain of 
driver fatigue. There is some evidence that drivers have a tendency to overestimate their own 
capabilities (Brown, 1990). This perspective is supported by research on skill development and 
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awareness (Baars, 1992; Langar & Imber, 1979), i.e. a high level of skill is equated with a low level of 
awareness of one's own performance. 
Both McDonald (1987) and Brown (1994) have advanced the hypothesis that rising fatigue may reduce 
the individual's capacity to self-monitor, with respect to both declining ability or the experience of 
fatigue. According to McDonald " .. anything that impairs self-monitoring, particularly in terms of 
over-estimating one's psychological resources or under-estimating the demands to be met, is likely to 
give rise to unpredictable or uncontrollable effects offatigue" (p. 187). This hypothesis raises a 
number of interesting questions for fatigue and the regulation of mental effort. In both cases, fatigue 
may exert a bias on the regulatory mechanism, such that we tend to over-estimate our performance 
capacity or disregard internal feedback regarding symptoms of fatigue or stress. There are several 
natural outcome of degraded effort regulation: (a) effort investment is misdirected, i.e. non-critical 
aspects of performance are preserved at the expense of critical aspects, (b) effort policy is inefficient, 
i. e. effort invested at a much higher level than is necessary to sustain adequate performance 
effectiveness, and (c) finite effort reserves are over-extended, i.e. individual overestimates ability to 
sustain performance over a given period and is forced to adopt a strategy of effort conservation, 
regardless of its impact on performance. 
One countermeasure to the problems of ineffective effort regulation due to distorted external feedback 
is the design and development of telematic systems to monitor driver behaviour. These systems 
encompass real-time monitoring, diagnosis and feedback of driving impairment in various forms 
(Brookhuis, De Waard, & Bekiaris, 1997; Fairclough, 1997; Fairclough & Hirst, 1993; Haworth & 
Vulcan, 1991; Mackie & Wylie, 1990; Wierwille, 1994). One goal of these systems is to provide a 
source of objective feedback to counteract the influence of fatigue on self-monitoring. However, like 
their human counterparts, these diagnostic systems are reliant on the sensitivity and validity of sensor 
apparatus. 
The measurement of driving performance represents a valid strategy to index impairment (i.e. 
impairment is inferred directly based on primary task performance rather than via a proxy measure). 
However, there are a number of problems associated with the use of driving performance as a 
predictive and diagnostic source of impairment (Fairclough, 1997). Specifically, primary task 
measures are deemed to be insufficiently sensitive to the presence of impairment, i.e. task performance 
is "protected" from the influence of impairment by compensatory strategies (De Waard, 1996; Hockey, 
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1997). Despite these problems, primary task measures occupy a pivotal role in the development of 
driver impairment monitoring systems. These measures form the main source of data for those 
telematic systems that employ multidimensional assessment (Brookhuis, De Waard, & Bekiaris, 1997). 
In addition, the standard means of estimating the validity of indirect measures such as 
psychophysiology is to utilise changes in primary driving performance as a reference variable 
(Wierwille, Wreggit, & Knipling, 1994). 
The aim of the current study was to investigate the influence of performance feedback on driver 
behaviour. A secondary goal of the study was to explore how alternative forms of interface designs 
may exert an influence driver behaviour, i.e. the provision of discrete vs. continuous performance 
feedback. In addition, it was important to consider any influence on fatigue accumulation and mental 
workload, which may be exerted by the alternative forms of warning display. 
6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Experimental Design 
The experiment was designed as a repeated measures experiment. All subjects participated in three 
sessions: (a) a Control condition (no feedback present), (b) the Discrete warning system condition, and 
(c) the Continuous warning system condition. The order of presentation of each condition was 
counterbalanced across the subjects. 
The experimental sessions were scheduled for three times during the day (10:00, 12:30, 15:00). Each 
subject was scheduled for the same time-period for each experimental session. There was at least a 48 
hour period between each consecutive session for all subjects. 
6.3.2 Simulated impairment warning system 
The simulation of a monitoring system was based on two performance-based indicators of driver 
impairment, these were: 
• The standard deviation of vehicle lateral position 
• The proportion of high velocity steering corrections 
The former measure has been validated via numerous studies of both on-road and simulator-based 
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studies of driver impairment (Brookhuis & De Waard, 1993; Riemersma, Sanders, Wildervanck, & 
Gaillard, 1977). The latter measure corresponds to the upper 20th percentile of steering velocity as a 
proportion ofa "baseline" period representative of "normative" driving, i.e. the number of fast steering 
corrections, which may be indicative of a sudden corrective movement to prevent the vehicle straying 
from the lane. Relative values of both criterion measures were calculated with reference to baseline 
values collected during a ten minute familiarisation session on the simulator. Criterion measures were 
calculated every 30 seconds according to the following formulae and used as input to the simulated 
warning interface. These criterion were enforced with reference to the highest value on an 
EITHER/OR basis, i.e. feedback was triggered with respect to the highest of the two criterion 
measures. 
LPcrit = LPsd (30s) / baseline LPsd 
STVEL = % of data (30s) < 80th percentile value of baseline / 20 
The simulated warning system appeared in two forms during the experiment: (1) as a discrete feedback 
system, and (2) as a continuous feedback system. In both cases, three levels of performance feedback 
were provided which were colour-coded into green, amber and red zones. The green zone was defined 
as 'normative' performance, the amber zone signified 'moderate impairment' and the red zone 
indicated 'severe impairment'. These zones were quantified by the percentage change of either Lpcrit 
or STVEL relative to baseline values as shown in Table 8. 
Impairment Zone Quantification by criterion values 
GREEN <-40 % above baseline values 
AMBER >41 % and <=70% above baseline values 
RED >71 % above baseline values 
Table 8. Quantification ofwaming feedback 
The discrete warning display (DD) corresponded to three coloured lights (FIG). Under normative 
circumstances, only the green light was activated. The Continuous warning display (CD) corresponded 
to a dial with three coloured sections (FIG). In this case, each of three impairment zones was divided 
into three sub-sections and the pointer moved within, as well as between each coloured section. In both 
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cases, each display was updated every 30 seconds. 
Figure 30. Schematic representations ofthe discrete and continuous warning interfaces. 
Both versions of the warning interface were supplemented by a spoken warning, which sounded if 
subjects exhibited moderate or severe impairment. These warnings were as follows: 
Amber warning: "W arning. You are showing symptoms of impairment." 
Red warning: "You are highly impaired. Please take a break." 
These voice warnings were activated during once during every 30 second period that the subject 
remained in either the amber or the red zone. 
6.3.3 Driving simulator 
The driving task was simulated via PC-based computer software devised at the TNO Institute for 
Human Factors. This software simulated a colour view of a single-vehicle road on a large 20" monitor. 
The roadway geometry in the simulated world represented a large circuit of straight road sections 
interspersed with curved sections to the left and to the right. The software also provided a speedometer 
and engine sound feedback. If the simulated vehicle drifted from the grey road area to off-road green 
area, subjects received noise feedback to aid error-correction. The simulated roadway circuit contained 
a "Services" sign at the mid-point. This sign functioned as a cue for subjects to elicit subjective data or 
to terminate the journey (see Procedure section below). Vehicular control input was achieved via 
adapted version of the ThrustMaster™ steering console with pedals for accelerator and brake control. 
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6.3.4 Apparatus 
The driving task was simulated via Pentium computer software with the screen placed at eye-level. 
The simulator PC was linked to a second Pentium via an Ethernet connection. This PC contained 
software written specifically for the experiment, capable of converting real-time, raw data from the 
simulator into baselined criterion values. These values were transmitted to a third PC that contained 
the necessary software to receive data and to simulate warning feedback. The simulation of each 
warning interface was achieved via software created in VisuaIBasic5. OTM specifically for the 
experiment. 
ECG data was collected via an analogue-to-digital converter (MacLab™) working in conjunction with 
specific software (Chart™) on a Macintosh Powerbook. 
6.3.5 SUbjects 
18 male subjects participated in the study. The average age of the subjects was 34.2 years (s.d. = 9.9) 
and they had been fully qualified drivers for an average of 16.5 years (s.d. = 10.7). The majority of the 
drivers used their vehicle everyday and most approximated their annual mileage to fall between 9000 
and 24,000 km. 
6.3.6 Experimental Measures 
Primary task performance was indexed by a number of variables related to the quality of driving 
performance. These measures were as follows: 
• Average value ofLPcrit 
• Average value ofSTVEL 
• Time spent in the Amber zone (as a fraction of total journey duration) 
• Time spent in the Red zone (as a fraction of total journey duration) 
• Mean frequency oflane crossings (per minute), i.e. when either right or left wheel of simulated 
vehicle made contact with lane boundary 
• Mean frequency of near-crossings (per minute), i.e. when either right or left wheel was 20 cm or less 
from lane boundary 
• Mean steering wheel standard deviation 
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• Mean speed (Km/h) 
Psychophysiological measures constituted the electrocardiogram trace (ECG) recorded at 1000Hz. The 
subsequent inter-beat interval (ID!) was subjected to power spectrum analysis in order to distinguish 
three bandwidths (upper, middle and lower). The mean power in the mid-frequency bandwidth (0.07-
0.14Hz) was calculated to represent a psychophysiological index of mental effort (Aasman, Mulder, & 
Mulder, 1987; Mulder, 1979a; Mulder, 1979b; Vicente, Thornton, & Moray, 1987). 
A range of subjective measures was employed during the study. A post-test and pre-test questionnaire 
was administered that included the University of Wales Mood Adjective Scale (UMACL) (Matthews, 
Jones, & Chamberlain, 1990), the Delft Effort scale (Zijlstra & van Doom, 1985) and the raw version 
of the NASA-Task Load Index (RTLX) (Byers, Bittner, & Hill, 1989; Hart & Staveland, 1988). In 
addition, subjects were asked to provide verbal ratings of fatigue symptoms in the course of simulated 
journey. These rating constituted a modified version of the fatigue symptoms checklist (Matthews & 
Desmond, 1998). The symptom checklist had been reduced to 16 items (constituting 4 symptoms in 
each of 4 categories of Visual Fatigue, Motivation, Muscular Fatigue and Malaise) where subjects had 
to respond "none," "Iow," "medium," or "high." 
6.3.7 Proced u re 
The subjects arrived at the Institute for the initial session and received a set of standard instructions that 
provided an overview of the study. The subjects were fitted with ECG electrodes and asked to 
complete a ten-minute familiarisation journey using the simulator. Baseline data were recorded during 
the latter portion of this familiarisation journey. 
Subjects received a set of standard instructions for each test session (control, DD, CD). These 
instructions included a description of the subjective data protocol, i.e. subjects instructed that they 
would be prompted to provide fatigue ratings at the "Services" sign. In addition, the subjects were 
informed about the financial rewards and penalties included in the experimental protocol. Subjects 
were told that they would receive a £ 1 0 minimum payment per session, but subsequent payment was 
contingent on the duration of time spent "driving" in the simulator. Specifically, the subjects would 
receive £2.50 for every 15 minute period spent performing the simulated drive. However, if they left 
the road with all four wheels at any time, the journey would be terminated and the subjects would 
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forfeit all payment except the £10 minimum. 
When a display was present, the standard instructions included a description of each display including 
graphical examples of full range of warning information, that the warning was based on their driving 
performance, and the degree of impairment indicated by the warning feedback (i.e. amber warning = 
minimum impairment of 40 per cent comparative to baseline, red warning = minimum impairment of 
70 per cent relative to baseline). 
Prior to beginning their journey, each subject was asked to complete a pre-test version of questionnaire 
index. Each subjects was instructed to drive until "they felt unable to continue at an acceptable level of 
performance." Subjects were provided with an opportunity to stop the session voluntarily by the 
appearance of a "Services" sign that appeared every 25km. When the subjects passed this sign, 
regardless of whether they wished to withdraw from the study, they were asked to provide subjective 
ratings via the fatigue symptoms checklist. If the subject continued for over 120 minutes, the session 
was terminated by the experimenter. Once the journey was over, the subjects completed post-test 
versions of questionnaire index. 
This sequence of familiarisation - instructions - pre-test scales - test session - post-test scales was 
followed in all three experimental sessions. 
6.4 Results 
The data collected during the experiment were principally SUbjected to ANOV A procedures for the 
purposes of statistical analyses. Most analyses conform to a 3 x 5 design, where experimental 
CONDITION (Control, CD, DD) and Time-On-Task (TOT) act as main effects. Naturally, the 
inclusion of TOT was problematic, given that simulated journeys could be terminated at the subjects' 
discretion and therefore, journey duration was variable. For the purposes of analyses, it was decided to 
divide each journey into five proportionate periods, hence the 3 x 5 ANOV A design. 
6.4.1 Total Journey Duration 
The total duration of the simulated journey was analysed via a 3-way ANOVA between each of three 
experimental conditions. This analysis revealed no significant differences in journey duration between 
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the Control condition (M = 97.7min) compared to those journeys when either the discrete (M = 
95.7min) or the continuous display (M = 97.8min) were available. 
A correlational analysis indicated that total journey duration showed only modest and insignificant 
levels of association with the frequency of amber and red warnings. These data are shown below in 
Table 9, comparative data from the Control condition are also included. 
CONDITION Amber warnings Red warnings 
CONTROL -0.10 -0.29 '. 
DISCRETE DISPLAY -0.32 -0.33 
CONTINUOUS DISPLAY -0.22 -0.32 
Table 9. Correlation coefficients between warnings and total journey duration for all subjects 
(N=18). NB: None of the coefficients reached statistical significance. 
6.4.2 Warning criterion and frequency of warnings 
The warnings presented by the interface were based on two measures, LPerit and STVEL (see 
methodology for definition). Both variables were subjected to 3 x 5 ANOV A analyses (CONDITION 
x TOT). 
The analysis of Lperit revealed a significant effect for TOT [E(4,68)=3 1. 1, n < 0.01] and an effect of 
marginal significant for CONDITION [1::(2,34)=2.9, n = 0.07]. Post-hoc analyses revealed that Lperit 
was significantly lower during periods 1 and 2 with respect to all consecutive periods. In addition, 
Lperit was significantly higher during period 5 relative to periods 3 and 4. Post-hoc analyses of the 
CONDITION effect indicated that Lperit was significantly higher during the Control condition relative 
to either display condition. 
The analysis of STVEL revealed a significant main effect due to CONDITION [1::(2,34)=4.2, n < 0.05] 
and an interaction between both main effects [1::(8,136)=2.1, n < 0.05]. The significantmain effect 
revealed that STVEL was higher during the Control condition relative to either of the two display 
conditions. Post-hoc analyses of the interaction effect indicated that S7n'L was significantly reduced 
during the DD condition during only periods 3-5. In the case of the CD condition, STVEL was 
significantly reduced during periods 2-5 relative to the Control condition. In addition, STVEL was only 
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sensitive to TOT during the Control condition (i.e. STVEL was higher during periods 3-5 relative to 1-
2). There was no TOT effect apparent during either the DD or CD conditions. This interaction effect 
is illustrated in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31. Mean values of STVEL during all 3 experimental conditions across TOT (N=18). 
It was apparent from the analyses that the Lpcrit was the criterion measure most sensitive to TOT. 
Therefore, it was not surprising that the majority of warnings presented to the subjects were triggered 
by Lpcrit rather than STVEL, i.e. fraction of alarms due to Lperit averaged 0.98 in both display 
conditions, whereas the equivalent for STVEL were 0.6 and 0.5 for the DD and CD conditions 
respectively. 
The warning displays in both DD and CD conditions were divided into three areas, i.e. green, amber 
and red. The amber zone indicated that either Lperit or STVEL had fallen by 40-69 per cent relative to 
baseline values, whereas the red zone was indicative of a primary task decrement of at least 70 per cent. 
The time each subject spent in either the amber or the red zones was quantified as a proportionate value 
and subjected to a 3 x 5 ANOVA The analysis of time spent in the amber zone revealed significant 
main effects due to CONDITION [£(2,34)=6.4, R < 0.01] and TOT [£(4,68)=7.9, R < 0.01]. Post-hoc 
testing revealed that subjects spent proportionately less time in the amber zone in the presence of either 
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display relative to the Control condition. In addition, it was found that subjects spent less time in the 
amber zone during periods I and 2 relative to consecutive periods. 
The same analysis was performed on proportionate time spent in the red zone. In this case, there was a 
significant main effect due to TOT [1:(4,68)=5.1, I! < 0.01] and a marginal effect due to CONDITION 
[E(2,34)=2.9, I! = 0.07]. A post-hoc analysis of the TOT effect revealed an identical trend to the one 
described earlier with respect to time in the amber zone. Post-hoc testing of the CONDITION effect 
revealed that subjects spent significantly less time in the red zone when using the CD interface (Q < 
0.05) compared to the Control condition. However, this effect was less marked when comparing the 
same data during the DD condition (I! = 0.09). 
Both main effects due to CONDITION for time spent in amber and red zones are shown below in 
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Figure 32. Mean proportion of time spent in the amber and red zones across all three 
experimental conditions (N=18). 
6.4.3 Primary task performance 
Several other aspects of vehicular control were measured and SUbjected to statistical analyses. 
The accuracy of subjects' lateral control was indexed via two related measures: (a) frequency oflane 
crossings per minute, i.e. when either the right or left-side wheel came into contact with the lane 
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boundary, and (b) frequency of near-crossings per minute, i.e. when either the right or left-side wheel 
was less than 20 cm from the lane boundary. These data were subjected to a 3 x 2 x 5 MANOV A 
(CONDITION x LATERAL CONTROL MEASURE x TOT). Several significant effects emerged 
from this analysis, there was a marginal effect for CONDITION [E(2,34)=3.l, I! = 0.06] and significant 
main effects for LATERAL CONTROL [E(1,17)=34.l, I! < 0.01] and TOT [E(4,68)=15.9, I! < 0.01]. 
The main effect due to LATERAL CONTROL indicated that the near-crossing were more frequent 
than the occurrence of actual lane crossings. Other main effects were investigated further via a number 
of significant interaction effects. In the first instance, an interaction effect was apparent between 
CONDITION x LATERAL CONTROL [E(2,34)=3.3, I! = 0.05], which indicated that there was no 
significant differences between the three conditions for lane crossings. However, the frequency of 
near -crossings was significantly lower during both display conditions relative to the Control condition. 
The interaction between LATERAL CONTROL and TOT [1':(4,68)=17.6, I! < 0.01] revealed that the 
frequency oflane crossings were significantly higher during period 5 relative to periods 1-2. It was 
also found that the frequency of near-crossings showed a significant linear trend with increasing TOT, 
i.e. frequency during period 1 was lower than periods 2-5, frequency during period 2 was lower than 3-
5 etc. The significant main effects for near-crossings are illustrated in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33. Mean frequency of near-crossings in three conditions across TOT (N=18). 
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An identical 3 x 2 x 5 MANOV A was performed to investigate the temporal dimension of both lane 
crossings and near-crossings, i.e. fraction of time when the 'vehicle wheels' were either in contact with, 
or within 20 cm of the lane boundary. This analysis revealed main effects for LATERAL CONTROL 
[1:(1,17)=28.1,11< 0.01] and TOT [1:(4,68)=15.3, 11 < 0.01]. These findings indicated that near-
crossings were longer than actual lane crossings and that durations were lower during periods 1 and 2 
relative to period 5. An interaction between CONDITION and LATERAL CONTROL [E(2,34)=4.5, 11 
< 0.05] revealed that near-crossings were shorter in the presence of a display (this trend was not 
apparent for actual lane crossings). 
The stability of the subjects' steering input was indexed by calculating the standard deviation of 
steering wheel input (steer sd). This variable was subjected to a 3 x 5 ANOV A, which revealed a 
significant main effect due to TOT [E(4,68)= 7.8, 11 < 0.01] and a significant interaction [E(8,136)=4.1, 
11 < 0.01]. The main effect indicated the standard deviation of steering input was significantly lower 
during periods 1 and 2 relative to consecutive periods of TOT. Post -hoc testing of the interaction effect 
revealed that steer sd was significantly higher during the Control condition relative to either display 
conditions during periods 2-5. In addition, steer sd exhibited a linear trend over TOT during the 
Control condition. However, this trend was not apparent for either of the two display conditions as 
shown in Figure 34. The post-hoc tests indicated that steer sd was significantly higher during periods 
4-5 relative to period 2 during the DD condition. There was no evidence for any such linear trend 
during the CD condition. 
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Figure 34. Mean values of steering wheel standard deviation for three experimental conditions 
across TOT (N=18). 
The subjects' choice of mean speed was subjected to a 3 x 5 ANOV A, which revealed a main effect of 
only marginal significance for TOT [£(4,68)= 2.2, I! = 0.08]. This effect indicated that mean speed 
increased with rising TOT. An identical analysis of speed variability (expressed as the standard 
deviation of speed) revealed no significant findings. 
6.4.4 Psychophysiology 
The raw ECG trace was subjected to a power spectrum analysis using the HRV extension to the 
Chart™ software package. Unfortunately, data from two subjects had to be discarded to measurement 
artefacts. Each original data file was initially sub-divided into five proportionate sections. This 
analysis software calculated inter-beat intervals (ffiI) from the trace (for each of the five data files per 
subject) and the power in the mid-frequency bandwidth (0.07-0.14) of the ffiI variability. These values 
were subjected to a natural log transform and baselined to resting values using the procedure described 
by Meijman (1995). 
These data were subjected to a 2 x 5 ANCOV A with total journey duration acting as a changing 
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covariate. This analysis revealed a significant main effect due to TOT [E(4,60)= 19.0, l! < 0.01). Post-
hoc testing indicated that psychophysiological mental effort was higher during periods 1-2 relative to 
all consecutive periods. 
6.4.5 Subjective data 
The fatigue checklist data were summed to produce scores for each of five fatigue factors (Desmond, 
Matthews, & Hancock, 1997) of between 0 and 12. These summarised data were averaged into five 
proportionate segments of the journey and divided by the duration of each segment, i.e. to produce a 
fatigue score per minute. These data were subjected to 3 x 5 ANOV A. These analyses revealed only 
significant main effects for TOT for: Boredom [E(4,6S)= 19.5, l! < 0.01], Malaise [E(4,6S)= 4.4, l! < 
0.01], Muscular fatigue [E(4,6S)= 14.4, l! < 0.01], Visual fatigue [E(4,6S)= S.6, l! < 0.01] and the 
frequency of reported symptoms per minute [E(4,6S)= 13.5, l! < 0.01). Post-hoc testing revealed 
similar linear trends with increasing TOT, e.g. a minimal number of symptoms during period I relative 
to periods 3-5, a higher number of symptoms during period 5 relative to periods 2-3. 
Post-test scores from the RTLX, the UMACL and the Effort scale were subjected to a 3-way 
ANCOV A with total journey duration acting as a changing covariate. These analyses revealed only 
one significant finding for Tense Arousal [E(2,32)= 3.3, l! < 0.05). Post-hoc analysis indicated that 
subjects felt significantly more tense following the DD condition (M = IS.3) relative to either the 
Control or the CD condition (respective M = 17.1 and 17.3). 
6.4.6 The decision to continue or to quit. 
As stated in the Methodology section, the subjects were allowed to terminate the simulated journey at 
their discretion. Those subj ects who did not withdraw voluntarily from the simulated task had their 
sessions closed by the experimenter following 120 minutes of sustained performance. 
In all three conditions, approximately half the subjects were terminated by the experimenter - five of 
whom had their sessions closed by the experimenter in all three experimental conditions. With respect 
to those subjects who withdrew of their own accord, the duration of their sustained performance was 
very consistent between the three conditions as shown in Table 10. 
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Control Condition Discrete Display Continuous Display 
N 9 8 8 
Mean duration 97.6 95.7 96.8 
(min) 
Standard dev.(mi;;) 27.9 25.0 27.9 
Maximum duration 110 94 95 
Minimum duration 36 35 26 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics for subjects who withdrew from study by choice. 
These data were supplemented by a discriminant function analysis (OF A), which was performed to 
determine which factors were associated with the decision to withdraw voluntarily from the task. 
For the purposes of the DF A, the subjects were divided into two classes: a FINISH group who 
performed the task for the maximum duration of 120 minutes and a QUIT group who terminated the 
journey by their own accord. 
*The following primary task variables were calculated as average values across the journey as a whole 
and used as independent variables in the DFA: fraction of time in yellow zone, fraction of time in red 
zone, frequency of lane crossing, frequency of near-lane crossing, Lperit, and STVEL. These primary 
task variables were supplemented by a number of subjective measures. These data from the fatigue 
symptom checklist (visual fatigue, motivation, muscular fatigue, malaise and total frequency of 
symptoms) were expressed as a gain rate per minute, i.e. period 5 value minus period I value 7 
duration of journey. The psychophysiological data representative of mental effort was also included as 
a gain rate per minute, i.e. mental effort at period I - effort at period 5 + journey duration. The 
inclusion of the psychophysiological data within the DFA meant that two subjects were not included in 
these analyses due to missing ECG data. 
Three DF As were performed which employed data from the three experimental conditions. In all 
cases, DFAs were performed as forward stepwise procedures with F-value to enter set at 1.50 and a 
Tolerance value of 0.0100. The results of the DFA are shown in a standard tabular format and a note of 
explanation is provided for those unfamiliar with DFA. The significance of the discrimination is 
expressed as a global Wilks Lambda value 11 w], i.e. 0 = perfect discrimination. This discrimination is 
constituted of a model containing several variables, which are shown in the Table. The Partial Lambda 
represents the unique contribution to the group discrimination provided by that variable. The f ratio 
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and associated level of probability are also provided in the Table, however since the DF A procedure 
capitalises on chance, these J;! levels should be interpreted with caution. 
The DFA using data from the Control condition was terminated after six steps, resulting in a highly 
significant discrimination between the two groups [1w (6.9)=0.13, J;!<0.01]. This analysis is 
summarised in Table 11. According to this analysis, subjects who withdrew from the journey 
experienced a higher gain rate for fatigue symptoms, particularly those associated with visual and 
muscular fatigue. In addition, QUIT subjects showed a superior level ofLpcrit, indicating a higher 
accuracy of lateral control. It was apparent that the frequency of fatigue symptoms and the level of 
Lpcrit were the two principle factors responsible for subjects choosing to terminate the journey on a 
voluntary basis (i.e. see partial Lambda and .E ratios in Table 11). 
Variable Partial F-value p-level Mean values 
Lambda FINISH QUIT 
Muscular fatigue 0.99 0.05 0.82 0.021 0.086 
Lpcrit 0.31 25.4 <0.01 1.117 1.014 
Frequency of symptoms 0.45 13.4 <0.01 0.027 0.093 
Visual fatigue 0.74 3.7 0.07 0.016 0.092 
Table 11. Results of the DFA analysis conducted on data from the Control condition (N=16). 
The DF A based on the DD condition was terminated after two steps, resulting in a significant 
discrimination between the two groups [1w (2,13)=0.52, J;!<0.05]. This analysis revealed two factors 
that may have been responsible for subjects choosing to withdraw from the simulated journey (Table 
12). It was apparent that subjects choose to QUIT the journey principally because of the STVEL 
variable, which was used as an input to the warning system. In addition, subjects who experienced the 
highest negative rate of gain with respect to psychophysiological effort tended to withdraw from the 
journey, i.e. those subjects whose effort expenditure was declining at the h,ighest rate 
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Variable Partial F-value p-Ievel Mean values 
Lambda FINISH QUIT 
STVEL 0.71 17.9 0.04 0.759 1.073 
O.IHz mental effort 0.71 8.3 0.04 -0.171 -0.661 
Table 12. Results of the DFA analysis conducted on data from the Discrete Display condition 
(N=16). 
The DF A which was based data from the CD condition was terminated after four steps, resulting in a 
significant discrimination between the two groups [!"w (4,11)=0.28,11<0.01]. This analysis is 
summarised in Table 13. It was apparent that three principle factors were responsible for subjects 
withdrawing during the CD condition. Those subjects who tended to QUIT were characterised by a 
higher rate of gain of those fatigue symptoms associated with declining motivation. As in the previous 
analysis, subjects who withdrew from the study exhibited a higher negative rate of gain associated with 
psychophysiological effort. It was found that QUIT subjects exhibited a lower frequency oflane 
crossings relative to the FINISH group. Finally, there was an indication that high levels of muscular 
fatigue prompted subjects to withdraw from the simulated journey by their own volition. 
Variable Partial F-value p-Ievel Mean values 
Lambda FINISH QUIT 
Motivation 0.64 6.3 0.03 0.022 0.095 
O.IHz mental effort 0.71 4.5 0.06 -0.245 -1.031 
Frequency oflane crossings 0.56 8.8 0.01 0.089 0.044 
Muscular fatigue 0.85 1.9 0.19 0.025 0.114 
Table 13. Results ofthe DFA analysis conducted on data from the Continuous Display condition 
(N=16). 
6.4.7 Performance Efficiency Index 
This analysis was based on the relationship between psychophysiological effort and performance as 
used in previous studies (Chapters 7 to 5) and described originally by (Meijman, 1995). For the 
purposes of the current analysis, the Lpcrit variable was used to represent primary task performance. 
The efficiency index is illustrated below in Figure 35. Values for psychophysiological effort and Lpcrit 
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were derived for each of the five consecutive periods of the simulated journey. 
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Figure 35. Performance efficiency index for all three experimental conditions. NB: numbers 
denote successive periods of a simulated journey, high y-values = poor performance, high x-
values = increased mental effort. 
It was apparent that subjects in the Control condition showed the greatest decline of performance 
efficiency in the course of the simulated journey. The level of mental effort feIl to around 19% 
between periods 2 and 3 and remained at a stable, low level whilst performance declined between 
periods 3 and 5. In the DD condition, subjects exhibited a similar trend with respect to mental effort , 
i.e. falling from 2S to 19 per cent over the course of the journey. However, subjects were capable of 
higher overal1 level of performance effectiveness in the presence of the DD and therefore, sustained 
efficiency at a higher level throughout the journey. The presence of the CD prompted subjects to invest 
mental effort at a higher level during the initial period of the journey, but this increased expenditure did 
not translate into superior performance (relative to the DD condition). Performance efficiency during 
the CD condition was characterised by a slightly higher level of mental effort throughout (relative to 
both other conditions), however, performance was broadly at the same level as the DD condition, with 
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the exception of periods 1 and 5. 
6.4.8 The regulation of mental effort 
The psychophysiological analysis revealed that the presence of performance feedback had no impact on 
the level of effort invested into the simulated driving task. However, it was hypothesised that feedback 
would influence the regulation of mental effort by increasing the salience of external performance cues. 
A regression analysis was conducted to test this hypothesis using psychophysiological effort as an 
independent variable. A number of variables represented internal costs (subjective estimates of fatigue 
symptoms) were entered into this analysis alongside variables representing external cues (frequency of 
warnings, line crossings, and near-crossings). Note that warning frequency was calculated as a 
"virtual" variable in the case of the Control condition. 
The regression analysis of data from the Control yielded a R2 value of 0.94 [E (7,5)= 8.6, Q < 0.05] 
(three subjects rejected as outliers). The significant predictors of mental effort are shown below in 
Table 14. The level of association between psychophysiological effort and each variable is expressed 
as a semi-partial correlation coefficient. In the Control condition, mental effort significantly declined 
when symptoms of visual fatigue increased. 
The regression analysis of DD data indicated a significant degree of association between predictor 
variables and mental effort. The R2 value was 0.89 [E (7,5)= 5.9, Q < 0.05]. The level of mental effort 
was significantly reduced whenever symptoms of boredom and visual fatigue were in ascendance. On 
the other hand, mental effort was invested when symptoms of muscular fatigue and the frequency of 
near line crossings increased (Table 14). 
The analysis of data from the CD was insignificant, R2 value = 0.84 [E (7,5)= 3.8, Q = 0.09]. None of 
the dependent variables was found significant. However, the correlation between the frequency of 
near-line crossings and mental effort indicated a weak association (Table 14). 
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CONTROL DD CD 
Boredom O.ol -0.58* -0.19 
Muscular fatigue 0.19 0.59* 0.19 
Visual fatigue -0.46* -0.41 * 0.15 
Frequency of Amber warnings -0.10 -0.29 -0.03 
Frequency of Red warnings 0.27 0.26 0.02 
Frequency ofline crossings 0.13 0.15 -0.04 
Frequency of near line crossings -0.08 0.50* 0.30 
Table 14. Semi-partial correlation coefficients between variables and psychophysiological mental 
effort in all three conditions (N=13). 
The regression analysis revealed no direct evidence to support the hypothesis that performance 
feedback increased the relationship between mental effort and external cues. The level of association 
between warnings and mental effort was inconsistent across conditions. In general terms, there was 
little consensus between regression equations across the three experimental conditions. 
6.5 Discussion 
The study revealed that the presence of performance feedback had no effect on either the average 
duration of the simulated journey or the number of subjects who chose to withdraw from the task of 
their own accord. 
Paradoxically, these subjects also exhibited a higher level oflateral control, as indicated by the Lperil 
data. These latter data may be used as evidence to support two hypotheses: (a) those subjects in the 
QUIT group withdrew earlier than FINISH subjects by definition, hence, their level of lateral control 
failed to decline to the same extent, i.e. Lpcrit was associated with a significant TOT effect, or (b) 
those subjects in the QUIT group may have been more sensitive to the level oflateral accuracy than the 
FINISH subjects, both in terms of external feedback and with respect to the acceptable level of 
performance decline. Therefore, these subjects decided to withdraw at an earlier point before lateral 
control was permitted to degrade to the same extent as the FINISH group. 
This hypothesis was supported by the DFA on data from the DD condition (Table 12), where STVEL 
was one of only two significant variables that discriminated between the two subject groups. Post-hoc 
correlations revealed that STVEL was correlated with both the frequency of amber and red warnings (R 
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= 0.68 and 0.67 respectively) and so it may be assumed that frequent warnings persuaded subjects to 
withdraw from the journey. 
The DF A summarised in Table 12 revealed that QUIT subjects exhibited a higher negative rate of gain 
associated with psychophysiological effort, i.e. the level of effort expenditure reduced at a higher rate 
across the journey duration. Post-hoc correlations indicated that mental effort was not correlated with 
STVEL (R = -0.11), but did reveal a substantial level of association between effort and those fatigue 
symptoms associated with declining motivation (R = 0.69). This association supports the hypothesis 
that mental effort expenditure increased in order to compensate for the accumulation of subjective 
fatigue. However, an increased rate of effort expenditure will exhaust finite reserves at a higher rate 
over the course of the simulated journey. Therefore, it is proposed that a high gain rate for subjective 
symptoms of fatigue accelerated the level of effort expenditure, which in turn, exhausted finite effort 
reserves at a higher rate per unit time. This positive feedback loop may approximate the link between 
effort expenditure and internal feedback of subjective discomfort in the effort regulation model. 
The rank order data indicated that some subjects were more likely to respond to warning feedback in 
the CD condition rather than the DD condition. However, the DF A analysis from the CD condition 
(Table 13) did not provide any evidence that subjects withdrew from the task on the basis of warning 
feedback, i.e. Lpcrit, STVEL and other variables related to the feedback system were not included in 
the data model. The DF A analysis reinforced the role of subjective fatigue coupled to the rate of 
negative gain associated with psychophysiological effort (Table 13). In this case, both motivational 
and muscular fatigue symptoms were highly correlated with the rate of effort expenditure over TOT (R 
= -0.69 and 0.95 respectively). These findings are explained via the hypothesis stated in the previous 
paragraph. It was also apparent that QUIT subjects made fewer lane crossings per minute relative to 
the FINISH group. This finding was similar to the results of the DF A in the Control condition 
concerning the Lpcrit variable (Table 11). The two hypotheses to explain this paradoxical finding were 
stated earlier in this section. 
The results of the DF A analyses did not reveal any conclusive differences between the reasons to quit 
across all three conditions. It was anticipated that variables related to the warning feedback would be 
implicated in the DF As performed during the CD and DD conditions. This hypothesis only received 
support during the DD condition, when STVEL was a significant, discriminating variable between the 
two subject groups. However, this particular DF A produced the highest overall Wilks Lambda value 
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(2" w = 0.52) which was indicative of a poor discrimination relative to the analyses from the Control and 
CD conditions (2" w = 0.13 and 0.25 respectively) - therefore, there are grounds to have less confidence 
in the results of the DFA from the DD condition. 
It was apparent that the rate of effort expenditure and the rate of gain associated with subjective fatigue 
both played a role in the decision to quit across all three conditions. Whilst the rate of effort 
expenditure was only significant during the display analyses, it was highly correlated with muscular 
and visual symptoms offatigue during the Control analysis (respective R = -0.59 and -0.69). These 
findings suggested that the presence of warning feedback may have raised subjects' awareness of effort 
expenditure, the level of effort reserves and associated costs in terms of rising subjective fatigue. This 
hypothesis amounts to a claim that the presence of objective performance feedback brought the issue of 
effort utility to prominence, i.e. the decision whether or not to continue as assessed with respect to 
effort expenditure and remaining effort reserves. However, this hypothesis is highly speculative. 
Based on the analyses from the previous section, which postulated a cyclic link between increased 
effort expenditure and accelerated sUbjective fatigue, it is impossible to determine which of the two 
variables was principally responsible for the decision to quit. 
The analysis of primary task performance indicated that both criterion variables (Lpcrit and STVEL) 
were sensitive to TOT effects during the Control condition (e.g. Figure 31). However, it would not be 
accurate to refer to either variable as a driver fatigue indicator. The criterion variables are simply 
indicative of a pattern of degraded driving behaviour, where lane weaving increased and a greater 
proportion of high-velocity steering corrections were made. Based on previous research (see 
Introduction), it would be accurate to state that this particular pattern of performance degradation has 
been associated with driver fatigue in the past. For the purposes of the current study, these findings 
demonstrated the sensitivity of simulated warning system to sustained temporal aspects of 
performance, which was used as a surrogate fatigue manipulation within the experimental design. 
It was clear from the results that the presence of performance feedback diminished the rate of primary 
task degradation with respect to TOT. This finding was most apparent for those driving variables that 
were directly represented by the simulated warning system, e.g. Figure 31 and Figure 32. The 
occurrence of severe driving errors such as lane crossings (i.e. departures from the roadway) was 
relatively rare events that increased with TOT. However, it should be noted that the presence of 
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warning feedback did not significantly reduce the frequency of such events. On the other hand, the 
presence of feedback proved a highly effective means of reducing the frequency and duration ofless 
severe events such as near-lane crossings (Figure 33). The STVEL variable was associated with the 
stability of steering control input, therefore, it was not surprising that the presence of warning feedback 
managed to reduce the variability of steering control (Figure 34). 
These findings indicated that the degradation of vehicular control due to TOT was counteracted by the 
provision of warning feedback. However, there was no evidence that the presence offeedback incited 
any adaptive safety-related response from the subjects such as speed reduction. 
The analysis of psychophysiological data did not reveal any significant differences between the three 
experimental conditions with respect to mental effort investment. This null finding was very striking 
for two reasons: (a) performance feedback appeared to improve performance effectiveness without 
necessitating increased effort investment, and (b) the level of mental effort was found to decline with 
increased TOT, however this conservation of mental effort did not adversely affect performance during 
the latter stages of the simulated journey. 
These findings suggested that mental effort may have been invested more efficiently during the display 
conditions. The depiction of performance efficiency (Figure 35) broadly supported this view. It was 
apparent that subjects invested effort at a higher level during both display conditions during periods 1-3 
compared to the Control condition. It was also evident that subjects achieved a higher level of 
performance effectiveness during the display conditions, regardless of the level of mental effort 
investment. This trend was particularly marked for subjects during the DD condition in Figure 35. 
This pattern is indicative of improved performance efficiency. 
Previous analyses (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Schonpflug, 1985) have stressed the quantitative basis of 
performance efficiency, i.e. efficiency is identified with a reduced quantity of effort and 
stable/improved performance effectiveness. This pattern of quantitative efficiency is apparent between 
the DD condition and the Control condition during periods 1-3 (Figure 35). However, during the latter 
periods of the journey (4-5), the level of effort investment is very similar between DD and Control 
conditions - but the DD group sustains performance at a much higher level. This pattern is suggestive 
of a qualitative form of performance efficiency. Therefore, effort is invested at the same gross level, 
but achieves a higher level of effectiveness via the timely introduction of procedural mental effort in 
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response to error. 
The only significant effect due the experimental condition to emerge from the analysis of the subjective 
data was an increased level of tense arousal in the presence of the discrete display. This finding may 
have indicated that increased performance efficiency (Figure 35) was only achieved at the expense of 
increased levels of subjective stress. The other scales included in the pre/post questionnaire were 
associated with null findings with respect to experimental condition manipulation. The absence of any 
significant differences indicated that the presence of warning feedback did not degrade alertness or 
cause a negative affective change. In addition, there was no evidence that either display had any effect 
on subjective mental workload or any sub-scale of the NASA-TLX. This effect was surprising, given 
the inclusion of sub-scales concerned with subjective estimates of performance quality and effort. The 
analysis of the fatigue symptom checklist data only revealed significant main effects due to TOT. 
Therefore, the presence of warning feedback neither accelerated nor reduced the rate of subjective 
fatigue accumulation. 
There was little evidence that either type of warning interface produced superior driving performance 
to the other. It was anticipated that the CD version of the interface would provide greater fidelity of 
feedback (i.e. 9 possible zones of performance as opposed to 3 in the DD condition) but at the expense 
of increased visual distraction from the simulated roadway scene. There was some weak evidence to 
support the former hypothesis that the CD warning was the more effective at reducing the proportion of 
time spent in the red zone (Figure 32). However, there was no evidence for either increased subjective 
workload or primary task interference that may have been associated with the latter hypothesis. 
The calculation of performance efficiency (Figure 35) suggested that the DD warning was associated 
with more efficient performance compared to the CD warning. In addition, there was some evidence 
from the DF A (Table (2) that subjects choose to withdraw from the journey based on DD feedback. 
Both effects may have been due to more concise form of warning feedback in the DD condition, i.e. 
subjects only received explicit feedback in the case of moderate or extreme impairment. However, this 
abrupt mode of discrete warning feedback may been responsible for the increase of subjective tension 
observed in the pre- and post -questionnaire data. 
The experiment may have been improved by evaluating the influence of warning feedback under a 
more strenuous fatigue manipulation. For example, by extending the maximum possible duration of 
simulated journey from 2 hours to 4 hours and/or by running the experiment between midnight and 
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4AM. The current study was only capable of providing an indication of how feedback may impact on 
driving performance under modest fatigue regime and it is possible that any beneficial effects may 
evaporate under conditions that are more strenuous. 
An additional flaw in the current study was the relatively small size of the subject group. For instance, 
in the earlier study performed by Nilsson, Nelson, & Carlson (1997), eighty subjects participated in the 
simulated journey. This study was designed in order to investigate idiosyncratic decision-making 
which constitutes the decision whether or not to continue a simulated journey and a larger subject 
population may have reduced inter-subject variability and permitted a more rigorous investigation of 
individual differences. 
In addition, the level of adaptivity available to the subjects was somewhat limited by the experimental 
design, i.e. the subjects had a choice whether to stop or to continue. The ecological validity of this 
approach could be improved by offering rest breaks and financial incentives linked to journey 
schedules, i.e. the possibility of additional financial reward by arriving at a destination ahead of 
schedule being countered by financial punishment linked to accidents (hence, encouraging subjects to 
take more frequent rest breaks). 
The current study used criterion levels of 40% and 70% to define respective, moderate and severe 
levels of impairment. However, this decision was arbitrary and was based on an unpublished pilot 
experiment. It would be interesting to vary this approach by selecting lower criterion levels of 
moderate and severe impairment, e.g. 15% and 40%, in order to investigate if the facilitative influence 
offeedback on performance may breakdown. 
6.6 Conclusions 
The study indicated that the provision ofwaming feedback had no influence on the decision to continue 
or to quit the simulated journey. However, it was apparent that feedback presentation prevented the 
degradation of driving performance due to time-on-task observed in the Control condition. It may be 
concluded on this basis that the precision of the external feedback loop may tend to degrade during 
sustained episodes of driving. This degradation may take the form of either reduced accuracy of 
performance appraisal or reduced fidelity of feedback associated with performance. The implication of 
this finding is that tired individuals may be relatively less aware of the quality of driving performance. 
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This conclusion is in broad agreement with the hypothesis that fatigue may degrade the process of 
performance appraisal (Brown, 1994; McDonald, 1987). However, there was no evidence to suggest 
that the appraisal of internal feedback (e.g. subjective fatigue) was influenced by the presence of 
performance feedback. 
The data analyses indicated that feedback was capable of preventing performance degradation. This 
protection of primary task performance was achieved via an improved level of performance efficiency, 
i. e. performance was sustained at a higher level in associated with reduced or equivalent levels of 
mental effort expenditure compared to the Control condition. The presentation of feedback was 
capable of increasing performance efficiency without: (a) sustained, high expenditure of 
psychophysiological mental effort, (b) accelerated evolution of subjective fatigue, and (c) an increase 
of subjective mental workload. However, the discrete feedback condition was associated with elevated 
levels of subjective stress. It is concluded that feedback of performance degradation led to a timely 
investment of procedural mental effort, which raised and sustained performance above the zones of 
'moderate' and 'severe' impairment. It is postulated that feedback influenced performance 
effectiveness by improving the precision of the external feedback loop, and therefore, promoting a 
highly efficient and exact schedule of procedural effort investment, i.e. effort was only invested when it 
was necessary. 
It was noted that the improvement of driving performance achieved by feedback was limited to sub-
critical/opaque aspects of degraded performance. For instance, feedback failed to reduce the frequency 
of lane crossings, which qualify as the most severe category of driver error possible in the simulated 
world - with the exception of an actual crash. It is postulated that feedback failed to impact on lane 
crossing events, because these events were obvious in each condition, i.e. subjects received noise 
feedback when they strayed from the lane. However, the presence of feedback did impact on the 
frequency and duration of near-crossing incidents, which were more frequent and less-critical in terms 
of 'safety'. It is logical to assume that a reduction of near-errors will lead to a decline in the frequency 
of actual errors. However, this logic was not supported by the experimental results and further research 
is necessary in this respect. 
The presentation of feedback did not impact on strategic activities such as the decision to cease driving. 
Further analyses indicated that the decision to quit was influenced by the gain rates associated with 
subjective fatigue symptoms and psychophysiological mental effort. It is possible that performance 
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feedback prompted subjects to consider their current and future levels of effort expenditure to continue 
driving, and that this factor may have influenced the decision to quit. However, this conclusion is 
highly speculative and warrants further investigation in future research. 
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7 A STUDY TO INVESTIGATE THE INFLUENCE OF TASK DEMANDS AND 
WORK SCHEDULE ON MENTAL EFFORT POLICY DURING SUSTAINED 
PERCEPTUAL-MOTOR ACTIVITY. 
7.1 Abstract 
Previous studies have investigated how individual differences, different classes of stressor and 
performance feedback influence the process of mental effort regulation. This study was performed to 
investigate how two factors (task demand, work schedule) influenced effort regulation across a 
sustained task. It was hypothesised that high task demands would emphasise external feedback and 
initiate an effort policy of investment. On the other hand, low task demands and increased time-on-task 
would bias regulation towards internal costs and effort conservation. Twenty-four male subjects 
participated in an experimental task, which constituted zero-order tracking and visual choice reaction 
time. The level of demand associated with the tracking task was manipulated by varying tracker target 
predictability, i.e. high task demands = unpredictable tracking. Subjects were divided into three 
groups who were exposed to three different task schedules: Continuous (CONT) subjects performed 
for 49 minutes under conditions of either high or low demands, Intermittent (INT) subjects were 
exposed to an alternating schedule of lowlhigh demands across the 49 minute task period, whereas the 
Rest schedule group (REST) were allowed seven minutes of non-activity following every seven 
minutes of performance. Data were collected from several sources: trackingIR T performance, 
psychophysiology (0. 1Hz bandwidth of heart rate variability) and subjective indices (the Dundee Stress 
State Questionnaire, SUbjective workload). The results clearly indicated the benefits of the REST 
schedule, e.g. increased performance efficiency, reduced level of energetical costs. In addition, high 
task demands increased the level of psychophysiological effort and associated energetical costs. 
7.2 Introduction 
Sustained performance may be described within a two-dimensional structure, where the level of task 
demand forms the x-axis and temporal scheduling constitutes the y-axis. The x-axis indicates the level 
of task demand and the level of effort investment necessary for requisite performance. The temporal 
schedule on the y-axis illustrates the duration over which requisite performance must be sustained. As 
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effort is a finite resource, there is a negative association between time-on-task and the capacity for 
continued effort investment. 
Hancock & Caird (1993) employed a similar two-dimensional model to describe mental workload. In 
this case, temporal factors were only concerned with the availability of time to reach task goals. 
Within industrial settings, the interaction between task demand and temporal factors is complicated by 
an expansive range of interacting factors. For example, task demand as indexed by subjective mental 
workload techniques may emphasise different facets of workload, e.g. physical demand, mental 
demand, temporal demand (Hart & Staveland, 1988). Similarly, temporal factors may vary with 
respect to different working time arrangements, e.g. hours worked, shiftwork, flexitime, overtime 
(Thierry & Meijman, 1994). 
The purpose of the current study is to understand how task demands/workload and temporal factors 
interact in order to influence mental effort policy. It is proposed that increased task demands may 
provoke a broad strategy of effort investment. However, sustained effort investment may be 
compromised by a number of "costs" (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997), some of which may impact on 
performance, e.g. subsidiary task failure, and others which influence energetical variables, e.g. 
increased stress via heightened sympathetic nervous activity, increased fatigue symptoms). If 
energetical costs reach high levels, the individual may be forced to invest higher levels of mental effort 
in order to protect performance from their influence. If costs reach critical levels, effort may be 
systematically reduced or conserved in order to alleviate associated costs such as stress and fatigue. 
It is postulated that this cycle of investment and conservation represents an underlying cognitive-
energetical trend with respect to task demand and temporal variables. Within the thesis literature 
review (Section 1.2), it has been proposed that mental effort is a finite resource, associated with a rate 
of expenditure during task performance and replenished during periods of rest (e.g. leisure time) and 
inactivity (e. g. sleep). 
This finite effort resource is regulated with respect to external cues concerned with task performance 
and energetical costs originating from internal, psycho-physiological sources. Task demands will exert 
a primary influence on the former whereas time-on-task will influence the latter. The purpose of 
external cues related to performance is to provoke a policy of effort investment in response to increased 
error frequency or accelerated task demands. The investment of mental effort is associated with 
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internal costs such as stress and fatigue. These costs fulfil an antagonistic function to inhibit sustained 
investment. The interaction between external cues and energetical costs determine the effort policy 
adopted by an individual, i.e. whether effort is invested or conserved. 
The respective weighting of external and internal feedback will depend on various factors. Some of 
these considerations are intuitive. For example, the severity of an error detected from external sources 
will determine its importance relative to internal costs. An instance of near-catastrophic failure would 
automatically take priority over internal feedback if performance was safety-critical. This distinction is 
mirrored with respect to internal costs. According to the SREF model (Wells & Matthews, 1994), 
internal sources of stress may influence behaviour in a hierarchical fashion. This implicit hierarchy 
was recently operationalised by Matthews, et al. (1997) within the Dundee Stress State Questionaire, 
which is divided into three meta-factors of stress. The first factor of Engagement represents the level 
of interest and stimulation induced by the task at hand. Those costs associated with falling engagement 
include decreased energy and concentration. The distress factor represents potentially more damaging 
category of internal costs such as tension and negative affect. In this case, the individual may feel that 
their capacity to cope with task demands is being exceeded. When an individual suffers from those 
costs associated with reduced self-esteem and increased self-focus, the level of internal costs have 
reached the top of the hierarchy where self-image is being threatened. This state of stress represents 
the third meta-factor of worry. 
It is proposed that all three categories of energetical costs require increased effort investment to 
compensate for their debilitating influence on task performance. In the case of decreased engagement, 
effort is required to prevent lapses of attention due to poor concentration. When an individual is 
significantly distressed, effort is invested to buttress performance against the influence of tension and 
reduced confidence. The primary influence of worry is to distract the individual from the task at hand 
via cognitive interference (Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990). In the former case, effort is invested to 
counteract the psychological inertia associated with sustained performance. When an individual is 
distressed or worried, it is proposed that an active process of task interference provoke additional effort 
investment. These mechanisms underlie the hypothesis that the purpose of energetical costs is to 
reduce the maximum duration of sustained effort investment. 
It has been suggested that assessment of internal and external feedback is a perceptual process and 
subject to attentional bias. For example, it has been hypothesised that either external or internal 
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sources of feedback may be emphasised at the expense of the other (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Ingram, 
1990). Furthermore, it may be argued that highly demanding tasks may engage the individual and 
emphasise external feedback at the expense of internal feedback (Matthews, Schwean, Campbell, 
Saklofske, & Mohamed, in press). 
The role of feedback and effort regulation underlies the dynamic ebb and flow of performance when 
tasks are sustained. The current study was designed to investigate the interaction between task 
demands and time-on-task on effort regulation and performance. 
7.3 Methodology 
7.3.1 Experimental design. 
The design was constructed as a three-way mixed within- and between-subjects design. Task demand 
was manipulated as unpredictable tracking (UP) and predictable tracking (P) to induce high and low 
levels of task demand respectively. The temporal aspects of the task were divided into seven, seven-
minute segments, i.e. 49 minutes of performance in a full experimental session. Both tracking 
predictability and time-on-task (TOT) functioned as within-subjects variables. The between-subjects 
variable was provided by three different task schedules. During the Continuous schedule (CONT), 
subjects experienced a sustained level of either unpredictable or predictable tracking. The second 
schedule was Intermittent in the sense that task predictability was alternated on successive task 
sessions. The REST group were exposed to episodes of performance interpolated with 7 minute rest 
periods. Eight subjects participated in two conditions according to one of the three schedules. This 
design is shown below in Table IS. 
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Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
TOT 7m 14m 21m 28m 35m 42m 49m 
Schedule i UP UP UP UP UP UP UP N=8 
Continuous P P P P P P P 
Schedule 2 UP P UP P UP P UP N=8 
intermittent P UP P UP P UP P 
Schedule 3 UP UP UP UP N=8 
Rest breaks P P P P 
Table 15. Experimental Schedules and Design. TOT = time-on-task, P = predictable tracking, 
UP = unpredictable tracking. 
The presentation order of task predictability/unpredictability was counterbalanced within each group. 
In addition, the experiment was performed at three different times of the day, morning (10:00), lunch 
(12:30) and afternoon (15:30). All testing times were counterbalanced across the subject group as a 
whole. 
In Table 15, alternate task segments are shown in bold - this indicates those task sequences that were 
used for comparative purposes in the data analysis. 
7.3.2 Apparatus and Experimental Task. 
The software to present task material and to collect data was written in VisuaIBasic 5.0 and ran on 
Pentium PC computers under Windows95 on 14" colour monitors. The task had two components, a 
tracking task where the subjects were asked to track a lateral target movements using the mouse. 
Specifically, the mouse controlled a white 'subject' cursor moving within a darker rectangle 
representing the software-controlled cursor. If the subject cursor made contact with the computer 
cursor, a tone sounded and the colour of the subject cursor turned from white to red. All subjects 
controlled the mouse with their right hand. A depiction of the computer screen is shown in Figure 14. 
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The movement of the computer cursor was modelled on 16 sinusoidal waveforms, which could be 
manipulated with respect to frequency, amplitude and phase angle. The manipulation of frequency 
controlled the speed at which the cursor moved from left to right. The amplitude associated with the 
waveform set the maximum extent oflateral movement. The manipulation of phase angle was 
associated with the predictability of the computer cursor. If phase was set to zero, the movement of the 
cursor was perfectly predictable. This manipulation in combination with a modest amplitude and a 
frequency of 1 was used to induce predictable tracking. For the unpredictable condition, the phase 
angle was set to 12 (i.e. the 16 waves are pulled out of synchronisation with one another by a factor of 
12, therefore creating erratic patterns oflateral movement to the left and to the right). In addition, the 
amplitude was set to maximum (i. e. the target had the fullest extent oflateral movement available) and 
frequency was set to 2 during unpredictable tracking, i.e. target movement was slightly faster during 
unpredictable tracking. 
The subjects were also asked to perform a cognitive, vigilance task (Warm & Dember, 1998) in 
conjunction with tracking activity. The targets for this task appeared in the upper portion of the screen 
above the tracking task (Figure 14). The cognitive, vigilance task took the form of a letter 
identification activity. The subjects were presented with a Landolt C, which was shown in four 
different orientations (north, west, east, south). The subjects were instructed to recognise the easterly 
orientation as a target and all other orientations as non-targets (Figure IS). 
The subjects were instructed to press the 'z' key with their left hand to indicate the presence of a target 
and to press the 'x' key to indicate a non-target. The vigilance stimuli were presented on a pseudo-
random basis at approximately 9 events per minute and 20% of stimuli were targets. These stimuli 
were localised across 12 potential locations, six locations on a semi-circle slightly above the tracking 
cursor( s} and six on a second semi-circle closer to the top of the screen. The relationship between 
stimuli and stimuli localisation was randomised. These task characteristics for the RT stimuli was 
fixed regardless of tracking condition. A sampling rate of 1000Hz was used for data capture. 
An eight-channel analogue-to-digital converter (MacLab™) was used to collect electrocardiogram data. 
This apparatus was connected to bioamplifiers and Chart™ software running on a Macintosh 
Powerbook™. 
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7.3.3 Subjects 
24 male subjects were recruited from the local population to participate in the study. Several criteria 
were employed in order to guide subject recruitment, these were as follows: 
• subjects should not be taking permanent medication 
• subjects should be right-handed 
• subjects should not be shiftworkers or work on permanent night-duty 
• subjects should have not suffered from any wrist injury or RSI-related complaints 
• subjects should have 20/20 vision or wear spectacles 
In addition, the subjects were instructed to prepare for each experimental session as follows: 
• to avoid alcohol on the. night previous to an experimental session 
• not to consume coffee or tea for 2 hours before the trial 
• not to consume a large meal during the 2 hours before the trial 
The subjects were allocated to one of the three schedule groups (CONT, INT or REST) based on age. 
It was felt that it was important to match the age distributions of the three subject groups as closely as 
possible. The age distributions for the three groups are shown below in Table 16. 
Subjectgroup Continuous (CONT) Intermittent (lliT) Rest breaks ~Sn 
Mean age 32.75 32.62 32.88 
Standard deviation 7.96 7.05 9.58 
Maximum 44 40 47 
Minimum 22 22 20 
Table 16. Age distributions of the three subject groups. 
Subjects were paid for their participation at an approximate rate of £1 0 per hour (i.e. subjects received 
£35 pounds for participation in both task sessions). In addition, subjects were instructed that those two 
individuals from each group of eight who achieved the highest level of performance e would receive a 
gift voucher to the value of ten pounds. 
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7.3.4 Experimental Measures. 
The experimental measures used during the experiment were drawn from three distinct categories of: 
primary task performance, psychophysiology and subjective measures. 
Primary task measures included data to index both tracking and RT performance. With respect to the 
former, these included: Root Mean Square error (RMS), frequency of collisions and level of mouse 
input. For the RT task, the level of perceptual sensitivity (A') was calculated (i.e. a nonparametric 
version of d' (parasuraman, 1986» and mean reaction time (in ms) to targets and non-targets. 
Psychophysiological measures constituted the electrocardiogram trace (ECG) recorded at 1000Hz. 
The subsequent inter-beat interval (IBI) was subjected to power spectrum analysis in order to 
distinguish three bandwidths (upper, middle and lower). The mean power in the mid-frequency 
bandwidth (0.07 - 0.14Hz) was calculated to represent a psychophysiological index of mental effort 
(Aasman, Mulder, & Mulder, 1987; Mulder, 1979a; Mulder, 1979b; Vicente, Thomton, & Moray, 
1987). 
Subjective measures were administered following sessions 1, 3, 5 and 7 (see Table 15). These 
measures included the full Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (Matthews, et al., 1997), the raw version 
of the NASA-Task Load Index (Byers, Bittner, & Hill, 1989; Hart & Staveland, 1988), a fatigue 
symptom checklist (Desmond, Matthews, & Hancock, 1997) and a bipolar Effort scale (Zijlstra & van 
Doom, 1985). 
7.3.5 Experimental Protocol 
The experimental protocol differs slightly between each of the two sessions performed by the subject. 
On most occasions, subjects were run through the experimental protocol in pairs sitting at identical 
workstations in adjacent rooms. It should be made clear that subjects could neither see nor hear one 
another during task performance. 
On arrival at the Institute, subjects received a briefing document providing broad details of the 
experiment and their participation. Subjects were then tested for near-vision acuity to confirm 20/20 
vision and fitted with three disposable ECG electrodes. After this phase, subjects completed a short 
demographic questionnaire and received their training instructions. All subjects received a sequence of 
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training sessions prior to task performance, this sequence was accompanied by a short document and 
was constructed as follows: (a) 3 minutes ofRT task performance only (subjects did not move the 
mouse and concentrated on learning stimulus-response mapping for RT performance), (b) 3 minutes of 
predictable tracking only (instructed to ignore RT stimuli) and (c) 3 minutes of unpredictable tracking 
only (instructed to ignore RT stimuli). After (c), the subjects were instructed to close their eyes and to 
relax for 4 minutes whilst resting values of ECG activity were recorded. Following this break, subjects 
completed two consecutive training sessions: (d) performance of both tracking and RT task during 
predictable conditions for 4 minutes, and (e) performance of both tasks for 4 minutes during 
unpredictable task conditions. 
Following the completion of training, subjects were presented with a list of instructions, which 
contained full details of their schedule for that particular session. Before the experimental session 
began, subjects were permitted a four minute familiarisation session with either predictable or 
unpredictable tracking, which was determined by the characteristics of their initial task session. 
Following the familiarisation session, subjects performed the initial seven minute task and completed 
the questionnaire index. The subjects were encouraged to complete the questionnaire index in less than 
five minutes. On completion of the questionnaire, the CONT and INT subjects performed the next 
consecutive task session. The REST subjects were provided with the newspaper(s) of the day and 
instructed to relax. This sequence of task session - questionnaire continued for 49min as shown in 
Table 15. 
The protocol for the second subject session differed from the initial session with respect to subject 
training. During the second session, the subjects were instructed to relax (to collect resting ECG 
values) and performed training sessions (d) and (e) along with the familiarisation task. It should be 
noted that each subject session was only separated by 24 hours. Following completion of the second 
session, subjects were debriefed and paid. 
7.4 Results 
The study employed a mixed design of between- and within-subject variables, which were subjected to 
a 3 x 2 x 4 ANOV A (GROUP x DIFFICULTY x TIME-ON-TASK). However, if significant 
differences were present during the initial test session due to the between-subjects factor (GROUP), 
this was interpreted as a generic inequality between the three groups, i.e. because all subjects had the 
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same task exposure during the initial test session. On these occasions, data obtained during sessions 3, 
5 and 7 during both conditions were baselined to the initial test session in the predictable tracking 
condition. Therefore: 
Baselillex = x(3,5, 7) - x (1, predictable) 
When data were baselined, a 3 x 2 x 3 ANOV A was used to estimate significant differences (GROUP x 
DIFFICULTY x TIME-ON-TASK). 
7.4.1 Tracking performance. 
Tracking performance was indexed by four variables: root mean square error (RMS error), frequency 
of collisions between subject-controlled cursor and tracking target, average time (in secs) to recover 
from a collisions (i.e. to detect and to correct for each collision) and the number of mouse movements 
used to control the subject-controlled tracker. 
A 2 x 4 ANOVA on RMS error revealed significant main effects for both DIFFICULTY (E[l, 21] = 
336.5, p<O.OI) and TIME-ON-TASK (TOT) (E[I, 21] = 4.36, p<O.OI), i.e. RMS error increased during 
unpredictable tracking and over TOT. However, there was no evidence for any significant interaction 
with the GROUP variable. 
The same analysis was conducted on the frequency of collisions. This ANOV A also revealed a main 
effect for DIFFICULTY (E[l, 21] = 622.1, p<O.OI) as described in the previous paragraph. In addition, 
there was a significant interaction between GROUP x TOT (E[6, 63] = 2.89, p<O.05), which indicated 
that the CON group made more frequent collisions than either of the other two groups during sessions 5 
and 7. Finally, this analysis revealed a 3-way interaction between GROUP x DIFFICULTY x TOT, 
which was of marginal significance (E[6, 63] = 1.99, p<O.09), but is worthy of note. Post-hoc testing 
revealed that the CONT group made more frequent collisions than the other two groups during sessions 
5 and 7 (p<O.05) when tracking was unpredictable. This interaction is illustrated in Figure 36 below. 
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Figure 36. Mean frequency of collisions for all three experimental groups during the 
UNPREDICTABLE tracking condition only (n=24). 
The analysis of error recovery time revealed no significant differences, whereas the ANOV A on 
baselined movement frequency found only a significant main effect for DIFFICULTY (i.e. higher 
movement during unpredictable tracking) and a marginal interaction between GROUP x DIFFICULTY 
(E[2,21] = 2.7,11 = 0.07). The latter effect indicated that subjects in the CONT group moved the mouse 
more frequently during the unpredictable tracking task than the other two groups, regardless of TOT. 
7.4.2 Choice reaction time. 
Data from the choice reaction time task was quantified in terms of accuracy and speed of response. The 
former was represented by P( A), which is the non-parametric equivalent of d' representative of 
response sensitivity in signal detection theory (parasuraman, 1986). The speed of response in terms of 
both targets and non-targets was measured in milliseconds. 
It was found that significant differences existed between the three groups with respect to both accuracy 
and speed of response to visual targets. Therefore, all RT data were baselined to the initial session of 
the predictable tracking task for each individual subject. 
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The analysis ofP(A) revealed a significant main effect due to DIFFICULTY (1:[1,21]=4.45, Q = 0.05). 
It was apparent that P(A) fell by approximately 0.02 during the unpredictable tracking task compared to 
a substantive decline of 0.04 during the predictable tracking task. Therefore, sensitivity to visual 
targets appeared lower during predictable tracking comparative to unpredictable tracking. In addition, 
this analysis revealed a 3-way interaction effect (1:[6,63] = 7.1, Q<O.OI), which is illustrated in Figure 
37. 
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Figure 37. Baselined values of P(A) for all three groups ofsubjects across both conditions 
(N=24). Note: negative values = declining sensitivity. 
Post-hoc testing revealed that baselined P(A) was significantly higher for the CONT group compared 
to INT group after 21 minutes during the predictable tracking task. In addition, P(A) was superior for 
the REST group relative to the INT group following 35 minutes of predictable tracking. During the 
unpredictable tracking task, the INT group exhibit superior sensitivity following 35 minutes relative to 
other two groups. However, the sensitivity of the INT group also showed a significant decline after 49 
minutes relative to both the CONT and the REST groups. 
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An identical ANOV A was conducted on mean reaction time latency to target items. This analysis 
revealed a significant main effect for DIFFICULTY, i.e. subjects tended to respond more rapidly 
during the unpredictable tracking task relative to the predictable tracking task. In addition, a 3-way 
interaction of marginal significance a::[6, 63] = 1.78, \FO.I) was apparent. This interaction is 
illustrated in Figure 38. Post-hoc testing revealed that subjects in the REST group took longer to 
respond to targets during predictable tracking relative to the other two groups (R < 0.05) after 35 
minutes of performance. With respect to the unpredictable tracking condition, both the INT and the 
REST group exhibited shorter response latencies relative to the CONT group after 35 minutes of 
performance. 
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Figure 38. Baseline change in target response latency for all three groups of subjects in both 
tracking conditions (N=24). Note: positive values = increased latency. 
An identical analysis of response latency was conducted with respect to non-target identification. No 
significant differences were apparent. 
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7.4.3 Psychophysiology 
The raw ECG data were subjected to analysis using the Heart Rate Variability extension software with 
Chart 1.5.6. This analysis performed artefact detection/correction and power spectrum analysis in 
order to isolate the mid-frequency component of the heart rate variability signal (0. 1Hz component). 
These data were obtained for a rest period prior to performance as well as experimental task sessions. 
The mean power from the mid-frequency bandwidth was subjected to natural log transformation and a 
baselining procedure, where the O.IHz component during performance was subtracted from the rest 
value, i.e. positive change is synonymous with increased mental effort (Meijman, 1995). These 
transformed data were subject to a 3 x 2 x 4 ANOVA (GROUP x DIFFICULTY x TOT). 
This analysis revealed only significant main effects for both DIFFICULTY (£[2,21] = 7.1,11<0.05) and 
TOT (E[3,63] = 7.3, 11<0.01). Post-hoc testing revealed a higher level of mental effort during 
unpredictable tracking relative to the predictable task. In addition, mental effort was significantly 
higher during the initial 7 minute period relative to the following three task intervals during 
unpredictable tracking, and during the 21 minute period relative to the following two task intervals in 
the predictable condition; both effects are illustrated in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39. Mean power in O.lHz bandwidth (following log-transform and baselining to rest 
period) for both tracking conditions across time-on-task (N=24). 
7.4.4 Subjective data. 
The subjective data was analysed in terms of six basic groups, these were: goal-setting, the fatigue 
symptom checklist devised by Desmond, Matthews, & Hancock (1997), a raw version of the NASA-
Task Load Index (RTLX) (Byers, Bittner, & Hill, 1989; Hart & Staveland, 1988) and the Dundee 
Stress State Questionnaire described by (Matthews, et aI., 1997), which may be sub-divided into three 
categories of Engagement, Distress and Worry. 
The one exception to this categorisation was the mental effort scale devised by (Zij Istra & van Doom, 
1985). These data were analysed via a 3 x 2 x 3 ANOVA (GROUP x DIFFICULTY x TOT) using 
baselined data, i.e. data converted to a change score based on deviation from baseline value collected 
following the initial task session. This analysis revealed main effects for GROUP and DIFFICULTY 
variables. The REST group rated their mental effort as significantly lower (M = 10) than either the 
CONT or INT groups (M = 29.3 and 30 respectively). In addition, mental effort was rated as 
significantly higher during the unpredictable tracking task relative to the predictable task (11 < 0.01). 
Goal-setting and self-rated performance 
Goal-setting behaviour was measured in terms of three variables: (a) aspired goal level, i.e. the standard 
of performance subjects set for themselves prior to task session, (b) achieved goal level, i.e. the 
standard of performance subjects felt they had achieved following the task session, and (c) subjective 
goal-performance discrepancy, i.e. aspired goal standard prior to session minus achieved goal standard. 
All goal-related data were assessed on a four-point scale with reference to five qualitative aspects of 
performance: consistency, speed of response (to RT targets), efficiency, accuracy and quality. The 
raw data from these scales were analysed via a 3 x 2 x 3 ANOV A (GROUP x DIFFICULTY x TOT) 
and the results are shown in 
Table 17 below. 
Table 17. ANOVA results for pre-test ratings of aspired goal levels (n=24). 
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Variable GROUP DIFFICULTY TOT INTERACTIONS 
A B C 
Consistency· E(2,21 )=6.6 1:(1,21)=35.3 E(2,42)=3.3 AxB 
12 < 0.01 12 < 0.01 12 < 0.05 1:(2,21)= 2.9 
12 = 0.06 
Speed 1:(1,21)=28 E(2,42)=14.7 AxB 
12 < 0.Ql 12 < 0.Ql 1:(2,21)=3.6 
12 < 0.05 
AxC 
E(4,42)=3.9 
Q < 0.05 
Efficiency E(2,21 )=3.7 1:(1,21)=21.9 1:(2,42)=5.8 
Q < 0.05 Q < 0.01 Q < 0.05 
Accuracy 1:(1,21)=27.5 E(2,42)=8.77 
12 < 0.01 12 < 0.01 
Quality 1:(2,21)=4 .1 1:(1,21)-29.8 E(2,42)-6.95 
12 < 0.05 12 < 0.01 12 < 0.Ql 
These analyses revealed that the REST group set goals significantly higher with respect to the 
consistency, efficiency and quality of performance. The mean values for pre-test ratings of aspired 
goal levels are shown below in 
GROUP CONSISTENCY EFFICIENCY QUALITY 
CONTROL 3.57 3.30 3.38 
INT 2.81 2.71 2.86 
REST 2.84 2.56 2.64 
Table 18. Mean values of aspired goal levels by experimental group (n=24). 
The main etTects due to DIFFICUL TV shown in 
Table 17 indicate that subjects lowered their goal aspiration during the unpredictable tracking relative 
to the predictable tracking conditions (respectives M = 2.56 and 3.34). In addition, main effects due to 
TOT indicate a declining level of goal aspiration as result of sustained performance, i.e. M = 3.21 prior 
to task activity compared to 2.74 prior to final period of the task activity. Post-hoc testing revealed that 
significant interactions between GROUP x DIFFICULTY (for goals related to the consistency and 
speed of performance) both indicated that the REST group set these goals higher than the other two 
groups, but only during unpredictable tracking. Similarly, the significant interactions between GROUP 
x TOT for speed indicated that the REST group sustained a higher level of goal-setting following 21 
minutes of performance relative to the other two groups. 
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A series of analyses were conducted to investigate the second aspect of goal behaviour - self-assessed 
aspects of achieved perfonnance, which were appraised immediately following the session. The results 
of these analyses are shown below in Table 19 
Variable GROUP DIFFICULTY TOT INTERACTIONS 
A B C 
Consistency E(2,21 )=4.1 E(I,21)=58.1 .E(2,42)=4.6 
Il< 0.05 Il< 0.01 Il < 0.05 
Speed .E(i,21)=32.8 E(2,42)=3.4 
11 < 0.01 .11 < 0.05 
Efficiency E( I ,21 )=64.4 .E(2,42)=4.4 AxBxC 
Il < 0.01 Il < 0.05 E(6,63)=2.2 
Il < 0.05 
Accuracy 1:(1,21)=45.5 1:(2,42)=9.5 
Jl <0.01 Il<O.OI 
Quality .E(2,21)=3.2 1:(1,21)=36.7 E(2,42)=5.5 
11 < 0.05 11 < 0.01 11 < 0.01 
Table 19. ANOVA results for post-task ratings of achieved performance (n=24). 
These analyses clearly indicated that subjects were aware of declining perfonnance standards during 
unpredictable tracking and with increasing time-on-task. With respect to the latter, subjects generally 
perceived standards to significantly decline after 21 minutes of perfonnance. In addition, subjects in 
the REST group perceived both the quality and the consistency of their performance to be superior to 
the CONT group (Il < 0.05). The three-way interaction with respect to efficiency indicated that the 
CONT group rated their efficiency as lower than the REST group after 35 minutes of performance, 
regardless of tracking condition. In addition, the INT group rated their efficiency as lower than the 
REST subjects following 49 minutes of predictable tracking perfonnance. There was no significant 
difference between the CONT group and the INT group with respect to self-rated efficiency. 
An identical series of analyses was conducted with respect to the goal discrepancy data (i.e. pre-test 
aspiration minus post-test appraisal of goal attainment). The results of these ANOVA revealed that 
unpredictable tracking produced significantly higher goal discrepancies with respect to consistency 
(.E(I ,21 )=6.5, Il<0.05) and efficiency (.E(I ,21 )=5.6, Il<0.05), relative to the predictable condition., i.e. 
unpredictable tracking produced a higher magnitude of goal-performance discrepancy. 
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Fatigue symptoms 
The fatigue symptoms checklist was quantified in terms of: (a) total number of fatigue symptoms 
reported by subjects, and (b) as a component score between 0-12 on each of four subcomponents 
described by Desmond, Matthews, & Hancock (1997) (visual fatigue, malaise, muscular fatigue, 
boredom). In both cases, data were baselined to the initial test session and analysed via 3 x 2 x 3 
ANOV A. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 20 below. The mean values for all variables 
are provided in the Appendices. 
Variable GROUP DIFFICULTY TOT INTERACTIONS 
A B C 
Number of .1:(2,42)-11.9 AxC 
symptoms p < 0.01 .E(2,21)= 3.9 
Q = 0.01 
Visual fatigue .E(2,42)=12.8 AxBxC 
p < 0.01 .1:(4,42)=3.1 
P < 0.05 
Malaise .1:(2,42)=5.7 
Q < 0.01 
Muscular .1:(1,21)=7.1 .1:(2,42)=13.1 
fatigue p < 0.05 P < 0.01 
Boredom .E(2,42)-3.5 
p < 0.05 
Table 20. ANOVA results from analysis of fatigue symptom checklist data (n=24). 
These results revealed a significant main effect for TOT for all variables associated the fatigue 
symptom checklist, i.e. fatigue increased over TOT. The interaction between GROUP x TOT indicated 
that the REST group reported significantly fewer fatigue symptoms following 21 minutes of the 
experimental session. The significant 3 x 2 x 3 interaction observed for the visual fatigue scale was 
subjected to post-hoc analysis. These results indicated that the INT group reported higher levels of 
visual fatigue after 21 minutes of performance relative to the REST group during predictable tracking. 
In addition, it was apparent that both the CONT and INT groups experienced increased visual fatigue 
following 21 minutes of unpredictable tracking comparative to the REST group. The only main effect 
due to DIFFICULTY was a significant increase of muscular fatigue during unpredictable tracking. 
Page 171 
- - - --- - - -----------------
Engagement 
The engagement factor is composed of three distinct sub-scales: (a) intrinsic motivation, i.e. related to 
interest in the experimental task (Desmond, 1998), (b) energetical arousal, i.e. bipolar mood scale 
indicative of a continuum between alertness and tiredness (Matthews, Jones, & Chamberlain, 1990), 
and (c) level of concentration devoted to task (Matthews, et al., 1997). All three components were 
baselined and subjected to 3 x 2 x 3 ANOV As (see Table 21 
Variable GROUP DIFFICULTY TOT INTERACTIONS 
A B C 
Intrinsic 
motivation 
Energetic 1:(1,21)=4.7 1:(2,42)-5.3 
arousal p < 0.05 P < O.oI 
Concentration E(2,21 )=3.2 E(2,42)=10.3 
P < 0.05 P < 0.01 
Table 21. ANOVA results from analysis of Engagement subcomponents (n=24). 
These results indicated reduced levels of energetic arousal during unpredictable tracking CM = 14.6 
during UP task compared to 16 during P task) and a reduction of both energy and concentration with 
increasing time-on-task. In addition, it was apparent that levels of concentration were significantly 
higher for the REST group compared to the other two groups, i.e. M = 21.3 for REST group compared 
to respective M of 20 and 20.4 for CONT and INT groups. 
Distress 
This factor is composed of three distinct sub-scales as described by Matthews, et al. (1997), they are: 
(a) tense arousal, i.e. bipolar mood scale indicative of a continuum between relaxation and tension, (b) 
hedonic tone, i.e. bipolar mood scale indicative of a continuum between happiness and sadness 
(Matthews, Jones, & Chamberlain, 1990), and (c) level of confidence in ones ability to perform the task 
(Matthews, et al., 1997). All three components were baselined and subjected to 3 x 2 x 3 ANOV As 
(see Table 22 below). 
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Variable GROUP DIFFICULTY TOT INTERACTIONS 
A B C 
Tense arousal EC1,21)-IO.9 
Q < 0.01 
Hedonic tone EC1,21)=14.4 EC2,42)=8.6 
11 < om 11 < 0.01 
Confidence W,21)=4.1 AxB 
Q < 0.05 EC2,2l}= 3.1 
Q = 0.06 
AxBxC 
EC4,42)=2.6 
Q < 0.05 
Table 22. ANOVA results from analysis of Distress subcomponents Cn=24). 
A significant main effect for DIFFICULTY was apparent across all three Distress sub-components, 
which was indicative of increased tension and decreased positive affect/confidence when subjects 
performed the unpredictable tracking task. In addition, there was a significant main effect for hedonic 
tone due to TOT, i.e. a declining level of positive affect following 35 minutes relative to 21 minutes of 
performance. The mean values for the DIFFICULTY main effect are shown below in Table 23. 
Variable Predictable Unpredictable 
Tense Arousal 14.\0 15.79 
Hedonic tone 25.5 23.4 
Confidence 16.1 14.9 
Table 23. Mean values for Distress variables by task demand (n=24) 
A number of interaction effects were observed with respect to the Confidence sub-scale. Post-hoc 
testing revealed the CONT group rated their level of confidence as significantly lower than participants 
in the other two groups during predictable tracking, but only foIlowing 21 minutes of performance. 
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Worry 
There are five distinct sub-scales subsumed within the Worry factor" (Matthews, et al., 1997), these 
are as follows: (a) extrinsic motivation, i.e. related to the need to succeed and fear offailure, (b) 
frequency of task-relevant thoughts, i.e. derived from the Cognitive Interference questionnaire 
produced by (Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986), (c) frequency of task-irrelevant 
thoughts, i.e. also derived from (Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986), (d) self-focus, i.e. 
level of self-directed attention derived from (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), and (e) self-esteem, 
i.e. derived from (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). All variables were baselined and subjected to 3 x 2 x 3 
ANOVAs, the results of these analyses are shown in Table 24. 
Variable GROUP DIFFICULTY TOT INTERACTIONS 
A B C 
Extrinsic E(2,42)=3.1 AxB 
motivation I! = 0.06 1::(2,21)= 3.2 
I! < 0.01 
Task-relevant 1::(2,21 )=3.2 1::(1,21)=8.5 AxB 
thoughts I! < 0.05 I! < 0.01 E(2,21)= 3.3 
I! < 0.01 
Task-irrelevant E(2,42)=8.6 AxBxC 
thoughts I! < 0.01 E(4,42)=2.7 
J!< 0.05 
Self-focus 
Self-esteem AxC 
E(4,42)=3.5 
I! < 0.05 
Table 24. ANOVA results from analysis of Worry subcomponents (n=24). 
These analyses revealed that increased TOT reduced subjects' levels of extrinsic motivation and 
increased the frequency of task irrelevant thoughts. With respect to the former sub-component, it was 
apparent that the CONT group expressed a significantly lower level of extrinsic motivation during both 
" Note this characterisation of the Distress factor described by Matthews et aI (1997) differs from the original with respect 
to the inclusion of the additional factor of extrinsic motivation derived from Desmond (1998). 
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predictable and unpredictable tracking conditions. In addition, the INT group expressed a higher level 
of extrinsic motivation during predictable tracking relative to either the CONT or the INT group. 
The significant main effect due to GROUP observed for the task-relevant (TR) thoughts revealed a 
increased frequency of TR thoughts for the INT group relative to both other subject groups. In 
addition, task-relevant thoughts tended to significantly decline during predictable tracking comparative 
to the unpredictable tracking condition. Post-hoc testing of the significant 3 x 2 interaction confirmed 
the significant main effect of GROUP during the predictable tracking condition. However, it was also 
revealed that the INT group showed significantly higher number of TR thoughts during unpredictable 
tracking relative to both other groups. Mean values for the analysis ofTR items are provided below in 
Table 25 
GROUP Group mean Predictable Unpredictable 
CONT 22.6 16.4 22.6 
INT 25.9 15.7 20.5 
REST 22.3 14.9 14.6 
Table 25. Mean values for frequency oftask-relevant thoughts for all three experimental groups 
(n=24). 
It was apparent that the number oftask-irreIevant (TI) thoughts increased with sustained TOT. Post-
hoc testing of the 3-way interaction revealed that INT experienced more TI thoughts during both 
predictable and unpredictable tracking conditions relative to the CONT group. In addition, the 
frequency ofTI thoughts was significantly higher for INT group than the REST group during 
predictable tracking and following 21 minutes of unpredictable tracking. During predictable tracking, 
it was found that the number ofTI thoughts were higher for the CONT group relative to the REST 
group following 35 minutes of performance. 
A significant interaction between GROUP x TOT was found for the subjective self-esteem variable. 
Post -hoc testing indicated that self-esteem was maximised after 21 minutes of performance during 
predictable tracking for the CONT group. However, this trend was reversed during unpredictable 
tracking and self-esteem peaked at 49 minutes, once the task had been completed. 
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Subjective mental workload 
The Raw Task Load IndeX (RTLX) contains seven sub-scales that represent the subjects' impression 
of the mental workload associated with task performance, i.e. mental demand, physical demand, 
temporal demands, performance, effort and frustration. These scales may be averaged to provide a 
global index of subjective mental workload (SMW). Each scale and the global index were baselined to 
the initial session involving predictable tracking and analysed via a 3 x 2 x 3 ANOV A. The results of 
these analyses are shown in Table 26. Mean values for the RTLX items are provided in the 
Appendices. 
Variable GROUP DIFFICULTY TOT INTERACTIONS 
A B C 
Mental demand 1:(2,21)-2.7 1:(1,21)-36.8 1:(2,42)-9.65 AxBxC 
n < 0.05 n < 0.Ql n < 0.01 1:(4,42)=2.4 
11 < 0.05 
Physical 1:(1,21)=1l.8 
demand 11 < 0.Ql 
Temporal W,21)=36.4 
demand n < 0.Ql 
Performance W,21)=12.6 
n < 0.01 
Effort W,21)=24.6 
11 < 0.01 
Frustration 1:(1,21)=12.7 
11 < 0.01 
Subjective W,21)=28.1 1:(2,42)-3.6 
mental n < 0.Ql n < 0.05 
workload 
Table 26. Results of Raw Task Load Index (RTLX) analyses (N=24). 
The analyses of subjective mental workload clearly illustrated that workload increased during 
unpredictable tracking relative to predictable tracking on all RTLX sub-scales. The mental demand 
sub-scale appeared particularly sensitive to the experimental manipulations. The GROUP effect for 
this factor indicated that mental demand was significantly lower for the REST group relative to the 
other two groups (n < 0.05). In addition, mental demand significantly increased with TOT regardless 
of GROUP or DIFFICULTY. The 3-way interaction was subjected to post-hoc testing. This analysis 
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revealed significantly higher levels of mental demand reported by the CONT group relative to the INT 
group following 35 minutes of unpredictable tracking performance. 
7.4.5 Perfonnance Efficiency index 
The efficiency of performance was operationalised via a consideration of the relationship between 
overt indices of performance and mental effort as indexed by psychophysiology (Meijman, 1995). For 
the purpose of the current study, it was desirable to investigate efficiency with respect to both tracking 
and reaction task performance in conjunction with mean power in the O.IHz bandwidth of heart rate 
variability. 
The first efficiency index was calculated to illustrate the relationship between tracking ability and 
psychophysiological effort. The O.IHz data were expressed as a percentage change from rest values, 
i.e. increasing positive percentage values being indicative of increased mental effort (Meijman, 1995). 
A similar transformation was performed with respect to RMS error data, these values were expressed as 
a percentage change from values obtained during the initial predictable tracking period. In this case, 
increasing positive percentage values were synonymous with declining performance, i.e. increased 
RMS error. The relationship between tracking ability and psychophysiological effort is shown below 
in Figure 40 for the predictable tracking task. 
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Figure 40. Performance efficiency index for tracking ability (%baseline RMS error) and 
psychophysiological mental effort (%baseline power in O.lHz bandwidth) during 
PREDICTABLE tracking (N=24). NB: Positive x = increased mental effort from baseline, 
positive y = increased tracking error from baseline. 
Figure 40 illustrates a number of differences between the three experimental groups with respect to 
tracking efficiency. The CONT group appear to conserve mental effort «5% from resting values) 
whilst tolerating comparatively high levels ofRMS error. A similar level ofRMS error was apparent 
for the INT group, but these subjects consistently invested a higher level of mental effort across each 
task period. By contrast, the REST group were conserving mental effort, which actually fell below 
resting values during the latter two task periods - however, this group were simultaneously capable of 
the highest overall level of tracking performance. 
The same analysis was conducted on data from the unpredictable tracking task, these data are 
illustrated in Figure 41. In this case, the INT group invested the highest level of mental effort and 
obtained the lowest overall RMS error. However, the REST group only increased effort by 
approximately 4% and were capable of almost equivalent performance. The CONT group did not 
invest high levels of effort and sustained the highest level ofRMS error through the task periods. 
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Figure 41. Perfonnance efficiency index for tracking ability (%baseline RMS error) and 
psychophysiological mental effort (%baseline power in O.IHz bandwidth) during 
UNPREDICTABLE tracking (N=24). 
An identical analysis was conducted to investigate the relationship between mental effort and 
performance on the reaction time task. In this instance, obtaining an adequate index of performance 
was complicated by the fact that both response latency and target accuracy are representative of overt 
output. The former was baselined to values obtained during the initial period of the predictable 
tracking task, and expressed as a percentage change value. The latter was quantified as the percentage 
of incorrect target responses, including both false alarms and misses. These data are shown for the 
predictable tracking condition in Figure 42. This analysis and representation is based on Meijman, 
(1995). 
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Figure 42. Performance efficiency index for reaction task performance (%baseline RT latency, 
%RT errors) and psychophysiological mental effort (%baseline power in O.lHz bandwidth) 
during PREDICTABLE tracking (N=24). NB: Positive x = increased mental effort from 
baseline, positive y = increased RT latency from baseline, the figures in parentheses represent % 
RTerrors. 
In Figure 42, it is apparent that the conservation of effort by the REST group resulted in increased 
response latency and high levels of RT error. By contrast, the CONT group were able to sustain levels 
ofRT latency and accuracy, which were close to baseline values with only a modest level of effort 
investment. The high level of effort investment that characterised the INT group resulted in sustained 
response latency (relative to baseline), but a reduced level of response accuracy. 
Response task data and psychophysiology from the unpredictable tracking condition were subjected to 
an identical analysis. The results are shown in Figure 43. 
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Figure 43. Performance efficiency index for reaction task performance (%baseline RT latency, 
%RT errors) and psychophysiological mental effort (%baseline power in O.lHz bandwidth) 
during UNPREDICTABLE tracking (N=24). 
In this case, the pattern of results are similar to the predictable condition shown in Figure 42. The 
REST group conserve effort despite a consistent reduction of performance, i.e. increased latency and 
decreased accuracy. The INT group invested the highest level of mental effort overall, which resulted 
in low response latency and high accuracy until the final session, i.e. 20% decline of target accuracy 
following 49 minutes of performance. On the other hand, the CONT group invested less mental effort 
as TOT increased, but managed to sustain the highest level of RT accuracy and only a five percent 
increase ofRT latency. 
7.4.6 The regulation of mental effort 
A regression analysis was performed to investigate how effort regulation was predicted by external and 
internal factors during each difficulty condition. It was predicted that external factors would be more 
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influential when task difficulty was high, i.e. indiyidual would focus on performance-related factors at 
the expense of internal factors. The obverse hypothesis would apply when task difficulty was low, i.e. 
internal factors emphasised at the expense of external ones. 
These hypotheses were investigated via a series of regression analyses conducted on four 7min 
segments of each task difficulty condition. External factors were represented by the frequency of 
collisions whereas internal factors were indexed via a number of variables including; fatigue 
symptoms, energetic arousal, tense arousal and self-focus. These variables were entered as dependent 
variables with psychophysiological effort as an independent variable. OutIiers were defined as subjects 
whose data was 2.5 standard deviations above or below the group mean. 
The series of regression analyses performed on data from the Predictable task condition are 
summarised in Table 27 below. 
Time elapsed N R' F-ratio I! 
7min 21 0.64 5.64 <0.01 
21min 22 0.70 7.63 <0.01 
35min 21 0.42 2.16 n.S. 
49min 21 0.57 3.89 <0.05 
Table 27. Summary of regression analyses performed on data from Predictable task condition. 
The semi-partial correlation for each predictor variable was calculated during the regression analyses. 
This coefficient indexes the amount of unique variance predicted by each predictor. The semi-partial 
correlation coefficients resulting from the regression analyses are illustrated below in Figure 44. 
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Figure 44. Semi-partial correlation coefficients from the regression analyses conducted on 
PREDICTABLE condition. NB: significant correlation> 0.40. 
The data illustrated in Figure 44 revealed the variable relationship between mental effort and related 
factors. It is notable that an increased frequency of collisions was associated with mental effort 
investment. However, other variables such as fatigue symptoms and falling energetic arousal tended to 
lead to effort reduction or conservation. The relationship between effort and certain variables tended to 
change over time-on-task. During the initial period, rising fatigue increased mental effort but this 
positive association was reversed during subsequent periods of task activity. A similar reversal was 
noted for the level of self-focus, being negative during the initial period and positive thereafter. 
An identical series of regression analyses was conducted on data from the Unpredictable task 
condition. The regression data is summarised below in Table 28 and the semi-partial correlations are 
illustrated in Figure 45. In this case, mental effort investment is driven by the number of collisions and 
reduced by the frequency of fatigue symptoms. 
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Time elapsed N R" F-ratio 11 
7min 21 0.47 2.65 0.06 
21min 21 0.71 7.27 <0.01 
35min 22 0.61 4.95 <0.01 
49min 21 0.66 5.73 <0.05 
Table 28. Summary of regression analyses performed on data from Unpredictable task condition. 
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Figure 45. Semi-partial correlation coefficients from the regression analyses conducted on 
UNPREDICTABLE condition. NB: significant correlation> 0.40. 
7.5 Discussion 
The important experimental manipulations of tracking predictability and time-on-task (TOT) had the 
expected influence on performance, psychophysiology and subjective data. By escalating the 
unpredictability of the tracker target, perceptual-motor demands were increased, both with respect to 
tracking difficulty and the potential for interference between the tracking task and the target detection 
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task. The net effect of target unpredictability was to reduce the accuracy of tracking performance, e.g. 
higher RMS error, more frequent collisions. However, increased timesharing demands between 
tracking and RT stimuli due to target unpredictability improved performance on the latter, i.e. target 
sensitivity increased and response times were shorter (Figure 37 and Figure 38 respectively). This 
effect may have resulted from the increase of psychophysiological effort during unpredictable tracking 
condition (Figure 39). According to this hypothesis, one influence of increased mental effort may have 
been increased timesharing efficiency between both task components, i.e. subjects 'break' from the 
tracking task to perform the RT stimuli for shorter periods as a means of protecting tracking 
performance during increased unpredictability. 
The main experimental manipUlation of increased tracking unpredictability exerted a range of 
influences on task strategy and subjective appraisal. In the first instance, subjects tended to reduce goal 
aspiration and to appraise declining performance standards during the unpredictable condition ( 
Table 17 and Table 19). Despite a reduction of goal aspiration, subjects attempted to compensate for 
accelerated demands by increasing their subjective level of mental effort investment. In addition, 
sUbjective mental workload increased on all sub-scales of the NASA-TLX (Table 26). A series of costs 
were associated with mental effort investment during unpredictable tracking, e.g. increased symptoms 
of muscular fatigue (Table 20), reduced energy (Table 21), and increased distress (Table 22). It should 
be noted that the unpredictable tracking manipulation induced increased physical as well as 
perceptuallattentional task demands. This was evident from the higher level of mouse input, the greater 
number of muscular fatigue symptoms (Table 20) and the increased level of physical demand (Table 
26) observed during unpredictable tracking. 
The time-on-task (TOT) effect shared a number of influences with the tracking manipulation, e.g. 
degraded tracking performance, reduced energy and affective tone, increased mental demand and 
subjective workload. However, there was also evidence for a number of specific TOT effects. For 
example, it was apparent that psychophysiological mental effort declined with increasing TOT (Figure 
39). This finding suggested either: (a) that mental effort is finite and investment could not be 
sustained across the whole 49 minutes of the task duration, or (b) that a learning effect occurred and 
subjects required lower consecutive levels of mental effort as TOT increased. This latter hypothesis is 
rejected on several grounds. In the first instance, by nature of the predictability manipulation, the 
opportunities for skill acquisition were very limited. The predictable tracking task was totally 
deterministic, whereas the unpredictable tracking manipulation produced totally random movement. In 
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addition, the presence ofa 12 -18 minute pre-test training session should have reduced the learning 
effect. Secondly, tracking performance did not improve over TOT, in fact, the opposite effect was 
observed with respect to RMS error, i.e. no evidence for improved performance with continued task 
exposure. Thirdly, subjects generally lowered goal aspirations and self-rated assessments of 
performance with increasing TOT rather than the opposite trend (Table 17 and Table (9) and finally, 
subjects perceived subjective mental workload and mental demand to rise with increased TOT (Table 
26), i.e. task demands were heightened rather than being reduced by TOT. Therefore, it is proposed 
that the initial hypothesis is supported and mental effort appeared to be finite and declined over a 
sustained period, regardless of task difficulty. 
It was apparent that subjects experienced accelerated costs due to both increased unpredictability and 
TOT. A number of costs were induced by both manipulations, e.g. reduced energy (Table 21) and 
affective tone (Table 22) coupled with increased muscular fatigue (Table 20) and increased mental 
demand (Table 26). Several other categories of cost were linked exclusively with effort investment 
induced by tracking unpredictability, e.g. increased tension and reduced confidence (Table 22), an 
increased frequency of task-relevant thoughts (Table 24) and increased subjective workload with 
respect to all sub-scales excepting mental demand (Table 26). It may be postulated that these costs 
function to provoke a strategy of mental effort investment. A third grouping of costs were associated 
with declining levels of effort due to TOT, these included: increased fatigue symptoms in all sub-
categories excepting muscular fatigue(Table 20), reduced concentration (Table 21) and an increased 
frequency of task-irrelevant thoughts (Table 24). These latter costs may be associated with a strategy 
of effort conservation (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, (997). Within Hockey's conceptualisation, effort 
conservation corresponds to an intentional strategy. The evidence for intentionality was mixed in the 
present case. On one hand, pre-task goal aspirations are reduced with increased TOT, however, there 
was no evidence for any influence of any systematic reduction of subjective effort mobilisation to 
parallel the decline of psychophysiological effort. 
Those costs that were common to both main effects may be ambivalent with respect to mental effort 
policy. For instance, effort may be invested or conserved as a result of falling energy levels, increased 
mental demands or negative affect. In the former case, the individual may wish to increase mental 
effort in order to compensate for reduced energy or increased mental demands. Alternatively, the 
individual could choose to reduce mental effort in the face of diminished energy or heightened mental 
demands. 
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The evidence discussed so far clearly indicates that mental effort is increased or invested due to the 
influence of unpredictable tracking. It was also apparent that mental effort tended to decline or to be 
conserved with increasing TOT. This antagonistic relationship between these main effects is 
fundamental to the following discussion of the group effects. 
The REST group were granted a seven-minute rest break between each period of task performance. 
The overall effect of rest break provision was to sustain those costs associated with effort investment 
whilst ameliorating the influence ofthose costs associated with effort conservation. For instance, 
subjects in the REST group reported an increased frequency of task-relevant thoughts (Table 24), 
higher concentration (Table 21) whilst experiencing a lower level of mental demand than others 
subjects (Table 26), regardless of tracker predictability. These findings suggested that frequent rest 
periods may preserve effort-preserving costs whilst inhibiting the accumulation of harmful costs. 
For reasons of clarity and consistency, further effects due to the Group variable are discussed with 
reference to each tracking condition as this interaction was crucial to the schedule experienced by each 
individual subject Group. 
During the predictable tracking condition, the CONT group experienced a sustained period oflow-
demand task activity, the INT group performed the same task between periods of unpredictable 
tracking, and the REST group performed the predictable tracking task between rest periods. Therefore, 
it would be anticipated that TOT effects may be most pronounced for the INT group. No evidence for 
this trend was apparent from the analyses of performance data. With respect to the response time task, 
the CONT group achieved a higher level of perceptual sensitivity relative to the INT group (Figure 37), 
but this advantage was dispersed by increasing TOT. There was also a surprising effect that a 
significantly longer response latency was associated with the REST group (Figure 37) following 35 
minutes of the experimental session. This may have been indicative of rising complacency due to the 
low demand associated with the predictable tracking task. 
The analysis of task efficiency shown in Figure 40 illustrated that both CONT and INT subjects 
produced similar levels of tracking performance. However, the INT subjects were forced to invest a 
higher level of mental effort in order to achieve this equivalence. The same pattern of data was 
observed for the RT performance, except that R T accuracy is slightly lower for the INT group (Figure 
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The evidence discussed so far clearly indicates that mental effort is increased or invested due to the 
influence of unpredictable tracking. It was also apparent that mental effort tended to decline or to be 
conserved with increasing TOT. This antagonistic relationship between these main effects is 
fundamental to the following discussion of the group effects. 
The REST group were granted a seven-minute rest break: between each period of task performance. 
The overall effect of rest break: provision was to sustain those costs associated with effort investment 
whilst ameliorating the influence of those costs associated with effort conservation. For instance, 
subjects in the REST group reported an increased frequency of task-relevant thoughts (Table 24), 
higher concentration (Table 21) whilst experiencing a lower level of mental demand than others 
subjects (Table 26), regardless of tracker predictability. These findings suggested that frequent rest 
periods may preserve effort-preserving costs whilst inhibiting the accumulation of harmful costs. 
For reasons of clarity and consistency, further effects due to the Group variable are discussed with 
reference to each tracking condition as this interaction was crucial to the schedule experienced by each 
individual subject Group. 
During the predictable tracking condition, the CONT group experienced a sustained period of low-
demand task activity, the INT group performed the same task between periods of unpredictable 
tracking, and the REST group performed the predictable tracking task between rest periods. Therefore, 
it would be anticipated that TOT effects may be most pronounced for the INT group. No evidence for 
this trend was apparent from the analyses of performance data. With respect to the response time task, 
the CONT group achieved a higher level of perceptual sensitivity relative to the INT group (Figure 37), 
but this advantage was dispersed by increasing TOT. There was also a surprising effect that a 
significantly longer response latency was associated with the REST group (Figure 37) following 3S 
minutes of the experimental session. This may have been indicative of rising complacency due to the 
low demand associated with the predictable tracking task. 
The analysis of task efficiency shown in Figure 40 illustrated that both CONT and INT subjects 
produced similar levels of tracking performance. However, the INT subjects were forced to invest a 
higher level of mental effort in order to achieve this equivalence. The same pattern of data was 
observed for the RT performance, except that RT accuracy is slightly lower for the INT group (Figure 
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42). Further evidence for higher levels of mental effort investment was apparent from the pattern of 
costs shown by the INT group. In addition, the INT group reported increased extrinsic motivation (i.e. 
increased concerns regarding success and failure, see Table 24) and visual fatigue (Table 20) relative to 
the other two groups. It is hypothesised that the increase of mental effort and associated costs resulted 
from the accelerated influence of TOT due to the interpolation of the unpredictable task. Therefore, the 
INT subjects were forced to increased mental effort in order to compensate for 'carry-over' effects 
from the unpredictable tracking sequence, i.e. a fatigue after-effect, (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997). 
The CONT subjects experienced a consistent and highly monotonous level of task demand during the 
predictable tracking condition. On the sole basis of a mental effort model, it would be predicted that 
the energetical demands of this schedule were lower than those experienced by the INT subjects. 
However, it may be overly simplistic to characterise sustained, low-demand activity as relatively 
effortless. For example, (Warm & Dember, 1998) has argued convincingly that the costs associated 
with continuous signaUnon-signal discrimination are substantive, due to time uncertainty and low 
levels of situational control. Several strands of evidence to support this position were apparent with 
respect to the CONT group. These subjects were distracted by a higher frequency of task-irrelevant 
thoughts (Table 24) and lowest level of confidence in their own performance (Table 21). Therefore, it 
may be reasonably assumed that a reduction of energetical demands with respect to TOT (relative to 
the INT group) did not reduce the level of task difficulty encountered by the CONT subjects. 
It is hypothesised that the monotonous character of the CONT schedule during the predictable tracking 
condition may have inhibited mental effort investment for two reasons. On one hand, overt errors such 
as collisions were relatively rare events, so subjects were generally deprived of an objective source of 
performance feedback during the unpredictable condition. Therefore, CONT subjects were aware of 
accelerated workload, but this awareness failed to promote increased task engagement, or to challenge 
individuals with respect to performance capacity (i.e. Distress as defined by (Matthews, et al., 1997)), 
or to provoke self-evaluation of personal qualities or goals (i.e. Worry as defined by (Matthews, et al., 
1997)). 
In the case of the REST group, mental effort was also conserved during predictable tracking and 
actually fell below resting values (Figure 40 and Figure 42). This conservation strategy had mixed 
results on performance effectiveness, being associated with the lowest RMS error (Figure 40) and the 
highest RT latencyl"loerror during later task periods (Figure 42). It could be hypothesised that the 
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monotonous nature of the predictable tracking task had a soporific influence on subjects generally, 
which have been most apparent for those subjects who encountered the lowest level of task-induced 
stress (Dinges & Kribbs, 1991; Kjellberg, 1977a). 
The unpredictable tracking condition represented high perceptual-motor demands. It was hypothesised 
that the influence of both condition and TOT would be maximised for the CONT group, who were 
required to sustain performance across seven consecutive task sessions. This schedule was less 
strenuous for the INT subjects who performed a predictable tracking session between each 
unpredictable sequence. Therefore, it was expected that the costs associated with TOT would 
accumulate at a lower rate for the INT subjects relative to the CONT group. Finally, the REST group 
had the easiest schedule where breaks were interpolated between episodes of unpredictable tracking. 
It was apparent that overt performance showed the highest decline for the CONT group during the 
unpredictable tracking condition (Figure 36). In addition, response latencies produced by the CONT 
group significantly increased following 21 minutes of performance relative to the INT and REST 
subjects (Figure 38). However, an unexpected effect occurred with respect to perceptual sensitivity, 
where INT subjects produced the highest level of performance over 35 minutes, before slumping to the 
lowest sensitivity during the final seven-minute task period (Figure 37). This finding suggested that the 
INT subjects may have over-extended their capacity with respect to perceptual sensitivity following 43 
minutes of performance and suffered a reversal during the final session. 
The analysis of tracking efficiency provided a clear illustration of several effort strategies in action 
(Figure 41). The INT group showed the highest level of mental effort investment in combination with 
a relatively high level of tracking performance. This was an example of an effective effort investment 
strategy where the mobilisation of mental effort has a beneficial influence on performance. The REST 
group did not appear to mobilise mental effort to a significant extent (i.e. around 5% above rest), but 
were capable of sustaining tracking accuracy at the same level as the INT group (i.e. who were 
investing effort at a level between 14 and 18% above resting values). A combination of high 
performance and low mental effort defines an efficient effort conservation strategy, i.e. where good 
performance is achieved at minimal effort investment (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Schonpflug, 1986b). 
Therefore, it may be appropriate to label the strategy associated with the INT subjects as effective, but 
relatively inefficient compared to the REST group. The data from CONT subjects were also 
representative of a conservation strategy, but in this case, high performance was not apparent. In 
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addition, the CONT group appear to progressively reduce mental effort across TOT at the expense of 
tracking performance. This conservation strategy may represent a rational reduction of performance 
standards as a means of reducing compensatory costs (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997) - however, this 
strategy may have been implicit as there was no evidence of a conservation strategy from the CONT 
pre-tests of goal aspirations or the subjective effort scales. 
The analysis ofRT task efficiency indicated that CONT subjects sustained high accuracy at the 
expense oflonger latency throughout the unpredictable tracking task (Figure 43). This finding 
suggested that CONT subjects may have compensated for poorer tracking by sustaining high RT 
accuracy. By contrast, the INI group decreased response latency, which had a detrimental influence on 
accuracy during the final task session. 
It was apparent that an increased rate of effort expenditure was accompanied by a number of specific 
costs, e.g. increased subjective workload, stress, falling confidence and reduced cognitive interference. 
On the other hand, a decrease of effort expenditure (i.e. effort conservation strategy) was associated 
with increased symptoms offatigue, reduced concentration and heightened cognitive interference. 
This distinction represents an indication that the presence of certain categories of cost may provoke 
increased expenditure, whereas others may have the opposite effect. A characterisation of costs or, 
rather, combinations of costs, working as 'activators' and 'inhibitors' received some support in the 
experiment. For instance, the combination of reduced Engagement with increased Distress, Worry and 
workload may have spurred the INT subjects to sustain effort investment during the predictable task. 
Whereas a combination of increased workload, decreased EngagementiDistress/Worry failed to do 
likewise for the CONT subjects. The same effect was apparent for the REST group who consistently 
experienced higher levels of 'activators' in combination with minimal levels of 'inhibitors.' 
The influence of costs on effort policy would appear to be a question of degree rather than kind. For 
instance, the INT group faced with almost identical levels of costs as the CONT group during the 
unpredictable task were capable of sustaining mental effort investment. The key differences between 
both groups were arguably a higher rate of replenishment for the INT group and the lower level of 
tracking task error (but no evidence that INT subjects subjectively assessed performance to be superior 
to the CONT group). This and the previous example illustrates the difficulties of describing effort 
strategies, which are multifaceted in nature and multidimensional in character. It is apparent that effort 
policy is primarily influenced by performance efficiency and its associated costs. However, the lines of 
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influence between efficiency and costs are cyclic in nature, i.e. efficiency is determined by costs and 
vice versa, and therefore causality is highly circular, which creates a host of problems for prediction. 
It is also important to acknowledge that all subjects were fully aware of task demands and temporal 
schedule. The knowledge oftask demand and remaining work duration may also influence the 
perception of task performance and associated costs. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that effort strategies may be highly idioscyncratic entities, subject 
to influences from trait as well as state variables «Matthews, et al., 1997; Matthews, Schwean, 
Campbell, Saklofske, & Mohamed, in press). Therefore, the potential role of individual differences 
should be emphasised and subject numbers were minimal in the study to accommodate the 
experimental design. This factor is particularly problematic when one considers that one group 
sustained mental effort across TOT regardless of tracking predictability. This finding could have been 
predicted from the finite resource model of mental effort. Alternatively, the experimenter could have 
been unfortunate enough to have unwittingly included a small number of highly-motivated individuals 
within the INT group. For the most part, the results of the experiment are fairly consistent, but one 
would feel more confident in the data if the study were to be replicated with a more substantive number 
of subjects (i.e. N = 24 per group). 
7.6 Conclusions 
The aim of the experiment was to investigate how different schedules of task demand influenced effort 
strategies in conjunction with time-on-task. The manipulation of tracking unpredictability was 
intended to provoke mental effort investment, whereas increasing TOT was predicted to curtail 
investment or induce the inverse strategy of effort conservation. In broad terms, both manipulations 
were successful with respect to these hypotheses. 
The beneficial influence of a schedule which included rest breaks was apparent, regardless of the level 
of task demand imposed on the subjects. The advantages conferred on the REST subjects included 
high tracking performance in combination with reduced mental effort (i.e. improved efficiency) and an 
increased willingness to set goals at a higher standard. The presence of interpolated rest breaks meant 
that accumulated harmful costs due to performance had sufficient time to disperse before the next 
period of tracking performance. Therefore, the REST subjects were able to devote mental effort solely 
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:0 task demands, which resulted in superior levels of task efficiency (i.e. during predictable tracking, 
:his group operated at levels of mental effort investment which fell below resting values). 
!\ rate of expenditure hypothesis was supported in the predictable tracking condition, i.e. the highest 
rate of expenditure was associated with highest level of performance inefficiency. During the 
~npredictable condition, the highest level of inefficiency was associated with the lowest level of effort 
expenditure. The former relationship is indicative of a strategy of effort investment, whereas the latter 
corresponds to an effort conservation strategy. 
It was difficult to predict effort policy based on those cost associated with expenditure, e.g. workload, 
fatigue, Engagement, Distress and Worry. These costs were capable of functioning as activators or 
inhibitors with respect to effort expenditure. When task demands were low, effort investment was 
associated with accelerated costs and reduced performance efficiency. When demands were high, both 
the highest and lowest level of effort expenditure were associated with a similar pattern of costs. It 
may be concluded that performance efficiency must be considered in conjunction with costs in order to 
characterise effort policy. 
The results of the study provided a clear indication of the significance of mental effort policy, both in 
terms of the development of cognitive-energetical theory and as a variable for consideration within 
applied research on work/rest schedules within industrial settings. 
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g DISCUSSION 
This discussion section will deal with specific areas of the thesis in a modular fashion. The initial 
Section 8.1 will provide an assessment of major findings from the empirical work within the context of 
the effort regulation model described in Chapter 2. The following Section 8.2 will attempt to refine 
and to extend the model of effort regulation on this basis of experimental findings. The third section 
(Section 8.4) describes possibilities for future research and Section 8.3 will provide a critical 
assessment of the thesis. 
8.1 Experimental findings 
The empirical work started from the hypothesis that mental effort represented a finite resource for the 
modulation of sustained, perceptual-motor performance. This hypothesis was the basis of both the 
theory of mental effort regulation (Chapter 2) and the foundation for the following three experimental 
studies. Empirical evidence to support this position originated from three sources of data from the final 
laboratory study (Chapter 7): 
• Those subjects permitted interpolated rest breaks achieved higher levels of performance and 
performance efficiency, regardless ofthe level of task demand. In addition, rested subjects did not 
accumulate energetical costs with respect to time-on-task. 
• When the task was relatively undemanding, the interpolation of high demand activity accelerated the 
rate of energetical costs and reduced performance efficiency (Figure 40). 
• When subjects were required to sustain performance on highly demanding activity, this group 
performed poorly (Figure 36), experienced high costs and exhibited reduced performance efficiency 
(Figure 41) relative to groups who were not subjected to the same level of sustained, high task 
demand. 
These findings support the hypothesis that mental effort represents a finite commodity. In addition., it 
was apparent that effort expenditure has a linear relationship with psychological costs (e.g. lowered 
task engagement, increased distress and worry). Evidence was also found for a third hypothesis that 
sustained effort expenditure was associated with declining performance efficiency as indexed by 
(Meijman, 1995), i.e. the requisite level of mental effort investment necessary to sustain performance 
tends to increase with time-on-task. The experimental findings described in Chapter 7 clearly 
indicated that all trends of increased effort expenditure and accumulated costs were ameliorated by the 
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provision of rest breaks. 
The hypothesis linking effort expenditure with declining performance efficiency is particularly striking 
as all four studies showed a significant time-on-task effect for psychophysiological mental effort, i.e. 
effort tended to decline with sustained performance. Three working hypotheses may be generated on 
the basis of this finding: (a) a finite resource effect, i.e. the gradual exhaustion ofa finite effort reserve, 
(b) a learning effect, i.e. effort level declines as subjects familiarise themselves with the task, or (c) a 
novelty effect, i.e. subjects initially invest high levels of effort because they are new to the task. The 
learning effect hypothesis is rejected because no other evidence for skill acquisition was apparent 
during the studies. In all four studies, the general influence of increased time-on-task was to reduce 
performance quality, reduce the assessment of performance quality and increase subjective workload. 
The opposite results would be anticipated if subjects acquired increased skill with task exposure. A 
novelty effect is more plausible as often effort investment during the initial task period is substantially 
higher than consequent periods, e.g. Figure 39. On the other hand, subjects received a substantial 
period of task familiarisation prior to data capture in at least two of studies, e.g. pre-task familiarisation 
was approximately IS - 25 minutes for the study reported in Chapter 7. It is argued that even if a 
novelty effect were present, its influence would be relatively short-lived and could not explain the 
reduction of effort and performance that occurred during the latter periods of task performance. 
It was anticipated that both increased task demand and accumulating time-on-task represented a dual 
'drain' on finite effort reserves. The systematic manipulation of both variables in Chapter 7 yielded a 
pattern of results supporting the economic conceptualisation of finite effort being expended at different 
rates per unit time due to the main effects of task difficulty and time-on-task. 
These finite boundaries on effort expenditure were explored in other studies described in the thesis. 
The study of individual differences (Chapter 4) revealed that less-proficient individuals tended to invest 
mental effort at a higher level than proficient counterparts. On this basis, it would be anticipated that 
the less-proficient would exhaust effort reserves at a higher rate and therefore, rapidly reduce their 
capacity for performance (Schonpflug, 1983) (Figure 22). In other words, these individuals with a 
higher rate of effort expenditure are more likely to encounter capacity limitations after a shorter period 
of activity and/or at lower levels of task demand. 
The issue of a performance capability was reprised in the first study of driver impairment (Chapter 5) 
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which yielded results that are more complex. This experiment manipulated the magnitude of stressor 
~y including both partial- and full-sleep deprivation groups within the design. It was anticipated that 
sleep deprivation would lower the level of finite effort reserves and therefore, diminish the 
performance capability of both groups of sleep-deprived subjects. This hypothesis was supported by 
the behaviour of the full sleep deprivation group. These individuals performed poorly, exhibited 
performance inefficiency and reduced effort investment with increased time-on-task. It was assumed 
that capacity was reduced because effort reserves were decimated by sleep deprivation before 
performance. 
The same logic could not be applied to the behaviour of those subjects who were partially deprived of 
sleep. It was assumed that partial-sleep deprivation would also reduce the quantity of finite effort 
reserves, but perhaps not to same extent as a full night without sleep. However, these subjects were 
capable of the highest level of sustained effort investment during the 120min task session (Figure 27). 
This finding cannot be explained by recourse to a simplistic fuel analogy or a one-to-one link between 
finite effort reserves and performance capacity. It is argued that this complex finding resulted from the 
transactional basis of the effort regulation mechanism (Section 2.2.6)and the appraisal of costs. 
It was postulated that the subjective assessment of cognitive-energetic efficiency via external and 
internal feedback (Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5) acted as a conduit between effort reserves and performance 
capacity. 
The evidence for external and internal feedback was provided by a range of subjective measures used 
throughout the experimental studies. It is hypothesised that several subjective scales were related to 
external feedback, e.g. workload scales such as mental/physical/temporal demands and performance. 
On the other hand, subjective scales associated with fatigue and stress (as defined as 
EngagementlDistressIWorry by Matthews, et al. (1997) were analogous to the process of internal 
feedback. Based on the final experiment (Chapter 7), it was suggested that specific patterns of 
cognitive-energetical appraisal were associated with an increased level of effort expenditure, e.g. 
increased workload/task-relevant thoughtsiDistress, whereas an increase offatigue symptomsltask-
irrelevant thoughts and reduced concentration were associated with declining effort. 
It is hypothesised that the magnitude of external/investment "costs" relative to the extent of those 
internal/conservation "costs" represents an operationalisation of efficiency assessment as described in 
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Table 4. 
However, these process of subjective self-appraisal are associated with a degree of indeterminacy. This 
was illustrated during the first experiment (Chapter 4) which provided some evidence of how this 
process of cognitive-energetic assessment could go awry. In this case, low-proficiency individuals 
were insensitive to both internal (e.g. energy levels) and external (e.g. performance) feedback cues. 
This effect was particularly marked in the presence of sleep deprivation, lending some support to the 
hypothesis that impaired psychological functioning extends to those processes of self-monitoring as 
well as task performance (Brown, 1994; McDonald, 1987). Based on an erroneous appraisal of 
efficiency, low proficiency subjects did not attempt to mobilise subjective effort as a compensatory 
response to sleep deprivation (Figure 18). This pattern of data was replicated in the driving 
impairment study (Chapter 5), when subjects were provided with alcohol. Two psychological 
manifestations of alcohol are increased self-confidence and an accentuated sense of wellbeing (Walls & 
Brownlie, 1985). In other words, the intoxicated subject may experience a bias with respect to both 
external feedback (i.e. believing performance to be superior than it actually is) and internal feedback 
(i.e. being insulated against task-related stress and other sources of discomfort). Support for this 
hypothesis were manifested for the intoxicated group via the pattern of degraded performance (Figure 
26) coupled to a decline of workload-related fiustration (Table 7) and the absence of any perception of 
significant performance degradation. 
Awareness and accurate appraisal of internal and external feedback is the foundation of mental effort 
regulation. This assertion is underlined by evidence that internal and external symptoms or cues may 
function in two distinctive modes. For example, feedback may function as a predictive indicator. This 
capability was demonstrated in the second study (Chapter 4), where correlational data suggested that 
proficient individuals employed internal and external cues to mobilise effort investment. These data 
illustrated a positive association between effort investment and decreased electrocortical arousal in one 
condition, indicative of a compensatory strategy, i.e. to invest effort in order to counteract drowsiness 
(Figure 23a). When operational conditions were more strenuous, the same individuals shifted the 
emphasis to external feedback as a means of protecting task performance. In this case, effort was 
invested in response to increased error frequency (Figure 24a). 
The second mode of operation for feedback cues is an active impact on effort expenditure. In this case, 
internal cues distract the individual from primary task performance (and may reduce performance) 
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~nless additional effort is invested as a compensatory strategy. The four studies provided numerous 
examples of this phenomenon in action. For example, the interpolation of high-demand activity 
increased the level of Distress and Worry for subjects during subsequent periods of low-demand 
activity (Chapter 7). The influence of sleep deprivation extended beyond the obvious (e.g. high 
subjective sleepiness and low energy) to increase Worry (task-relevant thoughts), fiustration, temporal 
demands and physical demands (Table 7). In the final study (Chapter 6), the rate of gain associated 
with subjective symptoms of fatigue was correlated with the rate of effort expenditure, i.e. higher gain 
rate of subjective symptoms = decreased effort expenditure per unit time. In addition, both factors 
were implicated in the subjects' decision to withdraw from the simulated journey (Table 12 and Table 
13) 
The levels of internal costs exert an influence on the assessment of cognitive-energetic efficiency in 
conjunction with external feedback, which concerns the quality of task performance. The study on 
performance feedback (Chapter 6) brought external feedback to prominence via the presentation of 
overt performance cues based on objective data. This manipulation prevented a deterioration of 
performance due to time-on-task without increasing the level of mental effort investment (Figure 35). 
This finding suggested that the deterioration of perceptual-motor performance due to time-on-task, 
which was observed in all four studies, may have been due to: (a) an inaccurate appraisal of 
performance quality that was counteracted via the provision of objective feedback, and/or (b) a reduced 
fidelity of performance checking, which was counterbalanced by the overt presentation of external 
feedback cues. In addition, the absence of any quantitative increase of mental effort in association with 
sustained performance effectiveness may indicate the significance of a qualitative aspect of procedural 
effort investment, i.e. the timing of effort investment as opposed to the quantity of effort investment. 
There was some evidence from the performance feedback study that the presence of feedback 
accelerated an awareness of effort expenditure and subjective fatigue, with respect to the decision to 
discontinue the task (Table 12 and Table 13). This link provides some support for the hypothesis that 
an awareness of internal costs may be accentuated by overt cues, which are associated with external 
performance feedback (Figure 11). 
The studies of simulated driving endowed the subjects with a increased degree of personal control, as 
they were able to manipulate the speed of the vehicle and therefore, exercise a degree of discretion with 
respect to task pacing. This aspect was apparent during the study of driver impairment (Chapter 5), 
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where evidence for several latent decrements associated with performance were apparent (Hockey, 
1993; Hockey, 1997). These decrements seem to represent stratagems to improve performance 
efficiency without reducing effectiveness. In this case, it was found that subjects who had been 
partially deprived of sleep permitted performance to decline to a sub-critical level, before affecting any 
corrective action. This strategy permitted the same subjects to reduce their level of steering input as an 
indirect result (Figure 26). These strategies did not appear to alleviate the level of mental effort 
required by the PartSD subjects to sustain performance (Figure 29) - which was not surprising, given 
that these subjects had to compensate for high internal costs provoked by a night of reduced sleep. On 
the contrary, the presence of these latent decrements hint of an increased awareness of external 
feedback and greater fidelity of control over performance, i.e. the ability ofPartSD subjects to respond 
proactively to near-lane crossings. This hypothesis is also based on the relative difference between the 
PartSD group and the FullSD subjects (who reduced steering input but only at the expense oflateral 
control) and the intoxicated subjects (who provided a 'normal' level of steering input coupled to poor 
lateral control). 
The experimental analyses from all studies included an analysis of performance efficiency based on the 
relationship between performance and psychophysiological mental effort. This formula replicated the 
analysis performed by Meijman (1995) and represented an operationalisation of performance efficiency 
as conceived by Schonpflug (1985) and Eysenck & Calvo (1992). Performance efficiency referred to 
the ratio between performance effectiveness and the level of effort required to achieve that level of 
effectiveness. It should be distinguished from the appraisal of cognitive-energetic efficiency, which 
represents the subjective utility between external and internal feedback cues. 
The analysis of performance efficiency permitted performance quality to be assessed in conjunction 
with the level of effort investment. This two-dimensional representation was used to distinguish 
effective from ineffective effort policies. For example, the group who received rest breaks during the 
first study (Chapter 7) exhibited efficient investment, i.e. maximum performance in combination with 
minimum increase of effort (Figure 41), as well as a highly efficient effort conservation strategy, i.e. 
maximum performance in combination with reduced mental effort (Figure 40). The study of individual 
differences contrasted the performance efficiency of high and low proficiency subjects, following a 
normal night of sleep and a night without sleep. The analysis illustrated in Figure 21 clearly indicated 
that high proficiency was associated with increased performance efficiency. This distinction between 
both groups was particularly evident, as sleep-deprived, proficient subjects exhibited higher efficiency 
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than rested, low proficiency subjects. During the study of driving impairment (Chapter 5), the same 
rnalysis indicated that partial-sleep deprivation decreased efficiency but not at the expense of 
performance, i.e. the partially-sleep deprived subjects increased effort investment to sustain equivalent 
performance to the control subjects (Figure 29). By contrast, the same analysis revealed that full sleep 
deprivation degraded performance as those subjects reduced the level of effort investment. The 
primary manipulation during the final study of sustained performance (Chapter 6) was the presentation 
of performance feedback. The analysis of performance efficiency indicated that discrete feedback 
sustained a higher level of performance efficiency relative to the control condition (Figure 35). In this 
case, the provision of feedback promoted increased performance effectiveness without inflating the 
requisite level of mental effort investment. 
It is argued that these data justified the inclusion of the performance efficiency index as a means of 
operationalising successful and unsuccessful effort strategies within a two-dimensional framework. A 
successful effort policy may be characterised as an episode of investment that improves performance or 
an instance of effort conservation, which reduces the intensity of internal costs. Unsuccessful effort 
investment does not improve performance and an ineffectual conservation strategy would fail to reduce 
the intensity of internal costs (Figure 9). Performance· efficiency data may be interpreted alongside the 
analyses of gain rates associated with psychological costs to represent the success or failure of effort 
conservation strategies. It was anticipated that the rate of gain would decline if effort conservation was 
successful. In the case of the subjects who received rest breaks during the final laboratory study 
(Chapter 7), these individuals actually experienced a negative rate of gain for most sources of internal 
costs, i.e. costs actually showed a progressive reduction with time-an-task. Examples of all four 
categories of effort policy were apparent from the four studies, based on the analysis of performance 
efficiency and the rate of gain associated with psychological costs. 
The success or failure of an effort policy may have profound implications for the experience of 
psychological cost. For example, in the study of driver impairment (Chapter 5), partial-sleep 
deprivation subjects experienced a similar level of cost to those who had been fully sleep deprived. 
However, the investment strategy enforced by the former group successfully counteracted the influence 
of sleepiness on performance. Whereas the latter group experienced a combination of performance loss 
and increased costs, which forced them to reduce their level of mental effort. These results indicated 
that those internal, psychological costs, characterised as discomfort, may be tolerated in combination 
with a successful task performance. This example illustrates the transactional relationship between 
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effort, costs and performance. 
A dissociation between subjective and psychophysiological indicators of mental effort was observed in 
two of the four studies. As stated earlier, the standard influence of time-on-task on the 0.1 Hz 
component of heart rate variability was a systematic reduction of mental effort. However, the 
subjective effort scale (from the Raw version of the NASA-TLX) indicated that subjects perceived their 
level of mental effort to increase with rising time-on-task (Table 26 and Table 7). This dissociation 
may be indicative of a subjective bias (i.e. the need to feel as though we are working as hard as 
possible) or it may simply reflect the fact that subjective feelings of effort mobilisation (i.e. our 
intentional effort policy) may dissociate from actual effort policy. This topic will be revised in the 
following section. 
These findings represent the core results from the empirical programme, the following section will 
attempt to reconcile experimental findings with the model of effort regulation described in Chapter 2. 
8.2 Theoretical issues 
The results of the four experimental studies produced some contradictory indications concerning the 
finite limitations of mental effort investment over sustained time-on-task. It was postulated in Section 
1.2 that finite effort reserves could be characterised according to an effort economy. In addition, it has 
been suggested that the finite character of mental effort reserves may be physiological in nature, i.e. 
being related to the efficiency of cerebral metabolism, and in particular, to energy consumption at the 
synapse (pumping out ions to prepare the synapse for subsequent signals). It was reasoned that the 
failure of the latter process would reduce the fidelity of synaptic transmission (Crawford, 1961; 
Tsaneva & Markov, 1971), which would represent an upper limit on performance effectiveness. This 
tenuous line of theorising links effort to energy and energy to the fidelity of nervous transmission, 
which in turn, has been assumed to influence performance. Moreover, this framework posits the 
existence of an absolute, physiological limit on mental effort expenditure over time. 
In broad terms, the experimental data supported a finite conception of mental effort. There was 
evidence that the rate of effort expenditure was influenced by the level of task demand and time-on-
task in contrary directions. In addition, continued effort expenditure was associated with increased 
psychological costs and latent decrements with respect to performance. The empirical data indicated 
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that perfonnance efficiency was the primary influence on the rate of effort expenditure, i.e. expenditure 
being detennined by the minimum requisite level of effort investment necessary to sustain adequate 
performance. Furthermore, it was apparent that psychological costs generally reduced the level of 
performance efficiency, i.e. increased costs = increased investment due to the requirement to 
compensate for task-irrelevant sources of effort consumption such as discomfort, distraction, reduced 
engagement etc. Therefore, the evolution of costs reduces the maximum level ofperfonnance 
efficiency, which raises the requisite level of effort expenditure whilst degrading the level of 
performance effectiveness. This scheme is represented schematically in Figure 46. 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
Level of Effort 
Expenditure required to 
sustain performance 
Performance 
Efficiency 
Psychological 
costs 
TIME - ON - TASK 
Figure 46. Schematic representation of the relationship between performance effectiveness, 
etTort expenditure, performance efficiency and psychologicaI/energetical costs. 
It was assumed that sleep deprivation would reduce the level of finite effort reserves available, and 
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:herefore, limit the maximum level and duration of effort expenditure. However, the evidence from 
::hapters 4 and 5 was contradictory with respect to this claim and begs a number of questions 
~oncerning the assumption of absolute limits on effort expenditure based on physiological processes. 
This hypothesis is challenged by the alternative formulation of flexible limits on mental effort, based 
on psychological appraisal. 
The notion of flexible limits on mental effort originates from the model proposed by Kahneman (1973). 
This author hypothesised that the level of effort available for task performance was determined by the 
level of psychological arousal, i.e. extremes of fatigue and stress inhibited the availability of mental 
effort. This model was contradicted by the results of the driver impairment study (Chapter 5). Both 
groups deprived of sleep invested mental effort at a higher level than the fully-rested Control group. 
Therefore, an alternative formulation is proposed where the amount of effort available for performance 
is determined by efficiency, valence and self-belief. 
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that humans may only assess the level of effort 
expenditure/replenishment indirectly, via the cognitive-energetic assessment of behavioural efficiency. 
Those external sources offeedback related to performance effectiveness may indicate sub-optimal 
effort investment via increased errors or a rising perception of task demands. Internal feedback of 
psychological costs are analogous to the level of discomfort experienced by the individual, and as such, 
denote the need for rest and restitution. It is impossible for individuals to register cerebral metabolism, 
synaptic efficiency or any alternative manifestation of psychophysiological energy directly. Indirect 
and subjective processes of assessment may be the sole means of indexing remaining effort reserves. 
It is hypothesised that flexible limitations on effort investment originate within this subjective 
framework of appraisal. For example, individuals may be capable of tolerating a high degree of 
discomfort in combination with good or acceptable levels of performance. However, it is anticipated 
that few are capable of sustaining effort investment in combination with task failure. This distinction 
was apparent in the study of driver impairment between the two sleep-deprived groups (Chapter 5). 
Those who had no sleep prior to test session experienced increased errors (lane crossings) with high 
discomfort (high sleepiness and workload). On the other hand, the PartSD group tolerated a similar 
level of discomfort because task performance was successfully protected from the influence of 
sleepiness. Therefore, the PartSD group was capable of sustaining a higher level of mental effort 
investment that the FullSD group. The flexibility of effort limitations may permit performance beyond 
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what may be considered the 'normal' boundaries of endurance. 
The proposition that the finite limits of effort investment are flexible and based on subjective appraisal 
should not be taken too literally. This hypothesis does not imply individuals may invest effort for an 
unlimited periods, based solely on subjective processes of appraisal. The perspective adopted by the 
model of regulation is identical with action theory, i.e. that appraisal involves a comparison between a 
subjective standard and an external source offeedback (Frese & Zapf, 1994). Therefore, the capacity 
of the individual to resist the objective reality of poor performance or the subjective presence of 
discomfort is bounded. For example, if a sleep-deprived operator continues to perform beyond a 
certain period of time, the symptoms of sleepiness will impose themselves on behaviour, resulting in 
performance lapses and microsleeps (Dinges & Kribbs, 1991). These limitations will degrade 
efficiency as a means of preventing task continuation. Under extreme circumstances, these limitations 
may simply induce sleep, suspending behaviour and the process of efficiency assessment alike. 
It is proposed that flexible limitations (defined by efficiency, goals and self-belief) may account for the 
differences between high and low proficiency subjects within a sustained performance scenario 
(Chapter 4). Similarly, this process of subjective appraisal may have influenced the subjects' decision 
to discontinue the experimental task (Chapter 6). 
The finite limitations on effort investment are proposed to result from the presence and magnitude of 
external and internal sources of feedback. It is postulated that external and internal feedback cues 
function as respective activators or inhibitors of mental effort investment. For example, the perception 
of increased task demands, increased error frequency, goal valence may activate higher levels of mental 
effort investment. On the other hand, rising symptoms of fatigue, Distress or Worry and reduced task 
Engagement may inhibit effort investment. The dual-appraisal of efficiency represents the crucial 
antagonism between the need to protect performance and to desire to protect the self from increased or 
continued discomfort. 
The presence of activators or inhibitors influence the assessment of efficiency, however, both activators 
and inhibitors may also be associated with a degree of severity. Feedback from external sources may 
differ with respect to the severity associated with a particular cost, i.e. feedback indicating a slight error 
vs. catastrophic failure. A similar hierarchy of severity is apparent for those sources of internal 
feedback. For example, low levels of subjective fatigue and reduced task Engagement may be 
Page 203 
tolerated. However, if subjects experienced greater Distress (Matthews, et al., 1997), these symptoms 
~reduced affect and concentration, increased stress) indicates that the capability to perform is under 
threat. Furthermore, if the level of Worry increases - this may indicate that the individual is 
reassessing their self-knowledge with respect to personal qualities and capabilities (Matthews, et aI., 
1997). This latter category represents the most severe type of internal cost. This hypothesis was 
supported by the results of the final study (Chapter 7) and the hierarchical analysis of internal costs is 
based on the S-REF model (Wells & Matthews, 1994) (Section 2.2.5). 
A second question is raised concerning the process of cognitive-energetical appraisal of efficiency. 
Specifically, is external feedback appraised then buffered for subsequent comparison with internal 
feedback? Alternatively, does efficiency appraisal involve a simultaneous appraisal of both sources of 
feedback? According to Duval & Wicklund (1972), appraisal may oscillate between the self and 
external sources of information. However, this possibility was challenged by Wells & Matthews 
(1994), who postulated co-occurrence, i.e. a resource view wherein the distinction between self-focus 
and task-focus is determined by the relative proportion of attentional resources directed towards 
appraisal of the self and the task. An intermediate approach was suggested by Ingram (1990), who 
described internal/external appraisal in terms of the relative frequency and duration of self- and task-
directed appraisal, i.e. the proportion of simultaneous appraisals directed to the self and the task. The 
data from the second study (Chapter 4) indicated that proficient subjects tended to regulate effort as an 
exclusive response to either external or internal feedback sources. These data represent preliminary 
findings but suggest a serial, switching strategy for feedback appraisal along the lines suggested by 
Duval & Wicklund (1972) and Ingram (1990). This serial strategy is supported by the model of goal 
management described by Baars (1988). According to this framework, goals are managed in a serial, 
sequential fashion. Therefore, a switching strategy for the appraisal of efficiency may reflect the 
relative prioritisation of: (a) the goal to protect performance, and (b) the goal to protect the self (i.e. to 
reduce discomfort). 
One implication of the serial strategy is the prioritisation of external and internal feedback. A 
weighting of one direction of feedback at the expense of the other could lead to an incomplete or 
distorted assessment of task efficiency. For example, an individual who is highly motivated to succeed 
may prioritise external, performance-related feedback at the expense of internal symptoms of 
discomfort. This is a potentially hazardous strategy, as continued neglect of internal feedback may 
result in stress-related, health problems. At the other extreme, an individual who is prone to 
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Iypochondria may find it difficult to attend to external feedback, because he or she habitually 
lrioritises feedback from internal, physiological sources. 
[he original model of mental effort regulation (Figure 11) postulated a bi-directionallink between 
~xternal and internal feedback. This link permitted internal discomfort to accentuate task demands and 
vice versa. The purpose of linkage between external and internal feedback may represent a corrective 
mechanism to ameliorate the kinds of distortion of efficiency appraisal due to attentional prioritisation. 
Therefore, the work-obsessive described in the previous paragraph may be forced to acknowledge 
internal feedback, as it impacts on task performance. Similarly, the hypochondriac is informed that an 
acceleration of internal costs may be triggered by poor task performance. Support for this hypothesis 
was evident from the study of performance feedback (Chapter 6), when the presence offeedback 
appeared to raise awareness of subjective fatigue, which subsequently persuaded some subjects to 
discontinue the simulated journey. 
This discussion of hierarchical costs and feedback prioritisation is intended to illustrate the 
complexities associated with mental effort regulation. The key to effort regulation and the formulation 
of policy is awareness of cognitive-energetic efficiency at both the strategic and the procedural level. 
The experimental programme provided examples of unresponsive effort policy due to lack of 
awareness (Chapter 4), and insensitive effort policy due to the influence of biological stressors 
(Chapter 4 and 5). It is also hypothesised that a poor internal model of the task would lead to a 
distortion of external feedback, which may have a negative influence on effort policy (Section 2.2.4). 
It was evident from the experimental work that psychophysiological and SUbjective indices of mental 
effort tended to dissociate with time-on-task. When effort was invested in response to task demands 
(Chapter 7), both indicators were in agreement. However, it was apparent that subjects perceived their 
level of effort to increase in order to compensate for time-on-task, whilst the opposite trend was 
observed in the psychophysiological variable. Several explanations are possible: (a) 
psychophysiological effort is influenced by a physiological confound, which decreases with time-on-
task, (b) subjective assessment is insensitive to the gradual reduction of psychophysiological effort, or 
(c) subjective estimation reflects the intentions of the individual rather than the psychophysiological 
policy. The first hypothesis is rejected on the grounds that psychophysiological effort is associated 
with declining performance quality, which would be anticipated if the former acted as a modulator of 
performance. It is argued that both (b) and (c) provide explanations that are more satisfactory and may 
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function in conjunction. For example, if the gradual reduction of effort goes undetected and the 
subjective estimates of the individual only represent an attempt to mobilise effort, i.e. an intention 
rather than an eventuality. 
These findings caU into question the link between effort investment and volitional control (Section 1. I). 
Those subjects who participated in these experiments desired to increase mental effort, but failed to do 
so according to psychophysiological data. This dissociation between subjective intentions and effort 
policy may indicate that the latter is formulated on either an active or a passive basis. For example, if 
we become absorbed in a task, we may invest substantive effort in the absence of any conscious 
intention (Kahneman, 1973). This scenario could be termed passive effort investment. On the other 
hand, as observed in the experimental data, increased time-on-task may reduce the level of effort 
investment due to internal costs without conscious realisation. This policy may be termed passive 
effort conservation. The active versions of both policies are linked to volitional control, i.e. investment 
to protect performance, conservation to ameliorate costs (Hockey, 1993; Hockey, 1997). 
These theoretical topics provide an indication of the complexity associated with mental effort 
regulation and highlight certain limitations of the current document, which are described in the 
foUowing section. 
8.3 Limitations of the thesis 
The diverse nature of the thesis topic necessitated a broad approach to literature review and theory 
generation. This expansive approach coUated diverse areas of psychological research under a common 
conceptualisation, and as such, was associated with a number of short-comings. For instance, the 
model of effort regulation is based on the fundamental hypothesis that effort is capable of modulating 
the quality of performance. 
The model of mental effort regulation rests on a second fundamental hypothesis that mental effort is 
finite. The empirical work provided several examples of indirect support for this hypothesis, involving 
psychophysiological indices such as the O.IHz component of sinus arrhymia. However, these indirect 
sources of data fail to resolve the finite reserve or fuel metaphor for mental effort. A more direct 
source of potential data is represented by recent developments in brain imaging techniques (Haier, et 
a\., 1988), where cognitive functioning may be indexed directly to processes of cerebral metabolism in 
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the brain. It was not possible to address this issue oflinkage between cerebral metabolism, effort and 
performance in the current document. 
The proposed model of mental effort was relatively simple, involving dual feedback loops to a 2-level 
hierarchy for effort regulation. However, this simple model produced a high number of possible 
patterns and contingencies between performance, effort and costs (Figure 46). These patterns of 
association and dissociation may be characterised as qualitative states (Hockey & Hamilton, 1983). 
However, it is difficult to make concise predictions concerning performance quality based on various 
contingencies. Furthermore, it is possible to expand the framework for mental effort regulation to 
include other important constructs such as self-efficacy, goal standards, mental models of task etc. It is 
argued that the inclusion of such constructs would make the business of prediction more opaque. This 
is a problem which besets all psychological models to a greater or lesser extent, i.e. to be sufficiently 
inclusive yet capable of concise prediction concerning behaviour. In the case of mental effort, this 
tendency may be amplified by the diversity of psychological concepts associated with regulation and 
control. 
It may be argued that operationalisation of the model placed too much emphasis on subjective, self-
report techniques. For example, data from subjective questionnaires represented both processes of 
feedback and appraisal from external and internal sources. However, the effort regulation model 
emphasises the argument that both exist as separate stages in a single process. 
It was also apparent that the operationalisation of variables was highly selective. For example, 
psychophysiological mental effort was represented by the O.IHz component. However, there were 
other potential candidates such as pupil diameter (Beatty, 1982b) or the P300 component of an evoked 
cortical potential (Ullsperger, Metz, & Gille, 1988). The representation of psychophysiological effort 
via a single variable also disregards the possibility that mental effort may be sensitive to phasic or tonic 
variables or exist as a multidimensional construct. 
The empirical research performed within the thesis was limited in a number of important respects. In 
the first instance, the process effort regulation was presumed to reflect a large amount of individual 
differences, due to expectancies, past experience etc. It was expected that the study of such an 
idiosyncratic phenomenon would necessitate higher subject numbers than those reported in Chapter 4. 
Only the study of driving impairment (Chapter 5) approached the requisite number of subjects required 
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for that particular experimental design. This flaw was particularly apparent for the between-subjects 
designs used in Chapters 4 and 7. This deficit is underlined by a consideration of the number of 
different measures employed in each study. Mental effort regulation requires the inclusion of 
multidimensional measures, however, the net result of performing a large number of statistical tests 
over many measures with low N is to accelerate the risk of a Type I error. 
It is acknowledged that the thesis struggled to operationalise the dynamics of the effort regulation 
model with respects to statistical analysis. For example, a regression analysis of subjective/objective 
aspects of external/internal feedback would have been more appropriate than the correlational analysis 
to investigate cues for effort investment in Section 4. In addition, it was difficult to test those metrics 
that captured salient aspects of effort model for statistical significance, such as performance efficiency 
and the rate of gain of costs. 
Several limitations of the current work constitute potential avenues of investigation during future 
research which are described in the following section. 
8.4 Future research 
The empirical work described in previous chapters failed to provide systematic coverage of the 
hypotheses arising from the model of effort regulation (Figure 11). This inadequacy was due to the 
largely applied nature of the experimental work. It would have been ideal to have tested and 
established a model of effort regulation in the laboratory with simple tasks before proceeding to 
ecologically valid, complex tasks such as driving behaviour. Therefore, the future research proposed 
below is generally concerned with basic issues which passed unexplored in the current document. This 
strategy may be seen as a step backwards, however, it is argued that the model testing must develop 
from rigid control of experimental variables. Several lines of future research are described in the 
following sections. 
• The model of mental effort regulation is justified by an argument that effort represents a finite 
resource. This claim raises at least two problems: (a) work remains to be done concerning the 
operationalisation of the effort concept, and (b) the resulting effort variables must be studied within 
the realm of sustained performance where exhaustion of a finite resource remains a possibility. The 
former problem would constitute a doctorate thesis in its own right and was not the focus of the 
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current document. It is postulated that finite boundaries on effort investment will be physiological 
in nature. Therefore, it is important to wed existing experimental work on effort operationalisation 
using heart rate variability, pupilometry etc. with contemporary advances in brain imaging and the 
measurement of cerebral metabolism. It seems reasonable to propose task-related effort investment 
represented by psychophysiology should have a relationship with an index of cerebral metabolism 
such as glucose uptake or blood flow. This relationship could be studied by adopting a similar 
design to that used in experiment 4 (Chapter 7), as an interaction between task demand and time-
on-task. 
• A second methodological point concerns the operationalisation of effort as heart rate variability used 
throughout the experimental work. As stated earlier, psychophysiology was not the focus for the 
current thesis, however, a range of candidate variables such as P300 and pupil diameter was also 
available. The inclusion of alternative indices of mental effort may have improved the sensitivity of 
psychophysiological effort. In addition, it may be useful to consider a multiple-resource conception 
of mental effort composed of 'visual effort' (pupilometry) and 'central processing' effort (P300). 
This would permit performance efficiency to be characterised with reference to more than one 
psychophysiological index. For example, the quantification of performance efficiency for a visual 
RT task shown in Figure 42 and Figure 43 could use pupilometry rather than O.lHz 
• The initial laboratory study focused on individual differences as categorised by a post-hoc division 
based on task performance. This analysis indicated that poor performance resulted from high effort 
investment coupled with insensitive regulation. This line of investigation warranted further 
experimentation, but limited subject numbers in the following three studies curtailed this possibility. 
This was unfortunate because the model of effort regulation may benefit from the use of individual 
differences as an experimental manipulation. For example, it may be argued that neurotic 
individuals have a heightened awareness of energetical costs, and therefore regulate effort in line 
with internal as opposed to external feedback. Similarly, individuals with high self efficacy are 
problem/task-oriented and may exhibit the opposite bias during effort regulation. This line of 
investigation may have implications for the study of occupational stress. 
• The driving impairment study (Chapter 5) suggested that intoxicated subjects performed poorly 
because they were less sensitive to external feedback of error. This hypothesis could be tested by 
providing intoxicated subjects with performance feedback as used in Chapter 6, to investigate if this 
manipulation resulted in an improvement of performance effectiveness and an increased awareness 
of internal costs. 
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• The final study described in Chapter 7 manipulated task demand and temporal schedule in order to 
influence the relative rates of effort expenditure and replenishment. This methodology could be 
replicated by varying the levels of demand, temporal scheduling and time-on-task, in order to 
investigate the adaptability of effort policy. If a larger range of test conditions could be generated, it 
may be possible to qualify various stages of effort policy, from high efficiency to extreme 
inefficiency, with respect to performance, psychophysiology and subjective data. 
• The subjects who participated in the study of demand and time-on-task (Chapter 7) received full 
instructions prior to performance, concerning the duration and level of demand they would 
experience during the experimental session. It would be interesting to investigate how effort policy 
is influenced by expectations by not providing information on the task schedule prior to 
performance. It would be anticipated that subjects may be less inclined to sustain effort investment 
in the face of uncertainty. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
Evidence from literature review and empirical study was gathered to support the hypothesis that mental 
effort is a significant construct for sustained, perceptual-motor performance. It is concluded that 
mental effort has an important theoretical position, as it constitutes a suitable candidate to unite 
cognitive and energetical (i.e. biological) traditions within psychology. In addition, it was argued that 
mental effort was relevant for applied research related to work/rest duration and safety-critical 
performance. 
[t was postulated that mental effort may modulate perceptual-motor performance via one of two routes: 
indirectly via top-down strategic adjustments of goal-setting (i.e. goal aspiration) or directly by 
responding to bottom-up discrepancy detection at the procedural level of perceptual-motor 
performance. In the former case, the investment of mental effort is concerned with those processes of 
decision-making, which exert a top-down influence on actual behaviour, i.e. goal-setting. The latter 
case of procedural effort investment involves the direct modulation of cognitive processes within the 
perceptual-motor chain. The precise foundations of mental effort could not be defined on the basis of 
the thesis. It is speculated that mental effort is related to cerebral metabolism at the physiological level 
iilld controlled processing at the psychological level. 
The regulation of mental effort is based on a cognitive-energetical assessment of behavioural 
efficiency, i.e. an dual appraisal of performance quality and energetical costs. This act of appraisal is 
accomplished with reference to external feedback from task performance and internal feedback from 
the self It should be noted that efficiency appraisal is characterised as a subjective assessment and 
therefore, is prone to bias and distortion from a variety of sources. 
The formulation of effort policy is based on the appraisal of cognitive-energetical efficiency and 
represents various modes of cognitive-energetical coping. If efficiency is sub-optimal due to poor task 
performance, effort may be invested via either a strategic or procedural route to improve performance. 
[f energetical costs are high due to discomfort, the individual may actively reduce effort investment to 
reduce the intensity of energetical costs. 
[t was concluded that the period of maximum effort investment was constrained by flexible 
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psychological limitations, operating within the boundaries of physiological limitations. Therefore, the 
amount of effort reserves which could be made available for performance were determined by 
efficiency and goal-setting operating within the context of self-belief and self-knowledge. 
The empirical research supported a number of hypotheses related to mental effort regulation, these are 
listed as follows: 
• A reduction of effort expenditure is often associated with declining performance effectiveness. 
• The rate of effort expenditure determines the maximum duration that error-free performance may be 
sustained. 
• The level of performance efficiency (ratio of mental effort to performance) determines the rate of 
effort expenditure 
• As effort reserves are expended, a number of psychological costs (e.g. task stress) and latent 
decrements (e.g. changes in performance quality) may be apparent 
• The negative consequences of effort expenditure (i.e. degraded performance efficiency, accelerated 
costs or decrements) may be counteracted by withdrawal from task activity and restitution 
• The presence of psychological costs have the potential to degrade performance quality 
• If costs are present, additional effort investment is required to protect performance, which degrades 
performance efficiency and increases effort expenditure. 
• The effort economy (physiological limitations on effort expenditure) are appraised via self-
assessment of external performance and internal state 
The awareness of performance feedback and internal feedback was essential for efficient effort 
regulation. Experimental findings indicated that sleep deprivation and alcohol reduced awareness of 
internaUexternal feedback, which affected effort policy and the quality of performance. In addition, the 
provision of performance feedback was found to sustain performance quality without increasing the 
level of effort expenditure. This finding illustrated the importance of external feedback as a cue for 
procedural effort investment. 
The thesis model was constructed based on three related hypotheses (Section 1.1). The postulation of 
strategic and procedural effort within a regulatory framework represented an attempt to reconcile these 
hypotheses within a unified framework. Based on this research, it is concluded that the relationship 
between effort and performance effectiveness was ambiguous (hypothesis 1). The investment of 
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mental effort may only improve performance if it is expended at a requisite level and directed to an 
appropriate site of action. Mental effort may be invested in response to other variables, such as 
psychological costs (hypothesis 2). It is concluded that costs represent an important source of internal 
feedback, capable of hindering performance at a high levels and increasing the requisite level of mental 
effort investment). It was hypothesised that an individual may decide whether or not to continue task 
performance on the basis of external feedback in combination with the frequency and severity of 
psychological costs. This chain of activity represents the final link between performance, costs and 
volitional activity (hypothesis 3). 
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